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Abstract
In my dissertation I explore how personal networks aect rms’ nancial decisions. In the
rst essay, I study how social connections among divisional managers aect the capital allocation
to divisions in diversied conglomerates. In contrast to the previous studies, I focus on the
horizontal connections or connections formed among managers of the same level of corporate
hierarchy. I show that connections among divisional managers lead to higher sensitivity of seg-
ment capital spending to segment’s growth opportunities, higher rm-level allocation eciency
and higher rm value. Additionally, rms tend to strategically assign better-connected managers
to these segments, and connections help to reduce internal information asymmetry. The results
are consistent with the idea that connections facilitate interdivisional cooperation and better
alignment of divisional and rm’s incentives.
In the second essay, I examine capital structure decisions of suppliers with social connec-
tions to major customers, which invest in relation-specic assets. Suppliers connected to major
customers with relation-specic assets have higher debt ratios. The eect is more pronounced
when intensity and duration of business relationship is high, and when information asymmetry
between parties is high. In addition, building up debt helps suppliers to reduce underleverage
and move faster toward target leverage ratios. Overall, the results are consistent with the view
that connections help to strengthen implicit contracts through establishing trust between trading
parties.
In the third essay, I study the eect of divisional manager-CEO social connections on the
scale and success of corporate innovation activities. Divisional managers who previously worked
or studied with CEO le a greater number of patents during their tenure at the segment. These
patents receive more citations in future and represent a greater scientic and economic value.
These ndings can imply that socials connections help to mitigate adverse selection problems
associated with R&D investments.
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CHAPTER 1: DIVISIONAL MANAGER CONNECTEDNESS AND CAPITAL ALLOCA-
TION EFFICIENCY
1 Abstract
Social connections among divisional managers are associated with capital allocation improve-
ments in S&P500 industrial conglomerates. Using plausibly exogenous changes in connections
due to deaths and retirements of managers at the sample rms and at other local rms for
identication, we show that connections among divisional managers lead to higher sensitivity
of segment capital spending to segment’s growth opportunities, higher rm-level allocation e-
ciency and higher rm value. Connections to peers benet the rm in two possible ways. First,
connections help to secure more funds to segments with better prospects, especially as rms tend
to strategically assign better-connected managers to these segments. Second, connections help to
reduce internal information asymmetry. Ultimately, the results of this study support the idea that
connections help to mitigate misallocation of funds by facilitating interdivisional cooperation and
better alignment of divisional and rm’s incentives. The conclusions hold after accounting for
the eects of manager’s human capital, reverse causality, connections to CEO or connections to
other executives of public and private companies.
2 Introduction
The growing body of research has been exploring the impact of social connections on capital
allocation process in multidivisional rms. Social connections can create social and political
forces that aect the way the capital is allocated across divisions (e.g. Xuan (2009), Gaspar
and Massa (2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2013), Glaser, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Sautner (2013)).
However, numerous papers focus on vertical connections or social connections that exist between
higher- and lower-ranking managers in the corporate hierarchy, such as connections between
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divisional managers and CEO. The novelty of our paper is the focus on horizontal connections or
connections among managers of the same level of hierarchy. Diversied conglomerates represent
an ideal setting to study the eect of horizontal connections, because each divisional manager
has likely an equal authority over investment decisions in his/her division.
In this paper, we examine the potential impact of horizontal (bilateral) connections among
divisional managers on the capital allocation decisions inside the conglomerates. There can
be both positive and negative causal relations between connections and rm value. We might
observe the positive eect if horizontal connections provide incentives to engage in coopera-
tive behavior through creating trust and mutual cooperation among divisional managers. The
negative eect can emerge if connections facilitate the collusion of divisional managers in ex-
tracting the resources from the conglomerate. For example, connected managers can more easily
over-report both their eort and the investment opportunities of their segments. Our results
suggest that social connections among divisional managers have a strong positive eect both on
the eciency of capital allocation and on the rm value of conglomerates. We also explore the
channels through which connections among divisional managers within rm positively aect the
eciency of capital allocation and rm value.
We build on the vast literature in sociology and economics showing that connections can
create trust and promote cooperation between connected individuals (e.g. Coleman (1988), Na-
hapiet and Ghosal (1998), Woolcock (1998), Putnam (2000), Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl
(2009)). The underlying idea of this stream of research is that social networks create trust, because
connections serve as a social collateral (or “credit slip”), and the possibility of losing valuable ties
(friendships) secures informal transactions just as physical collateral secures borrowing-lending
transactions. As Coleman (1988) and Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2009) emphasize
the importance of closed networks in facilitating cooperation, the tight networks of divisional
managers with mutual direct connections to each other are likely to strengthen cooperation
between them. In the context of internal capital markets, where capital markets are compet-
itive (Williamson (1975)), divisional managers tend to be self-interested (Milgrom (1988)), and
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decisions over allocation of funds ex ante are not contractible and subject to informal judgment
(Grossman and Hart (1986), Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015)), trust and mutual cooperation
become important for ecient allocation of funds across divisions.1 We propose that connections
among divisional managers lead to better alignment of divisional and rm’s incentives and goals
through creating trust and mutual cooperation.
There are at least three mechanisms, which can explain the impact of connections on
the capital allocation eciency. The rst mechanism, which we refer to as ecient bargaining
hypothesis, is that horizontal connections correct ineciencies in capital allocation through more
ecient bargaining over distribution of investment funds across divisions. For example, the
literature on internal capital markets has discussed inecient capital allocation in a form of
cross-subsidization, when strong divisions end up subsidizing weak ones (e.g. Scharfstein and
Stein (2000)). This, in turn, creates incentives for the strong divisions to engage in “defensive”
investment to protect their funds from poaching by other divisions. To avoid unproductive
defensive investments, headquarters of conglomerates tend to underinvest in segments with high
investment opportunities (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). If horizontal connections among
divisional managers create networks of “friends,” then trust and higher likelihood of mutual
cooperation will reduce the allocation ineciencies. The weaker division is less likely to demand
transfers, and the stronger division’s manager is also less likely to engage in defensive investment,
because she knows her division’s surplus will not be poached by friends. Hence, connections will
lead to more ecient allocation of funds.
The second mechanism, which we label as information asymmetry hypothesis, is that the
horizontal connections help to reduce internal information asymmetry between headquarters and
divisional managers.2 When top managers are better informed about the segments’ performance,
1The allocation of funds can not be contracted (Grossman and Hart (1986)), so the decisions over funds allocation
is a result of bargaining between divisions and headquarters (Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015)).
2Information asymmetry between headquarters and divisions has been documented by nancial literature as a
known factor leading to ineciency and nancial losses. For example, Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue
that information asymmetry between CEO and divisional managers and competition for internal resources may lead
to managers’ misreporting, when they emphasize their own division advantages and exaggerate the disadvantages
of other divisions. This leads to distorted capital allocation (Harris and Raviv (1996)).
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the nancing they provide should more likely reect segments’ investment opportunities. If con-
nections create networks of friends and facilitate better alignment of divisional and rm’s goals,
then better connected teams of divisional managers will report more accurately to headquarters.3
The costs of misreporting include the damage to potentially valuable connections and friendships.
In addition, the network itself can put a pressure on the person who would like to deviate from the
“optimal information transfer” strategy by punishing negative behavior (e.g. Boot, Greenbaum
and Thakor (1993), Brass and Labianca (2006)). Richer information provided to headquarters
implies lower internal information asymmetry, improved allocation eciency and higher rm
value (Billett, Chen, Martin and Wang (2014)).
The third mechanism, which we denote individual inuence hypothesis, is that relatively
more connected divisional managers can command greater shares of capital spending alloca-
tions regardless of their segments’ growth opportunities. Social science research has long as-
sociated overall within-group connectedness with concepts of individual inuence and power
(e.g. Mizruchi and Potts (1998), Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998)). The investment transfers toward
the more connected – and more inuential – divisional managers may be the consequence of
headquarters’ favoritism (say, in order to exploit private benets due to being associated with
inuential divisional managers). Then, the extra investment allocations exacerbate the ine-
ciencies of internal capital markets, and should have negative eect on rm value (Scharfstein
and Stein (2000), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)).
To study how connections among divisional managers aect the eciency of capital alloca-
tion, we hand-collected data on 765 divisional managers from a random sample of 100 industrial
S&P500 conglomerates from 2006 to 2013. We identify divisional managers using information
from companies’ annual reports, proxy statements, press releases and BoardEx. We dene two
divisional managers as being connected if they studied at the same academic institution or worked
in the same organization at a same time in the past. Requiring time overlap in measuring con-
3It is possible that if connections facilitate better alignment of only divisional, but not the rm’s goals, then
better connected teams of divisional managers will communicate across divisions, but not toward headquarters.
This would lead to the collusion against the headquarters, higher internal information asymmetry and lower rm
value. However, we do not nd any empirical evidence for such collusion.
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nections allows us to better account for actual interaction between two people in the past. The
majority of connections are employment-based, and such connections are more frequent than
other connection types. Further, employment-based connections are likely to build up common
experiences and shape long-term reputations in a corporate environment.
Our main results are as follows. After controlling for various segment and manager char-
acteristics (including managers’ ability and formal power) and rm xed eects, we nd that
bilateral connections among divisional managers are a relevant factor for allocation of capital.
Connections lead to economically sizeable improvements in segment allocation eciency. When
segment growth opportunities (measured by segment’s Tobin’s Q) move from 25th to 75th sample
percentile, the segment capital spending remains virtually constant for unconnected segments.
However, each additional social connection of a particular divisional manager is associated with
9.9% more capital allocated to the division, or $7.7 million in extra annual capital expenditure,
on average. The increased sensitivity of capital spending leads to improvements in rm-level
allocation eciency, and, ultimately, to higher rm values. When the overall rm connectedness
– measured by the weighted connections of all rm’s segments – changes from 25th to 75th
sample percentile, the rm’s excess value over the hypothetical value of its stand-alone segments
improves by 10.6%, on average.
However, empirical estimation of the eect of social connections on allocation eciency
and rm value poses an identication challenge, because social connections are endogenous.
To address this challenge, we use two approaches. The rst approach exploits the plausibly
exogenous variation in social connections due to deaths and retirements of connected divisional
managers unrelated to recent rm performance (Fracassi and Tate (2012)). For this subset of
plausibly exogenous managers’ turnovers, we use estimation in rst dierences to eliminate all
unobserved rm-level, segment-level and manager characteristics that aect the allocation of
funds to segments. We show that increase in the manager’s social connections corresponds to an
increase in the sensitivity of capital expenditures to opportunities, and vice versa.
In the second approach for identication we use two instrumental variables for social con-
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nections. The rst instrument again relies on plausibly exogenous changes in social connections
due to deaths and retirements of connected divisional managers. The second instrument uses the
unexpected changes in social connections due to deaths and retirements of executives at other
local rms. This instrument is motivated by the work of Karolyi (2018), who shows that deaths
and retirements at other rms signicantly increase the probability of turnover in the sample
rm due to changes in supply-demand in the market for executives. Both instruments are likely
to satisfy the exclusion restriction because they are plausibly independent from unobserved rm
and personal characteristics.
In two stages least squares estimation we use instrumental variables in combination with
rm xed eects, allowing us to identify the causal eect of social connections only through
within-rm changes in social connections due to plausibly exogenous departures of connected
managers. After instrumenting social connections the signicant positive eect of connections
on allocation eciency and rm value remains statistically signicant at 5% level.
Our analysis provides support for two possible mechanisms that potentially can explain
the positive eect of social connections on allocation eciency and rm value. Specically,
consistent with the ecient bargaining hypothesis, we show that improvement in rm value is
especially strong in at rms with diverse investment opportunities (as measured by Rajan, Servaes
and Zingales (2000)’s Segment Diversity), suggesting that connections mitigate investment inef-
ciencies by reducing internal power struggles for resources. We provide further evidence that
rms may pursue policies allowing strategic matching of well-connected managers into segments
with the superior investment opportunities. Amid frequent rotation of managers across segments,
we show that managers are less likely to leave the segment with high growth opportunities
(measured by Tobin’s Q) if they are highly connected.4
Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, we provide evidence that social
4The frequent rotation of managers across rm segments (about 35% of the managers’ sample turnovers
represents within company re-assignments) suggests some conglomerates may have a rotation policy on a regular
basis. In fact, Stein (2003) states that “..General Electric, which is widely viewed to be one of the most successful
diversied conglomerates .. apparently follows a policy of rotating its senior managers across dierent divisions on
a regular basis".
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connections between divisional managers reduce internal information asymmetry in the com-
pany. We follow the approach of Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and Chen, Martin, Wang, Roy-
chowdhury and Billett (2016) and measure internal information asymmetry between divisional
managers and top corporate managers as the dierence in their respective trading prots on their
own company’s stock. We nd that rms with better connected teams of divisional managers
demonstrate lower dierence in trading prots between divisional and top managers, or lower
internal information asymmetry.
We do not nd support for the individual inuence hypothesis. In multivariate tests social
connections per se are not related to divisional capital allocation. We also nd that rm-level
connectedness benets rm value, what contradicts with the predictions of this hypothesis.
Our results are robust to consideration of numerous alternative explanations and dierent
denitions of connections. Specically, we study the possibility that managers who receive more
funds in the segments with ample growth opportunities end up developing more connections
among their peers. In this case, the eect of connections on capital allocation sensitivity would
be also positive, but the direction of the eect would be reverse. We are able to eliminate this
reverse causality explanation by showing that our results remain unaected when considering
only connections formed ve years before the manager starts his tenure in the current position as
a divisional manager. Another possibility is that better connected managers could be connected
to CEO, and connections to CEO, not to other divisional managers could drive our results. We
show that our results do not change if we additionally control for CEO connections. Additionally,
our conclusions do not change if we account for the connections of divisional managers to other
executives of public and private companies.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to study the eects of horizontal
connections among divisional managers on the eciency of internal capital markets. Numer-
ous papers focus on vertical connections between divisional managers and CEO (Xuan (2009),
Gaspar and Massa (2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2013), Glaser, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Sautner
(2013)). For example, Xuan (2009) questions if CEO allocates more capital to the division, which
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he previously operated, and nds the opposite - the CEO will strategically favor unconnected
divisions, because CEO has lower information about businesses in these divisions. Duchin and
Sosyura (2013) continue the “information asymmetry” story and nd that connections to CEO
can improve rm value if they mitigate information asymmetry intrinsic to conglomerates. The
authors nd support for the positive role of connections as a channel of information transfer
documented in many studies (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008, 2010), Engelberg, Gao, and
Parsons (2012)). Gaspar and Massa (2011) nd support for the role of CEO-manager connections
as a trust-inducing mechanism and show that better connected managers are associated with
improved allocation eciency and increased rm value, when better connected managers preside
over segments with high growth opportunities. We complement these ndings by showing that
allocation eciency and rm value improve when managers have connections to their peers, not
just connections to CEO.
Ultimately, our paper contributes to the large stream of literature dealing with the debate
over the value-increasing (“bright side” view) vs. value-destroying (“dark side” view) eects of
internal capital markets.5 In addition, our paper is related to the studies about the factors that
aect the eciency of capital allocation. Wulf (2002, 2009) shows that rm-level incentive pay (i.e.
equity) is one of the mechanisms to mitigate the ineciencies of capital allocation. Our evidence
complements these ndings and is consistent with social connections providing non-monetary
incentives in mitigating capital allocation ineciencies.
5Integration of several businesses under one roof allows to solve underinvestment problem through ability to
borrow more than single-segment rms (Lewellen (1971)) or, holding the amount of available funds constant, does
a better job in nancing most protable projects (“bright side” view), because CEOs have incentive to engage in
value-enhancing allocations (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Li and Li (1996), Stein (1997), Matsusaka and
Nanda (2002), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)). On the other hand, if divisional managers engage in rent-seeking
behavior (“dark-side” view), they will try to use their bargaining power to get from CEO more compensation and
resources in form of allocations to their divisions (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales
(2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Wulf (2009)).
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3 Sample and Data
3.1 Firms and Segments
We select all the companies that enter S&P500 for one or more years within our sample period
of 2006-2013. We then exclude nancial and utilities companies leaving 507 companies. We next
require that conglomerates operate in industrial segments, that segments have non-missing SIC
values, that rms have at least 2 business segments with non-missing values for segment assets
and segment capital expenditures, and that the sum of segment sales does not deviate more than
5% from the total rm sales. These lters produce 237 rms. We then randomly select 100 rms
out of those 237 rms with information for all divisional managers for these rms. If a rm doesn’t
provide information on all divisional managers, we replace the rm with another rm from our
sample of multisegment rms. To avoid the reduction of the sample size due to missing nancial
data, we additionally hand-collect missing nancial data (operating prot and segment assets)
from 10-K annual reports for our sample of rms with information about divisional managers.
We collect information on 765 divisional managers, but our nal sample utilized in regressions
consists of 2008 division-year-observations, which cover 620 divisional managers, 431 unique
divisions and 100 companies.6
We report summary statistics on rms and segments in our sample in Panel A Table 1. An
average conglomerate has book assets valued at $31.4 billion, has Tobin’s Q of 1.56, operates in
4.12 business segments and has annual capital expenditures of 4.1% of book assets.
6In unreported analysis we compare our sample to all other industrial conglomerates in the S&P500 index (that
are excluded by sample lters) across the following measures: rm size (natural logarithm of total assets), book-to-
market, investment (rm capital expenditures scales by total assets), protability (return on assets), rm cash ow
(cash ow scaled by total assets). The comparison shows that there are no signicant dierences between our sample
and other industrial conglomerates (which are included in S&P500) across these measures. One notable exception
is the rm size – specically, the average rm in our sample is larger than other conglomerates. This nding is
not surprising, since larger rms provide more information both for segment nancials and for divisional managers.
Even though our sample constitutes roughly one third of all S&P500 industrial conglomerates, the rms in our sample
represent 44% of book assets and 40% of market equity of all S&P500 industrial conglomerates.
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3.2 Capital Allocation
We use three common measures of capital allocation between segments: (1) capital expenditures;
(2) industry-adjusted capital expenditures and (3) industry-rm-adjusted capital expenditures.
All variables are dened in the Appendix A. We obtain data on segments’ capital expenditures
and book assets from the Compustat segments database.
The rst measure, segment capital expenditures (CAPEX), is dened as annual amount of
divisional capital expenditures divided by book assets. Table 1 shows that the average segment
capital expenditures is $286 million, what represents 5.1% of segment book assets.
The second measure that we use is industry-adjusted capital expenditures (IA CAPEX),
which is dened as the dierence between the segment capital expenditures (divided by book
assets) and median capital expenditure ratio for the industry in which the division operates (as
measured by median capital expenditures of single-segment rms with the same two-digit SIC
code). The adjustment for industry median capital expenditures helps to control for scale and
capital intensity of dierent industries, since some industries invest more than others.
The third measure that we use is the industry-rm-adjusted capital expenditures (IFACAPEX)
or “segment transfer” as in Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), which is the industry-adjusted
capital expenditures additionally adjusted for average rm capital expenditures. Firm-level ad-
justment allows to account of over- and under-investment on a rm level. As shown in Table 1
the values of industry-adjusted and industry-rm-adjusted measures are very small (the medians
values are in fact close to zero), but display a considerable variance.
3.3 Divisional Managers
Our sample of divisional managers consists of 765 people. To identify the divisional manager
responsible for the business segment, we follow the procedure of data collecting described in
Duchin and Sosyura (2013). We read biographical histories of the rm’s executives in the annual
reports (both types of reports - “for investors” and 10-Ks) and proxy statements. In addition to
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these sources we use biographical information in BoardEx database and other publicly available
sources of information: Bloomberg Executive directory, Reuters and companies press releases.
Divisional managers typically hold the following titles: “Executive Vice President”, “Senior Vice
President”, “Divisional President” or “Chief Executive Ocer” (of the corresponding subsidiary).
We select only the managers who are responsible for a particular business segment. We disregard
managers who are responsible for a functional area across all or many segments (such as senior
vice president of nance, senior vice president of marketing), because it is not possible to establish
a clear match between these managers and particular business segments.
In matching managers to segments we consider only the highest-level executive responsible
for a business segment in a given period of time. In some cases the segment names in Compustat
and in annual reports disagree. For example, the segments reported by Compustat are sometimes
more aggregated than divisions reported in the annual report. In this situation, we match the
segment with the highest-level manager among all the managers responsible for the segment as
reported by Compustat. In addition, we collect starting and ending dates of the managers’ tenure
in the position. If a segment changes its manager during the scal year we assign both old and new
managers to the segment in this year. If several managers are assigned to a particular segment, in
our empirical tests we use the maximum number of connections across all the divisional managers
assigned to the particular segment.7
Panel B of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the sample of divisional managers.
The average tenure in the company is approximately 14 years, the average tenure at segment is 6
years, and the average age of the divisional manager is 53 years. The overwhelming majority of
the managers are males. About half of the managers have tenure more than 10 years, and about
one fth of the managers have graduated from universities of Ivy League.
7Our results are robust if we use the average number of connections across all the divisional managers assigned
to the particular segment.
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3.4 Social Connections
We consider two managers to be socially connected if at one moment in their past they par-
ticipated in the same organization. In our approach of measuring connections we require that
participation in the same organization has time overlaps. This stricter approach in measuring
connections allows us to better account for actual interaction between two people in the past.
Arguably, just having the same organization in their CV’s does not guarantee that two managers
were at one place in any period of time in the past.
We obtain data on social connections from the BoardEx database. BoardEx provides infor-
mation on pairwise connections, based on their educational, employment and non-professional
background. For each pair of people we have dates of their overlap in the same organization,
type of organization and the persons’ roles in that organization during the connection period.
We apply the following lters to compute the connections. First, we count only one earliest
connection between two managers irrespective of when and where it was established, and drop
all observations that represent duplicate connections between the same pair of managers but
dier in dates of intersection (for example, “promotions” within the same organization), or in
type of connected organization (university or employer). Second, we include only connections
formed at least 2 years before the year of interest.8 Third, we drop the connections made during
employment in the current company in the executive roles. Using the connections remaining
after these lters, we compute the number of pairwise connections the divisional manager has
with other divisional managers of a company for a given year.
As shown in Panel B of Table 1, 55% of our sample divisional managers can be connected
through working in a listed company, 9% had prior employment in a same private company,
and 0.5% of the managers studied at the same university at the same time. In our subsequent
analysis, we count only one connection per pair – that is, we consider two people connected
once any type of a connection exists between them. Once we disregard the overlaps, 63% of our
8In robustness tests, we show that our results hold if we keep only connections established 5 years before the
arrival of the manager at the segment of interest.
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managers are connected. The majority of connections are employment-based connections rather
than social connections coming from sharing the common educational or social backgrounds.
Such employment-based connections are more frequent than other connection types. Further,
employment-based connections are likely to build up common experiences and shape long-term
reputations in a corporate environment.
In our empirical tests we use four measures of social connections. The rst measure,
Segment Connections, is the absolute number of social connections of a divisional manager in
a given rm-year. The second measure, Average Segment Connections, is the sum of Segment
Connections of divisional managers across all segments scaled by a number of business seg-
ments in the given rm-year. As all segments in a given rm-year are assigned the same value
of Average Segment Connections, this measure helps to identify rms, in which the majority
of managers are connected among each other. It is possible that even the segments with low
Segment Connections can benet from being in a high-connected company. The third measure,
Asset-weighted Segment Connections is the asset-weighted value of Segment Connections in a
given rm-year. The variable captures similar concept as Average Segment Connections, but
takes the segment size into consideration. The fourth measure, High- (Low-) Connected Firm
is an indicator that equals one, and zero otherwise, if the Average Segment Connections are
above (below) the sample median. This variable will allow us to assess the economic signicance
of dierences between well-connected and less-connected rms, as opposed to the impact of
individual connections. Panel C shows that a mean [median] divisional manager possesses 1.37
[1.00] Segment Connections in a given rm-year. Managers in a given rm also have 1.36 [1.00]
mean [median] Average Segment Connections in a given year. Smaller segments appear to
be associated with better-connected managers, as the mean [median] Asset-weighted Segment
Connections are 1.04 [0.71], i.e. less than the corresponding Average Segment Connections
statistics. All connection variables in Panel C of Table 1 display considerable variance around
their mean values.
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3.5 Additional Variables
In our regressions we include the standard control variables used in the literature. Following Shin
and Stulz (1998), we control for the Tobin’s Q in the segment’s two-digit SIC industry. Following
the stream of research of determinants of the capital allocation inside the rm, we additionally
control for Segment Cash Flow (dened as sum of operating prots and depreciation divided by
segment assets), Segment Size (natural logarithm of segment assets), Segment Relative Size (ratio
of segment assets to rm assets) and CEO Ownership (percent of the rm’s outstanding stock hold
by CEO) in the rm. We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the
eect of outliers. In addition, to mitigate the eect multicollinearity between variables due to
dierent units of measurement, we standardize all variables.
We control for manager ability and formal inuence in order to isolate these two eects
from the role of manager’s connections. We utilize two proxies for manager ability developed
by Duchin and Sosyura (2013). The rst proxy is the Relative ROA, which reects the manager’s
relative performance and is computed as the dierence between the industry-adjusted ROA of
the manager’s division and the average industry-adjusted ROA of remaining divisions in a rm.9
The second proxy for ability and skill is the dummy variable that indicates the attendance of the
Ivy League university. We utilize the following proxies for divisional manager’s formal inuence
within rm: board membership (Board Member), status as one of the rm’s top-paid executives
listed on Execucomp (High Salary), tenure at rm greater than 10 years (Long Tenure) and se-
niority status (Senior Title). Using similar proxies, McNeil and Smyth (2009) nd that manager’s
formal inuence distorts capital allocation eciency, because more powerful managers obtain
more capital. In addition, we add retirement age indicator (Retirement Age), which captures the
possible changes in manager’s investment behavior when he is close to the retirement (Jenter
and Lewellen (2015)).
9Due to high correlation of this variable with Segment Cash Flow variable, we orthogonalize these variables.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Social Connections and Segment-Level Eciency of Capital Allocation
4.1.1 Baseline Results: Cross-Sectional Analysis
We begin our analysis by reporting the univariate results on the relation between the measures of
segment capital expenditures and the investment opportunities of segments. We compare these
relationships between high- and low-connected segments. Panel A of Table 2 shows tests of
dierences in three measures of capital expenditures comparing the segments above or below the
sample median in investment opportunities. We show that in the subsample of high-connected
managers, segments with high (above-median) investment opportunities receive consistently
more capital than segments with low (below-median) investment opportunities. The dierences
between these two groups of segments are highly statistically signicant for all three measures
of capital allocation. In contrast, in segments led by low-connected managers we do not observe
signicant dierences in capital allocation between segments with high and low investment
opportunities. These ndings are consistent with our ecient bargaining hypothesis that suggests
horizontal connections are associated with capital optimally owing primarily to segments with
good growth opportunities.10
Interestingly, in Panel B, we observe that better connected managers indeed get more capital
for the segments they operate irrespective to the investment opportunities of these segments.
While this result could support our individual inuence hypothesis stating that better connected
managers could attract more investment funds regardless of segment investment opportunities,
no denite inferences can be drawn from this relation. It is possible that connectedness of
10Panel A also shows that segments with high-connected managers tend to invest signicantly more (regardless
of growth opportunities) compared to the investment by segments with low-connected managers. In unreported
analysis, we nd that while rm values are negatively aected by high levels of capital (over)investment in rms
with low connectedness among managers, high capital spending does not hurt corporate value in high-connected
rms – again consistent with the ecient bargaining hypothesis. In addition, in subsequent analysis in this paper
(starting with Table 3), we specically control for segment- and rm-related determinants of capital spending, in
addition to managerial connectedness.
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divisional managers and the segment growth opportunities are related - in this case the capital
expenditure dierences may result from diverse growth opportunities and not from the eect of
connections per se. Consequently, in order to fully capture the determinants of segment capital
spending, we have to turn to multivariate analysis.
We rst study the relation between social connections and the sensitivity of a rm capital
expenditures to investment opportunities. Measuring the sensitivity of investment to segment
investment opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is a common approach in evaluating in-
vestment eciency in literature (e.g., Shin and Stulz (1998), Billett and Mauer (2003), Ozbas and
Scharfstein (2009)). We use the following baseline regression model:
Iivt = β1Connectionsivt + β2Tobin’s Qivt + β3Connectionsivt × Tobin’s Qivt +Xivtγ + λv + µt + ivt (1)
For rm v the dependent variable Iivt is one of the measures of segment i capital expendi-
tures in the scal year t, Connectionsivt is one of the measures of social connections of segment
i formed in the past, Tobin’s Qivt denotes segment i Tobin’s Q, measured at the beginning of the
scal year t, Xivt - vector of segment-level controls. We include in the regressions rm xed
eects λv to isolate within-rm variation and year xed eects µt to account for common time
trends in capital allocation. Our main variable of interest is the interaction term Connectionsivt×
Tobin’s Qivt, which captures the eect of social connections on the sensitivity of capital allocation
to investment opportunities. In all regressions we control for segment-level and manager-level
factors (discussed above), which are known to aect the level of capital expenditures in segments.
We cluster standard errors at the division level to account for the time-series correlation of capital
allocations to a given division.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of panel regressions of the measures of capital
expenditures on segment investment opportunities. We control for the year and rm xed eects
in all models, but in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) we additionally include higher-dimensional
industry-year xed eects (based on Fama-French 49-industry classication) to control for time-
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variant industry-level factors. For example, the managerial teams may dier by the amount of
industry specic expertise they possess, and they may share this knowledge through visiting
professional conferences and meetings. The empirical results are consistent with our univariate
results and show that across all three measures of capital allocation, the positive sensitivity of
capital expenditures to investment opportunities increases with connections. The result is robust
to the sets of xed eects and to the measures of social connections we use (the continuous
variable, columns (1) - (6), or the dummy variable, columns (7) - (12)). Looking at our main variable
of interest, which is the interaction term between social connections and segment Tobin’s Q, we
see that the coecient on interaction term is positive and signicant at 5% or better for three
measures of capital allocation. For example, as shown in Column (1) for CAPEX, the coecient
on Connections × Tobin’s Q is positive ( = 0.082) and statistically signicant (t = 2.49). The eect
is economically sizable: when segment growth opportunities (measured by segment’s Tobin’s
Q) move from 25th to 75th sample percentile, each additional social connection of a particular
divisional manager is associated with 9.9% more capital allocated to the division, or $7.7 million
in extra annual capital expenditure, on average. These results indicate that investments become
sensitive to segment opportunities, when these segments are led by better connected managers.11
Importantly, we also show that across all specications, coecient on Tobin’s Q is close
to zero and insignicant. This suggests that without connections, capital expenditures do not
depend on the growth prospects of the divisions. As the coecients on Tobin’s Q are close to
zero and not statistically signicant, we then check if capital expenditures are sensitive to growth
opportunities only in the presence of connections. The results in Panel B show that omitting
Tobin’s Q keeps the results unchanged, suggesting that connections indeed serve as a channel
for allocation improvement.
Our ndings that connections improve allocation eciency provide support for the ecient
bargaining hypothesis. However, Table 3 results do not provide support for the individual inu-
11In unreported analysis, we nd that if segments with high investment opportunities are led by well-connected
managers, then these segments are able to both retain a greater share of cash ows generated in the segment and
capture greater positive share of cash ows generated by other segments.
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ence hypothesis. The coecients on social connections are positive and marginally signicant
only in two models (out of twelve) in both Panel A and Panel B, suggesting that better-connected
divisional managers are not likely to command more capital, after specically controlling for
segment growth opportunities. This result contrasts to our univariate evidence and shows that
social connections is not a signicant determinant for capital allocations. This result is also
consistent with Duchin and Sosyura (2013) that social connections among divisional managers is
not a strong predictor of capital spendings.
Overall, the evidence in this section indicates that at the segment level, social connections
are associated with improved capital allocation. This eect remains positive and signicant
after controlling for segment-level characteristics, proxies for managerial abilities and proxies
for formal inuence.
4.1.2 Baseline Results: Unobservable Factors
While we control for a number of segment-level variables and rm-level unobservable factors
(through rm xed eects) in the above regressions, there is still a possibility that other un-
observable segment-level variables are driving our results. One example is that dierences in
managers’ personal characteristics (such as ability or skill) can aect both social connections
between divisional managers and capital expenditures. Hence, some divisional managers are able
to obtain more capital than other managers because of their human capital, not because being
highly connected allows them to extract benets of networking through ecient bargaining. We
need to separate the eect of social connections from the eect of manager’s human capital on
the capital expenditures. To address the problem of omitted unobservable variables, we perform
the rst-dierences estimation for divisional managers’ turnover events - this approach cancels
the eects of all unobservable segment-level and manager characteristics as long as they remain
constant over the year.
An important concern in this analysis is that turnovers of divisional managers can depend
on other rm and segment factors. To mitigate this concern, we use a subset of plausibly ex-
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ogenous turnovers of divisional managers driven by deaths and retirements of other divisional
managers, unrelated to rm performance (similarly to, Fracassi and Tate (2012)). Specically, we
focus only on changes in social connections driven by departures of other divisional managers in
a given rm due to retirements of other managers unrelated to rm performance. Importantly,
retirement decisions of other divisional managers are also plausibly unrelated to a particular man-
ager’s ability and her personal characteristics, since the manager cannot control the retirement
decisions of other divisional managers. Consequently, a retirement of a divisional manager with
a network tie to a given manager is likely to create a shock to her connections and ability to
cooperate with other divisional managers. Specically, if connections of a divisional manager
increase [decrease] exogenously, then we expect the sensitivity of capital spending to growth
opportunities in her division to increase [decrease]. For example, if connections of a manager
leading a high-Q division decrease, then we expect this manager (still operating a high-Q seg-
ment) no longer be able to extract higher allocations for her division, because the other divisional
managers are no longer likely to cooperate.
To empirically estimate the eect of exogenous shocks to managers’ networks, we lter
divisional managers’ retirements from all managers’ departures. We keep the departures of
divisional managers, in which he leaves at the age of 60 or above (this threshold is used in Parrino
(1997); Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001)). This lter forms a sample of potential retirements.
Next, we check each potential retirement using rms’ press releases and media articles. If we
nd a press-release about the planned retirement in media, we classify the potential retirement
as a retirement, otherwise - we exclude the retirement from the sample. If the divisional manager
did not retire, usually information from BoardEx conrms that he accepted other position. Using
this process, we nd that about 52% of all departures of divisional managers are retirements.
We estimate the rst-dierences regression, in which the dependent variable is the annual
change in the division’s capital expenditures for division-year observations, where the network
of the divisional manager has changed due to the retirement of other (connected) divisional
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manager, but the divisional manager has not changed. We run the following model:12
∆Iivt = β1∆Connectionsivt+β2∆Tobin’s Qivt+β3∆(Connectionsivt×Tobin’s Qivt)+∆Xivtγ+∆µt+∆ivt
(2)
The results in Table 4 show that there is a positive and statistically signicant relationship
between changes in divisional manager’s social connections and changes in eciency of capital
allocation. Specically, Panel A suggests that when divisional manager’s social connections
decrease [increase] (as a result of the exogenous change in her connections), the relation between
segment capital expenditures and its growth opportunities becomes weaker [stronger]. In other
words, the reduction in manager’s connections is associated with reductions in capital allocation
eciency, and vice versa. In Panel B we take dierences using restricted version of models in
Table 3 (with the insignicant eect of the change in Tobin’s Q omitted), and our results hold
with similar magnitudes and strong signicance levels.
Ultimately, our analysis presented in Table 4 captures the eect of a change in managerial
connections, while canceling the eect of personal human capital as long as it remains constant
over the year. Since the divisional manager has not changed, and the retirement decision of a
divisional manager from her network is presumably not dependent on her human capital, these
results indicate that social connections aect eciency of capital allocation over and above the
unobserved manager’s characteristics.
As a robustness check, we take into account that CEO turnovers may aect the capital
allocation to a particular manager, because the manager’s connections to CEO could change as a
result of CEO turnover ((Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). To address this concern we exclude years
with CEO turnovers and keep only observations, when CEO remains the same from the previous
year. All the results reported in Table 4 remain unchanged.
12This model directly follows from the model (1):
∆Iivt = Iivt − Iivt−1 = β1(Connectionsivt − Connectionsivt−1) + β2(Tobin’s Qivt − Tobin’s Qivt−1) +
β3((Connectionsivt×Tobin’s Qivt)−(Connectionsivt−1×Tobin’s Qivt−1))+(Xivt−Xivt−1)γ+λv−λv+µt−µt−1+
ivt−ivt−1 = β1∆Connectionsivt+β2∆Tobin’s Qivt+β3∆(Connectionsivt×Tobin’s Qivt)+∆Xivtγ+∆µt+∆ivt
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4.2 Social Connections, Firm-Level Eciency of Capital Allocation, and Firm Excess
Value
4.2.1 Social Connections and Firm-Level Eciency: Cross-Sectional Analysis
So far, we documented that there is a positive eect of social connections on the capital allocation
eciency at the segment level. In this section we study if such eects exist at rm level. To do this,
we use the measure of rm-level capital allocation eciency, Relative Value Added by Allocation,
which is introduced by Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and represents the overall value impact
of divisional capital allocations. Relative Value Added by Allocation is measured as the sum of
the weighted Industry-Firm-Adjusted Capital Expenditure across all segments of a rm in a given
year:
Relative Value Added by Allocation =
∑N
j=1 BAj(qj − q¯)
(
Ij
BAj
− Issj
BAssj
−∑Nj=1wj ( IjBAj − IssjBAssj ))
BA
where I denotes capital expenditures of segment j, BA denotes book assets, q denotes industry
Tobin’s Q, q¯ denotes average industry Tobin’s Q for the rm, ss denotes single-segment rms in
the segment’s two-digit industry, and wj is the ratio of segment assets to rm assets.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the estimates obtained by regressing the allocation measure on
rm-level connections measures. In our regressions we control for the same set of variables as in
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000): Firm Sales (rm sales scaled by total assets), Segment Diversity
(standard deviation of asset-weighted segment Qs divided by equally weighted average segment
Qs in a rm) and Inverse of Average Q (dened as inverse of equally weighted Q). The reported
results show that overall higher rm connectedness (measured by average segment connections
or by asset-weighted segment connections) is associated with improved allocation, as captured
by Relative Value Added by Allocation.
Next, we estimate the direct eect of social connections on rm value. We use common
approach in literature and compute Excess Value as in Berger and Ofek (1995). We dene Excess
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Value as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the conglomerate actual value to its imputed value.
A conglomerate actual value is the market value of assets, which is equal to the market value of
equity minus book assets and book value of debt. A conglomerate imputed value is the sum of
imputed values of its segments, where each segment’s imputed value is equal to segment’s sales
multiplied by the sales multiple (median market value of assets-to-sales ratio of all single-segment
rms in a segment two-digit SIC industry). We use sales multiplier because according to Rajan,
Servaes and Zingales (2000) it is less likely to have strategic reporting bias.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of regressions of excess value on rm connectedness
measures and rm-level controls similar to those utilized by previous research: rm cash ow,
rm sales, segment diversity and CEO ownership. For example, results from column (1) show
that coecient on Excess Value is 0.071 (t=3.82) suggesting that higher rm connectedness is
associated with higher rm values. Economically, this eect of 0.071 translates into 10.6% increase
in Excess Value when rm connectedness (measured by the average connections of all rm’s
segments) changes from 25th to 75th sample percentile.
4.2.2 Social Connections and Firm-Level Eciency: Instrumental VariableMethodology
The eect of rm-connectedness on allocation eciency and rm value is subject to potential
endogeneity concerns. For example, in cross-section we may observe a positive correlation
between team connectedness and rm performance simply because connectedness is an attribute
of well-performers, but not because it is the cause of better performance. Also rm connectedness
might be explained by the same factors that aect rm value, - for example, by rm strategy. In
time-series, rms might build more connected teams exactly when rms’ performance goes up.
Hence, to proper estimate the eect of rm connectedness on rm-level allocation eciency and
rm value, we need to control for unobserved common factors that aect both rm connectedness
and rm value.
To address the endogeneity of the rm connectedness, we use two instrumental variables
for rm connectedness. The rst instrumental variable Lost Connections relies on the plausibly
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exogenous variation in connections, created by deaths and exogenous retirements of divisional
managers during the sample period (as described in Section 3.1.2).13 We construct the instrument
in the following way: for each rm we sum all connections of all retired managers (to other
divisional managers) in a given scal year. This helps to account for multiple retirements during
the scal year. If in some rm-year there are no events of retirement(s) of managers connected
to other divisional managers, we set the value to zero. Next for each rm we nd the cumulative
number of these connections, accumulated up to a given year, starting from the scal year of
retirement. This cumulative value of connections in the next scal year (after the retirement scal
year) would represent the total number of connections lost (by divisional managers) because of
the retirements.
In construction of the second instrumental variable (Exogenous Job Openings) we use ex-
ecutive deaths and retirements at other local rms. These deaths and retirements are likely to
increase the likelihood of executive turnover at the sample rm (Karolyi (2018)), and result in
executive’s transfer to the rm with the vacant position. Hence, these deaths and retirements will
create an exogenous shock to rm connectedness, and will result in change in connections due to
managers’ departures. We start with identifying the deaths and retirements at other companies
using Execucomp data. Following Karolyi (2018), we focus on a subset of executive’s departures
with codes for the reason “Deceased”, “Resigned” and “Retired”. To truly lter all retirements,
we require the executive to have age exceeding 60 years at the year of the departure (Parrino
(1997); Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001)). We additionally restrict the departing executives’ titles
to titles corresponding to CEO, CFO, COO, Executive Vice President or Division/Group President
positions to focus only on those vacant positions, which could potentially serve as divisional
managers prospective jobs. Then for each state we count the number of the retirements and
deaths in each 2-digit SIC industry. The rationale for the state and industry classications is
that previous studies have shown that the markets for executives are geographically segmented
(Yonker (2017)) and executives have industry-specic expertise (Parrino (1997)). Our nal variable
13Because there are only 3 deaths of connected managers during the sample period, we are unable to construct a
separate instrument based on only deaths.
23
(Exogenous Job Openings) shows the number of job openings due to plausibly exogenous deaths
and retirements of executives in all other rms in the state and industry corresponding to those
of the sample conglomerate. Further, in the tests we take a 1-year lag of this variable to better
account for the subsequent eect on connections.
Next, we test whether our instruments are correlated with rm connectedness. In re-
gressions with instruments we add rm xed eects - this allows us to identify eects of rm
connectedness purely through within-rm (i.e time series) variation. The rst stage regressions
reported in Panel B of Table 5 show that both instruments (Lost Connections and Exogenous
Job Openings) are negatively correlated with rm connectedness measures, suggesting that rm
connectedness decreases in the year, following the year of retirement(s)/departure(s) of connected
manager(s). This result also implies that on average the incoming replacing manager is less
connected than the departing manager. Both instruments are statistically relevant, since they pass
weak instruments test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic exceeds Stock and Yogo (2005) thresholds
at 5%). In the second stage, in Panel B of Table 5, we use only the within-rm decreases in
rm connectedness, which are predicted by our instruments, to identify the eect on allocation
eciency and excess value. The estimates show that after instrumenting Firm Connectedness
- the signicant positive eect of connections on Relative Value Added by Allocation remains
statistically signicant, so there seems to be exogenous variation in rm connectedness variables
that causes the improvement of allocation eciency.
In Panel B of Table 6, we perform the same two-stage instrumental variable analysis to
analyze the eects of rm connectedness on excess value. Again, nd the instrumented rm
connectedness is a signicantly positive determinant of excess value, suggesting that exogenous
increase in connectedness leads to higher rm values.
Altogether, the results in Tables 3-6 suggest that better connected divisional managers are
associated with greater segment-level investment eciency. This leads to improved rm-level
allocation eciency (proxied by the Relative Value Added by Allocation) and to greater rm
values. These ndings are consistent with the ecient bargaining hypothesis that states con-
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nections facilitate cooperation among divisional managers, which should mitigate investment
ineciencies (such as cross-subsidization, underinvestment in high-Q segments) and allow for
more ecient distribution of investment funds across divisions. In addition, improvements in
allocation eciency and greater rm values are also consistent with information asymmetry
hypothesis that asserts connections reduce information asymmetry within the rm thanks to
more accurate reporting by the divisions to the headquarters, allowing the headquarters to better
identify growth opportunities of segments worth nancing.
Our results allow us to reject the individual inuence hypothesis. First, while we do not
nd that segments led by managers with greater number of social connections command greater
shares of capital allocations. Second, we nd that rm connectedness leads to improvements
in rm-level allocation eciency and excess value, what contradicts with the predictions of this
hypothesis about distortions in capital allocation and reduction in rm value caused by managers’
inuence.
In the next section, we will analyze channels through which connections lead to improved
allocation eciency and higher rm values, consistent with both ecient bargaining and infor-
mation asymmetry hypotheses.
4.3 Mechanisms of the Eect of Social Connections on Allocation Eciency and Firm
Value
4.3.1 Strategical Matching of Divisional Managers to Segments
Based on ecient bargaining hypothesis, we should expect that improvements in capital allo-
cation and rm value to occur primarily when well-connected managers control high-Q seg-
ments. If connections facilitate cooperation and trust among divisions, then high-Q segment led
by a well-connected manager is unlikely to be engaged in spending misallocation documented
by Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) due to defensive investment (to protect its funds from
poaching requests by other divisions) and/or subsequent underinvestment induced by headquar-
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ters. Instead, such segment can properly (over)invest to take advantage of its superior growth
opportunities, leading to greater rm-level eciency and higher rm values. While the head-
quarters may be “passive beneciaries” of the more ecient bargaining process, they still have
their active role through aecting the assignments of managers into divisions and putting better
connected managers into high-Q divisions. Consequently, we now analyze whether companies
strategically match high-connected managers to high-Q segments to reduce ineciencies caused
by misallocation of funds primarily in high-Q divisions. We explore this question by studying the
turnovers of divisional managers across rm segments. To identify turnovers more accurately,
for each manager we hand-collected information about the start and the end dates of operating
the segment.14
We begin by studying the divisional managers’ appointments. If the location of the divi-
sional manager at the high-Q segment is benecial for the company, then we would expect that
companies assign the better-connected managers to high-Q segments. To test this channel, we
regress the beginning of the (previous) year Tobin’s Q of the division on the social connections
of the incoming divisional manager and his other characteristics. Column (1) of Table 7 shows
that companies assign better connected managers to divisions with historically superior growth
opportunities. Additionally, in columns (2) and (3) we test the idea if better connected managers
are assigned to historically capital rich divisions. We regress beginning of the year capital ex-
penditures measures on characteristics of the incoming manager. We do not nd that divisional
managers are appointed at historically capital rich divisions.
Overall, our tests show that companies tend to strategically assign better connected man-
agers to higher-Q segments. It is also possible that the departures of divisional managers convey
some information about the segments. For example, well-connected managers may have longer
tenures at the high-Q segments. To capture this eect, we investigate how the manager departure
from the the segment is related to the matching of his characteristics to the segment Tobin’s Q.
14Every manager goes through formal promotions (such as promoting from Vice President to Executive Vice
President) while still being the highest person responsible for the segment. To accurately identify tenure dates we
used many resources: 10-Ks, companies press releases, BoardEx, Bloomberg executives database and the managers’
Linkedin proles.
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Specically, we estimate the hazard rate (or approximately) probability that a current divisional
manager leaves the segment over the next year using the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model.
The Cox model evaluates the probability of the divisional manager’s exit from the segment as a
function of her tenure at segment and control variables. For this test, we hand-collect the start and
end dates of the manager tenure at the segment from BoardEx, annual reports, proxy statements,
managers’ LinkedIn proles and companies’ press-releases. Since manager’s connections and
segment investment opportunities vary from year to year, we allow the explanatory variables
to vary with time (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). It allows us to compare the probabilities of
exits between high-connected managers that are properly matched to segments with those (high-
connected managers) who are not properly matched to segments at each exit event. We estimate
the following model:
λ(t|Z, β) = λ0(t) exp(β1Connections(t) + β2Mismatch(t)+
β3(Connections(t)×Mismatch(t)) +X(t)γ)
(3)
The dependent variable is a hazard rate of a divisional manager exit from a segment (com-
pany) within a sample period. We consider the managers’ exits as right censored observations,
when the divisional manager drops out the sample at the end of the sample period, but we can
conrm that he continues to operate the segment in next scal year. The unit of observation is
the combination of segment and manager in a given year. Following Jenter and Kanaan (2015)
we keep only divisional managers with tenure at the segment at least 2 years. Connections is
measured by rm-adjusted social connections to capture the relative connectedness of a particular
divisional manager within a rm.15 Mismatch measures the quality of matching between the
managers and segments, and is equal to an absolute value of a dierence between two ranks:
connections rank of a divisional manager and the Tobin’s Q rank of the segment (which this
15Firm-adjusted Social connections is computed as the absolute number of connections of a divisional manager
(with other divisional managers) minus the average number of connections between divisional managers within a
rm in a given year.
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manager operates) within a rm in a given year.16 Our main variable of interest is Connections×
Mismatch, the interaction term of the social connections with a quality of matching between
the connections of its manager and investment opportunities of the segment. We measure all
explanatory variables at the beginning of the scal year, in which the manager leaves the segment.
As in Jenter and Kanaan (2015) we control for potential retirements by including the dummy
variable for managers’ age greater than 60. Since the Cox model accounts for the eect of
tenure on the probability of the manager turnover, we exclude the company tenure variable
(Long Tenure) from the regressions.
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation. Column (1) shows that relatively better
connected managers are less likely to leave the segment, however the greater initial mismatch
between connections and segment Q increases the hazard rate of the turnover for these managers.
The coecient onConnections×Mismatch is positive and signicant at 1% level. If high-connected
managers are properly matched to segments, then they are more likely to stay longer with the
company. Our data shows that this is indeed the case: we estimate the hazard rate that a divisional
manager will leave the company conditional she is leaving the segment. In column (2) the
coecient on Connections×Mismatch remains positive and signicant for managers’ exits from
the company conditional on the exits from the segments.
To ensure that results are not driven by the specic choice of the Cox hazards model
(which is apparently more suitable), we estimate the probability of the manager’s exit using a
parametric logit model. We additionally include in the logit regressions divisional manager’s
tenure at segment, computed in months and measured at the time of exit. Columns (3) and
(4) present the results. The coecients on Connections × Mismatch remain positive and highly
signicant (at 5% or better level). Specically, we again observe that better connected managers
are more likely to leave the segment (or company conditional on segment exit) if there they are
previously assigned to a segment with a worse growth opportunities.. Based on logit regressions,
16We dropped the observations, where there is no variation either in segment connections or in Tobin’s Q or both.
We also corrected this variable by assigning zero values for cases when the dierence appeared mechanically - the
highest rank in connections was not equal to the highest rank in segment Q due to repeated values in connections
or Q.
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we estimate the conditional probabilities of managers’ turnovers. The average implied probability
of the divisional manager turnover increases from 12.46% to 15.27% ifConnections drops from 90th
to the 10th percentile and Mismatch increases from the 10th to the 90th percentile, what roughly
corresponds to about 20% increase in implied probability of the divisional manager turnover for
a median rm (with covariates taken at the median values).
Taken together, our results provide additional support to the ecient bargaining hypothesis
and suggest that headquarters tend to understand the benets of matching better connected man-
agers to high-Q segments by strategically allocating the managers to improve capital allocation
eciency and rm value.
4.3.2 Social Connections and Segment Diversity
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) show that high segment diversity – i.e. variation in segment
Qs within the same rm-year - is associated with reduction of rm excess value (we document the
same relation in Panel A of Table 6). The reason is that capital allocation ineciencies – such as
the incentives to poach high-growth divisions, leading to desire to pursue defensive spending by
such divisions, and limiting investment by headquarters into high-growth divisions (to prevent
defensive spending) – should be greater precisely in rms that have both types – high-growth and
low-growth – segments. Our ecient bargaining hypothesis states that managerial connections
promote trust and cooperation among divisions, decreasing the likelihood of poaching and de-
fensive spending. Consequently, the greatest benets of rm connectedness should be observed
in rms with sizable segment diversity.
To test whether connections help to reduce the negative eect of diversity in segments’
Q, we examine whether rm connectedness mitigates the (known) negative impact of segment
diversity on excess value. In Table 9 we report mean excess values for high- and low- connected
rms. We also split the sample based on value of segment diversity. The results are consistent
with our expectations. In the subsample of rms with high diversity (segment diversity is above
the sample median), we observe a signicant dierence in excess values between high- and low-
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connected rms, with dierence signicant at 1% (t = 4.25). In contrast, in the low-diversity
subsample (segment diversity is below the sample median), the dierences in value are not sig-
nicant. These results provide support to our ecient bargaining hypothesis and imply that
horizontal connections may be benecial for rm values in rms with diverse segment investment
opportunities, because they help to correct misallocation of funds by mitigating power struggles
for funds (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)).
4.3.3 Social Connections and Information Asymmetry
In this section we provide evidence for support of the information asymmetry hypothesis. This
hypothesis suggests that connections reduce internal information asymmetry between divisions
and headquarters through truthful reporting by divisional managers about the investment op-
portunities of their segments. We expect that when headquarters’ managers are better informed
about the segments’ performance, the nancing they provide will more likely reect segments’
investment opportunities, which will lead to improved allocation eciency.
One reason for existence of information asymmetry between headquarters and divisional
managers in conglomerates is that divisional managers may capture private benets by distorting
information about their divisions (e.g. Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992)).17 However, such
behavior leads to ineciencies in capital allocation (Harris and Raviv (1996), Ozbas (2005), Wulf
(2009)), which destroys rm value and thus has negative consequences for other divisions. If
connections among divisional managers facilitate cooperation and friendly relations, then better
connected teams of managers should be associated with less incentives to misreport to headquar-
ters. Individual managers might be less likely to pursue activities beneting them at the expense
of their colleagues. Instead, there should be greater alignment between divisional policies and
overall rm’s goal to maximize value. Deviation from the policy to jointly pursue rm goals
may be costly - in rms with well-connected teams, untruthful reporting can damage valuable
17Consistent with the important role of information asymmetry in capital allocation decisions, Graham, Harvey
and Puri (2015) in the recent survey note that CEO needs the most informational input from divisional managers in
the capital allocation and investment decisions.
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connections, ruin friendships and reputations (Brass and Labianca (2006)).
In testing the information asymmetry hypothesis, the main challenge is to measure internal
information asymmetry, which is dierence between the amounts of information that the head-
quarters and the divisional managers possess. We construct our measure of internal information
asymmetry following Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and Chen, Martin, Wang, Roychowdhury and
Billett (2016) and measure internal information asymmetry by comparing private information
sets of divisional managers with those of top executives, which is reected in the dierence in the
protability of their insider trades. If divisional managers have some private information about
their divisions, and they do not share this information with others, then ex post of protability
of their trades in their own rm stock will reveal this information. Hence the dierence in the
protability of insider trades between divisional managers and top executives will indicate the
relative information advantage of divisional managers over that of corporate headquarters.
For calculating the measure of internal information asymmetry we use data from the Thom-
son Reuters insider lings database. The process of calculation is as follows: we rst sort insider
trades into “routine” trades and information-based “opportunistic” trades as in Cohen, Malloy
and Pomorski (2012). We label the trade as “routine” if an insider makes open-market trades in
the same calendar month over a period of a least three consecutive years. If for that insider the
trades do not t into an obvious calendar pattern, they are labeled as “opportunistic”. We compute
the trading prot as an average cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return over the six-month
period following insider trades made during current scal year. We then calculate internal infor-
mation asymmetry as the dierence in trading prots between the divisional managers and top-5
corporate managers for opportunistic trades.18 To estimate the eect of social connections on
internal information asymmetry, we regress this measure on our rm connectedness measures
and additional controls based on Ravina and Sapienza (2010) - rm size and book-to-market ratio.
As shown in Panel A of Table 10 the coecients on all of our rm connectedness measures
are negative and signicant at 5% level, suggesting that rm connectedness reduces internal
18The group of top-5 corporate managers consists of: CEO, Chairman, Vice Chairman, CFO and COO.
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information asymmetry.
In Panel B of Table 10 we address endogeneity of rm connectedness using two instruments
we discussed in Section 3.2.2. Using two-stage least squares approach we can identify the eect
of rm connectedness on internal information asymmetry only through within-rm changes in
rm connectedness due to plausibly exogenous departures of connected managers. Columns
(1) and (3) report the rst-stage regressions, in which we regress rm connectedness on two
instruments, and include the set of controls from Panel A, rm and year xed eects. Both
instruments have a signicant negative impact on rm connectedness. Columns (2) and (4) report
the results of the second-stage regressions, in which we regress internal information asymmetry
on predicted rm connectedness. As in OLS regressions, we again nd a positive signicant
eect of rm connectedness on internal information asymmetry. The corresponding coecients
on rm connectedness measures are -0.067 (t = -2.26) and -0.099 (t = -1.98). We also checked that
both instruments pass the weak instruments test and satisfy the exogeneity assumption, because
we cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions of both models.
Ultimately, our results provide support for the information asymmetry hypothesis that social
connections contribute to lower internal information asymmetry.
4.4 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
The main results in our paper suggest that better connected managers are associated with more
ecient capital spending in their divisions. Our previous analysis rules out some confounding
factors, but there are still at least two potential threats to identication. First, is it possible that
managers of divisions that receive more capital end up developing more connections with other
divisional managers? Second, could our results be driven by connections to CEO or better overall
external connectedness of divisional managers? In this section we address these identication
challenges.
Our results indicate that well-connected divisional managers, which operate high-Q divi-
sions, obtain more capital for their divisions. One standard identication concern for papers
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measuring the eect of connections on capital allocation is the concern that the observed corre-
lation results from the positive eect of capital allocation on connections (Duchin and Sosyura
(2013)). To address this concern, we keep only connections that were established earlier than 5
years before the arrival of the manager at the segment of interest. This lter results in dropping
only 20% of connections, suggesting that the majority of connections were formed long before
the arrival of the manager at the segment of interest.19
Table 11 Panel A repeats the analysis of segment capital expenditures performed in Panel
A Table 3, with the additional restriction that each of the connections measures is based only
on connections formed earlier than 5 years before the arrival of the manager at the segment
of interest. After applying this lter, we nd that our results for all three capital expenditures
measures are nearly unchanged compared to those presented in Table 3. That is, in columns
(1)-(3) the coecients on the interaction term between social connections measures and segment
investment opportunities are still signicantly positive, while social connections per se are not
signicantly related to capital spending. In Panel B we get the same results, when we repeat the
analysis for the restricted model (which omits Tobin’s Q). Hence, these ndings suggest that our
results are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality.
We next check the robustness of our results by excluding observations, in which the same
division is overseen by multiple managers. There are about 14% of such observations, suggest-
ing that these cases are relatively rare. Our main results (reported in columns (4)-(6)) remain
unchanged if we remove these observations.
Existing research has documented that better connected to CEO managers receive more
capital allocations (e.g. Xuan (2009), Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). If well-connected divisional
managers are managers who are simply connected to more people - including CEO of their
own company, then our results could be driven by the eect of connections to CEO, rather than
connections to other divisional managers. To address this possibility we add to our baseline
regressions the indicator variable Connected to CEO, which identies managers connected to
19In our sample approximately 80% of connections were formed 5 years or earlier before the arrival at segment
and 62% of connections were formed 10 years or earlier before the arrival at segment.
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CEO. As shown in columns (7)-(9) of Table 11, the coecient on Connected to CEO is positive
and signicant consistent with the role of connections to CEO in capital allocation documented
in previous studies. Importantly, after controlling for connections to CEO we obtain results that
are very similar to the regressions in Table 3.
Finally, there is concern that connections to other divisional managers is a proxy for overall
connectedness of divisional manager. To address this concern, we compute two measures of
centrality of divisional managers, which measure the degree of connectedness to other (outside)
executives. We use BoardEx data to calculate centrality measures. Specically, in creating the
centrality measures we build the network using employment connections between individuals
formed in listed and private rms located in the North American region. Employment connec-
tions are considered the most reliable, and not aected by self-reporting bias (El-Khatib, Fogel
and Jandik (2015)). We compute two types of network centrality - Degree and Eigenvector. Degree
Centrality measures the total number of social connections a given manager has to all other
executives within the whole BoardEx network. Eigenvector Centrality also tracks the number
of total social connections, but gives greater weight to links with better-connected individuals.
As common in literature, our centrality measures are expressed in percentiles (1st percentile –
least central, 100th percentile – most central), which capture the relative position of the manager
in the entire network of BoardEx executives.20
As shown in columns (10)-(12) of Table 11, adding Degree Centrality does not change the
results. Notably, the coecient on Degree Centrality is not signicant, suggesting that overall
connectedness of divisional managers does not matter for capital allocation. We repeat analysis
using Eigemvector Centrality instead (unreported), and our baseline results again do not change,
while observing insignicant eect of Eigemvector Centrality on capital spending. Ultimately,
because high-centrality individuals should be considered inuential and/or powerful based on
20The mean (median) Degree Centrality is 81 (83), and the mean (median) Eigenvector Centrality is 78 (82).
Divisional managers in our sample on average are more central compared to the sample of CEOs of S&P1500
in El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik (2015). This is not surprising since our sample consists of the largest and most
signicant companies of S&P500, hence on average divisional managers in our sample are more connected than
CEOs in S&P1500.
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social science research (see e.g., Mizruchi and Potts (1998), Hanneman and Riddle (2005), Jack-
son (2010), Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duo and Jackson (2012)), these results provide additional
evidence for rejecting individual inuence hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the debate whether social connections are associated with allocation
eciency and rm value improvements. We use the hand-collected dataset of 765 divisional
managers, matching them to segments of S&P500 conglomerate rms. We nd that social con-
nections among divisional managers lead to higher sensitivity of segment capital spending to
segment’s growth opportunities. We nd the positive causal eects of social connections on
rm-level capital allocation eciency and rm value.
Our analysis provides support for two possible mechanisms that potentially can explain
these results. Specically, consistent with the ecient bargaining hypothesis, we show that
the improvements in rm value tend to occur in rms with high dispersion of segment growth
opportunities, where high-Q divisions are more likely to invest at lower sub-optimal levels (Ra-
jan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). Since social links likely promote cooperation and trust, well-
connected managers may be able to secure enough investment funds into their high-growth
segments, without inducing power struggles among divisional managers (which could lead to
prot grabbing demands by low-Q divisions, and to defensive spending by high-Q segments).
We provide further evidence that companies are likely to strategically match well-connected
managers into segments with better investment opportunities, and that well-connected managers
are less likely to leave their rm or a high-Q segment, once they get matched to it. However, we
do not nd support for the individual inuence hypothesis stating that well-connected managers
should be able to secure additional investment funds based on their greater inuence and/or
power.
We also nd support for the information asymmetry hypothesis, as we document that rms
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with well-connected divisional managers are associated with less internal information asym-
metry between divisions and headquarters – which likely allows headquarters to better assess
true growth opportunities of rm’s segments and thus nance divisions more eciently. Our
ndings are consistent with the results in Billett, Chen, Martin and Wang (2014) that lower
internal information asymmetry should enhance rm value.
Overall, our ndings suggest that social connections among divisional managers play an
important role in capital allocation process. They are associated with improved allocation e-
ciency and greater rm values.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for a random sample of 100 S&P industrial conglomerates
between 2006 and 2013, which operate in at least two business segments, have non-missing
operating prot and segment assets and disclose identity of divisional managers. Panel A shows
the nancial characteristics of rms and segments. Panels B and C provide information about
620 divisional managers: personal characteristics related to the managers’ employment in the
company and their social connections. The accounting information is from merged Compustat
and Compustat Historical Segments, identities of divisional managers’ are collected from 10-K
annual reports and data on divisional managers’ personal characteristics and connections is from
BoardEx. Appendix A provides denitions of these variables.
Panel A: Firms and Segments
Variable Mean 25th perc. Median 75th perc. St. dev.
Company level
Tobin’s Q 1.560 1.217 1.494 1.826 0.444
Cash ow/Assets 0.104 0.075 0.104 0.138 0.064
Market value, $millions 48570 9596 23611 45165 102000
Book assets, $millions 31450 5796 14867 30941 85118
Number of business segments 4.120 3.000 4.000 5.000 1.398
Capital expenditure/Assets 0.041 0.020 0.028 0.046 0.043
Sales, $millions 23110 5628 11590 30908 26965
Segment level
Return on assets (ROA) 0.180 0.084 0.149 0.254 0.232
Cash ow 0.227 0.122 0.192 0.305 0.168
Industry Tobin’s Q 1.505 1.259 1.492 1.709 0.358
Capital expenditure, $millions 286 30 78 203 966
Capital expenditure/Assets 0.051 0.017 0.034 0.063 0.056
Sales, $millions 6008 1440 3027 6241 10572
Book assets, $millions 6692 1141 2429 5895 30892
Industry-Adjusted Capital
Expenditure
0.018 -0.011 0.006 0.031 0.051
Industry-Firm-Adjusted Capital
Expenditure
0.006 -0.010 0.001 0.018 0.041
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Panel B: Divisional Managers
Variable
Continuous variables Mean
Tenure at the company (years) 14.42
Tenure at the segment (years) 6.19
Age 52.76
Indicator variables % from total N
General:
Male 92.42%
Senior 59.52%
Tenure >10 years 56.13%
Retirement Age 15.65%
Board Member 16.77%
High Salary 60.48%
Graduated from Ivy League 18.71%
Connections:
Total connected managers 62.74%
Employment: Worked for the same listed company at the same time in past 54.68%
Employment: Worked for the same private company at the same time in past 9.03%
Education: Studied at the same university at the same time in past 0.48%
Panel C: Connections
Variable Mean 25th perc Median 75th perc. St.dev.
Segment level (rm-year-segment)
Segment connections 1.367 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.566
Firm level (rm-year)
Average Segment Connections 1.363 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.440
Asset-Weighted Segment Connections 1.035 0.000 0.709 1.539 1.101
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Table 2: Comparison of Capital Expenditure across Segments - Univariate Evidence
The table reports dierences-in-means estimates across our three capital expenditures measures
depending on segment connections and investment prospects of segments. Panel A compares
High Q segments (that have Tobin’s Q above the sample median) with Low Q segments (that
have Tobin’s Q below the sample median). High (Low) Segment Connections - indicator variable
equals one for segments with connections above (below) sample median. Panel B compares
capital expenditures between the segments with connections above and below the sample median.
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) – annual capital expenditure of the division (capxs) divided by the
division’s lagged one year book assets (ias). Industry-Adjusted Capital Expenditure (IA CAPEX) –
annual capital expenditure of the division adjusted for the industry-specic variation in capital
expenditures, as measured by the median capital expenditure of single-segment rms in the
division’s industry (two-digit SIC code). Industry-Firm-Adjusted Capital Expenditure (FIA CAPEX)
– industry-adjusted capital expenditure further adjusted for the rm’s asset-weighted average
of industry-adjusted capital expenditures across all divisions. ***, ** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Capital Expenditures and Segment-Level Eciency of Allocation
High Segment Connections
High Q Low Q Dierence t-statistic
CAPEX 0.0636 0.0517 0.0119 2.76 **
Industry-adjusted CAPEX 0.0370 0.0184 0.0186 4.36 ***
Industry-rm-adjusted CAPEX 0.0154 0.0041 0.0114 3.12 ***
Low Segment Connections
High Q Low Q Dierence t-statistic
CAPEX 0.0457 0.0501 -0.0044 -1.43
Industry-adjusted CAPEX 0.0139 0.0115 0.0023 0.90
Industry-rm-adjusted CAPEX 0.0044 0.0053 -0.0008 -0.42
Panel B: Capital Expenditures and Segment-Level Connections
High Low
Segment Segment Dierence t-statistic
Connections Connections
CAPEX 0.0571 0.0482 0.0090 3.45 ***
Industry-adjusted CAPEX 0.0268 0.0126 0.0143 6.04 ***
Industry-rm-adjusted CAPEX 0.0092 0.0049 0.0043 2.24 **
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Table 3: Social Connections among Divisional Managers and Capital Allocation
The table presents the results of segment-level regressions of three capital expenditures measures on social connections measures,
segment and manager controls. Columns (1) - (6) use Segment Connections as a measure of social connections, which is computed an
absolute number of social connections of a divisional manager in a given rm-year. Columns (7) - (12) use High Segment Connections,
which is an indicator that equals one if Segment Connections is above the sample median. Panel A shows the results of the full model,
whereas Panel B shows the results of the restricted model, where Tobin’s Q is omitted. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%
and 99% levels. All variables except for dummies are standardized. Other variables are dened in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported in
parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the segment level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Model
Measure of Segment High Segment
Social Connections Connections Connections (Dummy)
Dependent CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA
Variable CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Social Connections 0.058* 0.037 0.021 0.068* 0.063 0.048 0.090 0.063 0.019 0.079 0.086 0.035
(1.75) (0.95) (0.53) (1.74) (1.50) (0.95) (1.15) (0.69) (0.19) (1.02) (1.01) (0.34)
Tobin’s Q 0.032 0.015 0.019 0.032 0.025 0.034 -0.041 -0.069 -0.069 -0.047 -0.076 -0.071
(0.75) (0.30) (0.32) (0.67) (0.44) (0.52) (-0.89) (-1.27) (-1.11) (-1.03) (-1.46) (-1.16)
Social Con. x Tobin’s Q 0.082** 0.094** 0.090** 0.083** 0.103** 0.101** 0.196*** 0.226*** 0.238** 0.214*** 0.271*** 0.285***
(2.49) (2.54) (2.12) (2.21) (2.47) (2.07) (2.77) (2.81) (2.59) (2.60) (2.93) (2.59)
Segment Cash Flow 0.237*** 0.153*** 0.118** 0.256*** 0.143** 0.121* 0.236*** 0.151*** 0.116** 0.252*** 0.138** 0.116*
(5.41) (3.40) (2.34) (4.69) (2.51) (1.87) (5.41) (3.39) (2.32) (4.66) (2.45) (1.82)
Segment Size -0.202* -0.190* -0.183 -0.188 -0.160 -0.181 -0.202* -0.189* -0.183 -0.188 -0.159 -0.180
(-1.87) (-1.71) (-1.43) (-1.48) (-1.23) (-1.19) (-1.87) (-1.70) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-1.22) (-1.18)
Segment Relative Size 0.150** 0.086 0.073 0.140* 0.065 0.068 0.151** 0.086 0.075 0.142* 0.067 0.070
(2.09) (1.33) (0.93) (1.76) (0.90) (0.76) (2.11) (1.33) (0.95) (1.79) (0.92) (0.79)
CEO Ownership 0.321* 0.282 0.079 0.218* 0.251* 0.011 0.326* 0.288 0.085 0.220* 0.254* 0.010
(1.92) (1.44) (0.61) (1.95) (1.68) (0.09) (1.94) (1.46) (0.66) (1.94) (1.68) (0.08)
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Panel A: Full Model
Measure of Segment High Segment
Social Connections Connections Connections (Dummy)
Dependent CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA
Variable CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Segment Relative ROA 0.116*** 0.128*** 0.161*** 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.161*** 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.159*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 0.159***
(3.37) (3.61) (4.11) (3.46) (3.60) (3.91) (3.38) (3.62) (4.11) (3.47) (3.62) (3.94)
Board Member 0.066 0.104 0.095 0.068 0.130 0.118 0.066 0.105 0.098 0.068 0.129 0.120
(0.91) (1.21) (0.95) (0.88) (1.45) (1.10) (0.92) (1.24) (0.99) (0.90) (1.48) (1.13)
High Salary 0.024 0.041 0.069 0.038 0.067 0.074 0.020 0.038 0.066 0.036 0.066 0.072
(0.54) (0.82) (1.32) (0.84) (1.36) (1.25) (0.46) (0.76) (1.27) (0.79) (1.33) (1.21)
Retirement Age 0.073 0.001 -0.005 0.111 0.015 -0.002 0.075 0.004 0.001 0.118 0.022 0.009
(0.94) (0.01) (-0.05) (1.35) (0.16) (-0.02) (0.96) (0.04) (0.01) (1.44) (0.24) (0.08)
Long Tenure -0.129** 0.000 0.001 -0.132** 0.001 -0.000 -0.121** 0.008 0.011 -0.118* 0.014 0.016
(-2.19) (0.00) (0.01) (-2.08) (0.01) (-0.00) (-2.03) (0.12) (0.15) (-1.87) (0.21) (0.21)
Senior Title 0.053 0.087 0.170 0.062 0.074 0.146 0.049 0.084 0.167 0.051 0.063 0.134
(0.63) (0.90) (1.58) (0.67) (0.69) (1.17) (0.59) (0.88) (1.58) (0.57) (0.60) (1.09)
Ivy League -0.089 -0.101 -0.120 -0.113 -0.125 -0.129 -0.094 -0.106 -0.125 -0.119 -0.131 -0.137
(-1.14) (-1.25) (-1.22) (-1.42) (-1.50) (-1.29) (-1.20) (-1.30) (-1.27) (-1.48) (-1.57) (-1.35)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year xed
eects
No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
R2 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.55 0.44 0.20 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.55 0.44 0.21
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Panel B: Restricted Model
Social Connections 0.058* 0.037 0.021 0.068* 0.063 0.048 0.087 0.059 0.014 0.074 0.079 0.028
(1.75) (0.95) (0.53) (1.74) (1.50) (0.94) (1.11) (0.63) (0.14) (0.96) (0.93) (0.27)
Social Con. x Tobin’s Q 0.080** 0.094** 0.089** 0.082** 0.103** 0.101** 0.169*** 0.181** 0.193** 0.184** 0.222** 0.239**
(2.48) (2.56) (2.13) (2.24) (2.50) (2.09) (2.63) (2.43) (2.25) (2.29) (2.41) (2.19)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year xed
eects
No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
R2 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.55 0.44 0.20 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.55 0.44 0.20
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Table 4: Exogenous Shocks to Social Connections: Death and Retirement Events
The table presents the results of regressions in rst-dierences, in which the dependent variable
is the annual change in capital expenditures measures. The sample consists of segment-year
observations, in which the network of the divisional manager has changed due to deaths and re-
tirements of other (connected) divisional manager(s), but the divisional manager has not changed.
Panel A shows the results of the full model, whereas Panel B shows the results of the restricted
model, where Tobin’s Q is omitted. Social Connections is measured by Segment Connections,
which is an absolute number of social connections of a divisional manager (to other divisional
managers) in a given rm-year. Explanatory variables are computed as annual changes. All
regressions include rm and calendar-year xed eects. All variables are dened in Appendix A.
t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the
segment level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Model
Dependent Variable ∆CAPEX ∆IA CAPEX ∆IFA
CAPEX
Model (1) (2) (3)
∆Social Connections 0.062 0.048 0.031
(0.98) (0.71) (0.22)
∆Tobin’s Q 0.068 -0.049 -0.115
(0.55) (-0.39) (-0.37)
∆(Social Connections x Tobin’s Q) 0.144*** 0.170*** 0.256***
(2.69) (2.90) (2.67)
∆Segment Cash Flow 0.076 -0.026 -0.107
(0.66) (-0.24) (-0.58)
∆Segment Size -2.694*** -3.289*** -5.972*
(-3.02) (-3.57) (-1.93)
∆Segment Relative Size 0.170 0.491 1.035
(0.35) (0.94) (0.82)
∆CEO Ownership 16.019*** 16.035*** 16.830**
(3.13) (3.48) (2.57)
∆Relative ROA 0.233** 0.138 0.175
(2.13) (1.28) (1.14)
∆Board Member 0.161 0.056 -0.089
(0.60) (0.22) (-0.23)
∆High Salary 0.171 0.263** 0.709*
(1.55) (2.11) (1.82)
∆Retirement Age 1.163*** 1.324*** 2.080***
(3.98) (4.39) (5.38)
∆Long Tenure 5.348*** 4.891*** 6.358***
(6.25) (7.11) (4.90)
∆Senior Title 0.709 1.169* 2.527
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Panel A: Full Model
Dependent Variable ∆CAPEX ∆IA CAPEX ∆IFA
CAPEX
Model (1) (2) (3)
(1.15) (1.68) (1.33)
∆Ivy League omitted
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes
N 142 142 142
R2 0.83 0.82 0.58
Panel B: Restricted Model
∆Social Connections 0.054 0.054 0.044
(0.84) (0.77) (0.35)
∆(Social Connections x Tobin’s Q) 0.138** 0.174*** 0.267***
(2.52) (3.02) (2.80)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes
N 142 142 142
R2 0.83 0.82 0.58
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Table 5: Firm-Level Social Connections and Allocation Eciency
The dependent variable in Panel A and in Panel B (in columns (2) and (4)) is Relative Value Added
by Allocation, measured as the sum of the weighted Industry-Firm-Adjusted Capital Expenditure
across all segments of a rm in a given year (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). The depen-
dent variable in Panel B (in columns (1) and (3)) is one of the measures of rm connectedness.
Average Segment Connections is the sum of Segment Connections of divisional managers across
all segments scaled by a number of business segments in the given rm-year. Asset-Weighted
Segment Connections is the asset-weighted value of Segment Connections in a given rm-year.
Lost Connections is the cumulative number of connections lost (by divisional managers) due to
deaths and retirements of connected managers in the previous scal year. Exogenous Job Openings
is the total number of deaths and retirements of executives in all other rms in the state and
industry corresponding to those of the sample conglomerate measured at the previous scal year.
Firm Sales is the natural logarithm of the rm’s sales. Segment Diversity is the standard deviation
of asset-weighted segment Qs divided by equally weighted average segment Qs in a rm. Inverse
of Average Q is the inverse of equally weighted industry Tobin’s Q over segments of the rm. All
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
robust to heteroscedasticity standard errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: OLS Regressions
Dependent Variable Relative Value
Added by Allocation ( x 100)
Measure of Average Asset-Weighted
Firm Connectedness Segment Segment
Connections Connections
Model (1) (2)
Firm Connectedness 0.023*** 0.027***
(3.22) (2.95)
Firm Sales 0.007 0.006
(0.85) (0.82)
Segment Diversity -0.015 -0.038
(-0.17) (-0.42)
Inverse of Average Q -0.028 -0.022
(-0.36) (-0.29)
Year xed eects Yes Yes
Industry xed eects Yes Yes
N 616 616
R2 0.07 0.07
49
Panel B: IV-2SLS Regressions
Dependent Variable Relative Value
Added by Allocation ( x 100)
Measure of Average Asset-Weighted
Firm Connectedness Segment Connections Segment Connections
First Second First Second
Stage Stage Stage Stage
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Connectedness 0.080** 0.092**
(2.03) (1.99)
Lost Connections -0.136*** -0.120***
(-6.81) (-6.76)
Exogenous Job Openings -0.073** -0.049*
(-2.38) (-1.80)
Firm Sales 0.093 -0.005 0.057 -0.002
(0.54) (-0.10) (0.37) (-0.04)
Segment Diversity -0.055 0.079 0.296 0.046
(-0.11) (0.56) (0.68) (0.33)
Inverse of Average Q 0.398 -0.045 0.234 -0.035
(0.99) (-0.40) (0.66) (-0.31)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald F statistic 26.09 24.49
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.24 (0.63) 0.41 (0.52)
N 541 541 541 541
R2 0.82 0.36 0.76 0.36
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Table 6: Firm Connectedness and Firm Value
The dependent variable in Panel A and in Panel B (in columns (2) and (4)) is Excess Value, measured
as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the conglomerate actual value to its imputed value (Berger
and Ofek (1995)). A conglomerate actual value is the market value of assets, which is equal to the
market value of equity minus book assets and book value of debt. A conglomerate imputed value
is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where each segment’s imputed value is equal to
segment’s sales multiplied by the sales multiple (median market value of assets-to-sales ratio of all
single-segment rms in a segment two-digit SIC industry). The dependent variable in Panel B (in
columns (1) and (3)) is one of the measures of rm connectedness. Average Segment Connections is
the sum of Segment Connections of divisional managers across all segments scaled by a number
of business segments in the given rm-year. Asset-Weighted Segment Connections is the asset-
weighted value of Segment Connections in a given rm-year. Lost Connections is the cumulative
number of connections lost (by divisional managers) due to deaths and retirements of connected
managers in the previous scal year. Exogenous Job Openings is the total number of deaths and
retirements of executives in all other rms in the state and industry corresponding to those of the
sample conglomerate measured at the previous scal year. Firm Cash Flow is the sum of rm’s
income before extraordinary items and depreciation scaled by rm’s book assets. Firm Sales is the
natural logarithm of the rm’s sales. Segment Diversity is the standard deviation of asset-weighted
segment Qs divided by equally weighted average segment Qs in a rm. CEO Ownership is the
percent of the rm’s outstanding stock hold by CEO. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%
levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on robust to heteroscedasticity standard
errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: OLS Regressions
Dependent Variable Excess Value
Measure of Average Asset-Weighted
Firm Connectedness Segment Segment
Connections Connections
Model (1) (2)
Firm Connectedness 0.071*** 0.091***
(3.82) (3.60)
Firm Cash Flow 3.341*** 3.441***
(6.30) (6.48)
Firm Sales -0.139*** -0.141***
(-6.58) (-6.78)
Segment Diversity -0.347* -0.418**
(-1.89) (-2.28)
CEO Ownership 2.345** 2.299*
(2.00) (1.96)
Year xed eects Yes Yes
Industry xed eects Yes Yes
N 644 644
R2 0.19 0.18
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Panel B: IV-2SLS Regressions
Dependent Variable Excess Value
Measure of Average Asset-Weighted
Firm Connectedness Segment Connections Segment Connections
First Second First Second
Stage Stage Stage Stage
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Connectedness 0.136** 0.167**
(2.47) (2.53)
Lost Connections -0.137*** -0.117***
(-4.93) (-4.54)
Exogenous Job Openings -0.073** -0.046*
(-2.58) (-1.92)
Firm Cash Flow -0.687 0.702** -0.881** 0.758**
(-1.35) (1.99) (-2.02) (2.13)
Firm Sales 0.100 -0.184* 0.104 -0.188*
(0.60) (-1.72) (0.73) (-1.78)
Segment Diversity -0.160 -0.183 0.139 -0.230
(-0.50) (-0.71) (0.46) (-0.91)
CEO Ownership 2.200 -9.058** 0.315 -8.812*
(0.93) (-2.00) (0.13) (-1.91)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald F statistic 30.53 28.21
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.55 (0.46) 0.32 (0.57)
N 555 555 555 555
R2 0.82 0.86 0.77 0.86
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Table 7: Social Connections, Capital Allocation and Managers’ Turnovers
The table presents the results of segment-level regressions in which the dependent variable is
one of the characteristics of a division, to which a particular manager is assigned at the time of
turnover. Social Connections is measured by Segment Connections, which is computed an absolute
number of social connections of a divisional manager in a given rm-year. The sample includes
rm-segment-year observations in which the divisional manager has changed from the previous
year. The control variables are characteristics of the incoming manager. All regressions include
rm and calendar-year xed eects. All variables are dened in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported
in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the segment level. ***, **
and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Qt-1yr CAPEXt-1yr IA CAPEXt-1yr
Model (1) (2) (3)
Social Connections 0.253** 0.172 0.303
(1.97) (1.09) (1.40)
Segment Relative ROA 0.155** 0.051 0.107
(2.55) (0.69) (1.10)
Board Member 0.152 0.323** 0.381*
(0.63) (2.05) (1.95)
High Salary -0.387** -0.067 0.137
(-2.35) (-0.44) (0.76)
Retirement Age 0.730*** -0.196 -0.453
(2.73) (-0.72) (-1.57)
Long Tenure 0.022 -0.166 -0.258*
(0.18) (-1.55) (-1.74)
Senior Title 0.161 0.165 0.249
(0.71) (0.50) (0.63)
Ivy League -0.575*** -0.064 -0.293
(-2.78) (-0.51) (-1.47)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes
N 153 145 145
R2 0.87 0.84 0.72
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Table 8: Social Connections, Mismatch and Subsequent Segment Departure
The table presents the coecients of Cox proportional hazards and logit regressions, which pre-
dict that a divisional manager exits the segment (or company conditional on leaving the segment)
over the next year. Social Connections is measured by the absolute number of connections of a
divisional manager (with other divisional managers) minus the average number of connections
between divisional managers within a rm in a given year. Mismatch is the absolute value of
dierence between two ranks: raw connections rank of a divisional manager and segment rank on
Tobin’s Q. All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the scal year, in which the
manager leaves the segment. Retirement Age is an indicator that equals 1 if a divisional manager’s
age is above 60 years old in a given year. Tenure at Segment is the tenure of a divisional manager
at the segment (in months) measured at the time of exit. z-statistics, reported in parentheses, are
based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Cox Hazards Regressions Logit Regressions
Dependent Variable Segment Company Segment Company
Exit Exit Exit Exit
Conditional Conditional
on on
Segment Exit Segment Exit
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Connectionst-1yr -0.122* -0.108 -0.197** -0.170*
(-1.72) (-1.25) (-2.27) (-1.72)
Mismatcht-1yr 0.189*** 0.159** 0.020 -0.034
(2.81) (2.10) (0.23) (-0.34)
Social Con.t-1yr x Mismatcht-1yr 0.122*** 0.130** 0.149*** 0.147**
(2.87) (2.49) (2.91) (2.32)
Retirement Aget-1yr 0.853*** 0.880*** 1.470*** 1.384***
(5.32) (4.67) (4.53) (4.42)
Tenure at Segment -0.018*** -0.015***
(-5.81) (-4.36)
N 692 692 692 692
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Table 9: Excess Value and Segment Diversity
The table reports dierences-in-means estimates for Excess Value, measured as the natural loga-
rithm of the ratio of the conglomerate actual value to its imputed value (Berger and Ofek (1995)).
A conglomerate actual value is the market value of assets, which is equal to the market value
of equity minus book assets and book value of debt. A conglomerate imputed value is the
sum of the imputed values of its segments, where each segment’s imputed value is equal to
segment’s sales multiplied by the sales multiple (median market value of assets-to-sales ratio
of all single-segment rms in a segment two-digit SIC industry). High- (Low-) Connected Firm is
an indicator that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the Average Segment Connections is above
(below) the sample median, where Average Segment Connections is a sum of a number of social
connections of divisional managers across all segments scaled by a number of business segments
in the given rm-year. High (Low) Diversity is an indicator that equals one (and zero otherwise)
if the Segment Diversity is above (below) the sample median, where Segment Diversity is the
standard deviation of asset-weighted segment Qs divided by equally weighted average segment
Qs in a rm. *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level.
Firm Value and Segment Diversity
High- Low-
Connected Connected Dierence t-statistic
Firm Firm
High Diversity (> Median):
Excess Value 0.128 -0.182 0.311 4.25 ***
Low Diversity (< Median):
Excess Value -0.065 -0.137 0.073 0.93
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Table 10: Social Connections and Information Asymmetry
The dependent variable in Panel A and in Panel B (in columns (2) and (4)) is Internal Information
Asymmetry, measured as the dierence in trading prots between divisional managers and top-5
corporate managers (Chen, Martin, Wang, Roychowdhury and Billett (2016)). The trading prot
is average cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return over the period of six months from the
transaction date for open market insider (“opportunistic”) trades in a given rm during the current
scal year. The dependent variable in Panel B (in columns (1) and (3)) is one of the measures
of rm connectedness. Average Segment Connections is the sum of Segment Connections of
divisional managers across all segments scaled by a number of business segments in the given
rm-year. Asset-Weighted Segment Connections is the asset-weighted value of Segment Connec-
tions in a given rm-year. Lost Connections is the cumulative number of connections lost (by
divisional managers) due to deaths and retirements of connected managers in the previous scal
year. Exogenous Job Openings is the total number of deaths and retirements of executives in all
other rms in the state and industry corresponding to those of the sample conglomerate measured
at the previous scal year. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of the rm’s
equity. Book-to-Market is book value of common equity divided by the market value of the rm’s
equity. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on robust to heteroscedasticity standard
errors. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: OLS Regressions
Dependent Variable Dierence in Trading Prots between
Divisional Managers and Top-5 Executives
Measure of Average Asset-Weighted
Firm Connectedness Segment Segment
Connections Connections
Model (1) (2)
Firm Connectedness -0.014** -0.016**
(-2.15) (-2.08)
Firm size 0.004 0.004
(1.49) (1.45)
Book-to-Market 0.077* 0.082*
(1.75) (1.84)
Year xed eects Yes Yes
Industry xed eects Yes Yes
N 307 307
R2 0.09 0.08
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Panel B: IV-2SLS Regressions
Dependent Variable Dierence in Trading Prots between
Divisional Managers and Top-5 Executives
Measure of Average Asset-Weighted
Firm Connectedness Segment Connections Segment Connections
First Second First Second
Stage Stage Stage Stage
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Connectedness -0.067** -0.099**
(-2.26) (-1.98)
Lost Connections -0.115*** -0.076**
(-3.32) (-2.35)
Exogenous Job Openings -0.095** -0.069*
(-2.08) (-1.73)
Firm Size -0.012 0.002 -0.035 -0.001
(-0.21) (0.23) (-0.74) (-0.13)
Book-to-Market 0.208 0.103 0.088 0.098
(0.40) (1.37) (0.17) (1.33)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald F statistic 15.32 10.19
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.003 (0.95) 0.001 (0.99)
N 270 270 270 270
R2 0.85 0.40 0.77 0.40
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Table 11: Reverse Causality and Robustness Checks
The table presents the coecients on main variables of interest from segment-level regressions from Table 3 Panel B. All regressions
include the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All variables are dened in Appendix A.. t-statistics, reported in parentheses,
are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the segment level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Model
Specication Keeping only Connections Excluding Divisions Overseen Controlling for Controlling for External
Formed Before Current Position by Multiple Managers Connections to CEO Manager Connectedness
Dependent CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA
Variable CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Social Connections 0.042 0.022 0.033 0.061* 0.039 0.040 0.051 0.027 0.012 0.056* 0.042 0.024
(1.28) (0.56) (0.73) (1.77) (1.02) (0.91) (1.56) (0.72) (0.31) (1.67) (1.06) (0.58)
Tobin’s Q 0.031 0.014 0.017 0.035 0.021 0.032 0.033 0.016 0.020 0.032 0.020 0.022
(0.71) (0.27) (0.28) (0.75) (0.38) (0.49) (0.77) (0.32) (0.34) (0.75) (0.38) (0.36)
Social Con. x Tobin’s Q 0.081** 0.088** 0.075* 0.079** 0.088** 0.079* 0.082** 0.094** 0.090** 0.082** 0.094** 0.091**
(2.40) (2.30) (1.69) (2.25) (2.23) (1.72) (2.49) (2.55) (2.13) (2.47) (2.50) (2.12)
Connected to CEO 0.089* 0.124** 0.115*
(1.69) (2.04) (1.67)
Degree Centrality 0.019 -0.008 0.019
(0.72) (-0.27) (0.55)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2008 2008 2008 1729 1729 1729 2008 2008 2008 1981 1981 1981
R2 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.49 0.37 0.19 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.49 0.37 0.17
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Panel B: Restricted Model
Specication Keeping only Connections Excluding Divisions Overseen Controlling for Controlling for External
Formed Before Current Position by Multiple Managers Connections to CEO Manager Connectedness
Dependent CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA CAPEX IA IFA
Variable CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Social Connections 0.042 0.022 0.033 0.061* 0.039 0.040 0.051 0.027 0.012 0.056* 0.041 0.023
(1.30) (0.56) (0.73) (1.77) (1.02) (0.92) (1.57) (0.72) (0.31) (1.66) (1.06) (0.58)
Social Con. x Tobin’s Q 0.080** 0.088** 0.074* 0.077** 0.087** 0.078* 0.080** 0.094** 0.089** 0.081** 0.093** 0.090**
(2.40) (2.30) (1.69) (2.26) (2.25) (1.73) (2.49) (2.56) (2.14) (2.47) (2.51) (2.13)
Connected to CEO 0.088* 0.123** 0.114*
(1.66) (2.03) (1.66)
Degree Centrality 0.021 -0.007 0.020
(0.79) (-0.23) (0.59)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2008 2008 2008 1729 1729 1729 2008 2008 2008 1981 1981 1981
R2 0.49 0.37 0.16 0.49 0.37 0.19 0.49 0.37 0.17 0.48 0.37 0.17
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8 Appendix A. Variables Denitions
A. Segment and Firm Financial Variables
• Capital Expenditure (CAPEX)– Annual capital expenditure of the division (capxs) divided
by the division’s lagged book assets (ias).
• Industry-Adjusted Capital Expenditure (IA CAPEX)– Annual capital expenditure of the
division adjusted for the industry-specic variation in capital expenditures, as measured by
the median capital expenditure of single-segment rms in the division’s industry (two-digit
SIC code), formally presented by the equation below. Here I denotes capital expenditures
of segment j, BA denotes book assets, ss denotes single-segment rms in the segment’s
two-digit industry:
Industry-Adjusted Capital Expenditure =
Ij
BAj
− I
ss
j
BAssj
• Industry-Firm-Adjusted Capital Expenditure (IFA CAPEX)– Industry-adjusted capital ex-
penditure further adjusted for the rm’s asset-weighted average of industry-adjusted cap-
ital expenditures across all divisions, formally presented by the equation below. Here I
denotes capital expenditures of segment j, BA denotes book assets, ss denotes single-
segment rms in the segment’s two-digit industry, and wj is the ratio of segment assets to
rm assets:
Industry-Firm-Adjusted Capital Expenditure =
Ij
BAj
− I
ss
j
BAssj
−
N∑
j=1
wj
(
Ij
BAj
− I
ss
j
BAssj
)
• Tobin’s Q (industry) – the median Tobin’s Q across all single-segment rms in the segment’s
two-digit SIC code industry, where the Tobin’s Q for single-segment rms is equal to market
value of assets (book assets (at) + market value of common equity (csho*prcc) – common
equity (ceq) – deferred taxes (txdb)) / (0.9*book value of assets (at) + 0.1*market value of
assets).
• High Q (Low Q) segment – division with Tobin’s Q above (below) the sample median.
• Segment Size – the natural logarithm of the segment’s lagged book assets (ias).
• Segment Relative Size - ratio of lagged segment assets (ias) to lagged rm assets (at).
• Segment Cash Flow – annual operating prot (ops) plus depreciation (dps) divided by
lagged book assets (ias).
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• Relative ROA – the dierence between the industry-adjusted ROA of the division and the
average industry-adjusted ROA of other divisions in the rm. Industry-adjusted ROA of a
division is the dierence between the ROA of the division and the median ROA of single-
segment rms in the division’s industry (two-digit SIC code).
• Firm Sales – the natural logarithm of the rm’s sales (sale).
• Firm Cash Flow – sum of rm’s income before extraordinary items (ib) and depreciation
(dp) scaled by rm’s book assets (at).
• Firm Size - the natural logarithm of the market value of the rm’s equity.
• Book-to-Market - book value of common equity divided by the market value of the rm’s
equity.
• Inverse of Average Q – inverse of equally weighted industry Tobin’s Q over segments of
the rm.
• CEO Ownership – percent of the rm’s outstanding stock hold by CEO.
• Excess Value – the natural logarithm of the ratio of the conglomerate actual value to its
imputed value. A conglomerate actual value is the market value of assets, which is equal
to the market value of equity minus book assets and book value of debt. A conglomerate
imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, where each segment’s
imputed value is equal to segment’s sales multiplied by the sales multiple (median market
value of assets-to-sales ratio of all single-segment rms in a segment two-digit SIC indus-
try).(Berger and Ofek (1995))
• Relative Value Added by Allocation – the sum of the weighted Industry-Firm-Adjusted
Capital Expenditure across all segments of a rm in a given year (Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales (2000)).
• Segment Diversity – standard deviation of asset-weighted segment Qs divided by equally
weighted average segment Qs in a rm (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). Here q denotes
industry Tobin’s Q of segment j, and wj is the ratio of segment assets to rm assets:
Segment Diversity =
√∑N
j=1
(wjqj−w¯q)2
n−1∑N
j=1 qj
n
• Internal Information Asymmetry (IIA) – dierence in trading prots between divisional
managers and top corporate managers (Chen, Martin, Wang, Roychowdhury and Billett
(2016)). The trading prot of divisional managers is average cumulative market-adjusted
abnormal return over the period of six months from the transaction date for the division
managers’ open market insider trades in a given rm during the current scal year. The
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trading prot of top corporate managers is average cumulative market-adjusted abnor-
mal return over the period of six months from the transaction date for the top corporate
managers managers’ open market insider trades in a given rm during the current scal
year. The group of top corporate managers includes top-5 executives: CEO, Chairman, Vice
Chairman, CFO, COO. We consider only “opportunistic” trades. In calculating the abnormal
return for open market sale transactions, we take the opposite sign.
B. Manager Variables
• Board Member – an indicator that equals 1 if a divisional manager is a member of the board
of directors in a company in a given year.
• High Salary – an indicator that equals 1 if a divisional manager is reported by ExecuComp
among rm’s ve executives with a highest salary.
• Retirement Age - an indicator that equals 1 if a divisional manager’s age is above 60 years
old in a given year.
• Long Tenure – an indicator that equals 1 if the tenure of a divisional manager in the
company is more than 10 years.
• Senior Title – an indicator that equals 1 if a manager’s role description on BoardEx includes
"senior" or “executive”.
• Ivy League – an indicator that equals 1 if a divisional manager graduated from an Ivy league
school.
• Tenure at Segment – total tenure of a manager at the segment (in months).
C. Connections Variables
• Social Connections – an absolute number of social connections of a divisional manager in
a given rm-year.
• Average Segment Connections – a sum of Segment Connections of divisional managers
across all segments scaled by a number of business segments in the given rm-year.
• High (Low) Segment Connections – an indicator that equals 1 if segment connections are
above (below) the sample median.
• Asset-weighted Segment Connections – asset-weighted value of Segment Connections in
a given rm-year.
• High- (Low-) Connected Firm – an indicator that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the
Average Segment Connections are above (below) the sample median.
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• Mismatch – an absolute value of dierence between two ranks: rank of social connections
of a divisional manager and segment’s (which this manager operates) rank on Tobin’s Q.
• Connected to CEO - an indicator that equals 1 if a divisional manager has at least one social
connection (through prior employment or education) to CEO in a company in a given year.
• Degree Centrality – degree centrality for a divisional manager in a given year, measured
in percentiles (1 to 100), and based on employment network formed in quoted and private
companies in North America.
• Eigenvector Centrality – eigenvector centrality for a divisional manager in a given year,
measured in percentiles (1 to 100), and based on employment network formed in quoted
and private companies in North America.
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL CONNECTIONS ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN
SUPPLIER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS
1 Abstract
Using a matched supplier-customer sample of U.S. rms, we examine capital structure decisions
of suppliers with social connections to major customers, which invest in relation-specic assets.
Suppliers connected to major customers with relation-specic assets have higher debt ratios. To
establish causality, we use top executives’ turnovers at the customer rms as exogenous shocks
to supplier connections. We document that following the turnover supplier rms signicantly
reduce debt ratios. We propose two explanations for this result. Consistent with the role of
connections in bonding trading parties’ commitment, connections to major customers help to
increase customer purchases and support longer business relationships. Consistent with the role
of connections in mitigating information asymmetry, connected suppliers choose higher debt
only when information asymmetry is high. In addition, building up debt helps suppliers to reduce
underleverage and move faster toward target leverage ratios. Overall, our results are consistent
with the view that connections help to strengthen implicit contracts through establishing trust
between trading parties.
2 Introduction
There is a large stream of literature that studies the choice of capital structure in the presence
of relation-specic investments (e.g. Titman (1984), Maksimovic and Titman (1991), Kale and
Shahrur (2007), Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008), Hennessy and Livdan (2009), Chu (2012)).
Theoretical arguments imply that suppliers choose lower levels of debt, because customers with
investments in relation-specic assets will suer direct costs if the supplier goes bankrupt (Tit-
man (1984)) and customers are reluctant to deal with supplier who may not have incentives to
maintain reputation (Maksimovic and Titman (1991)). Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Banerjee,
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Dasgupta and Kim (2008) nd empirical support for these arguments and show that rms use de-
creased leverage to commit to business partners who undertake relationship-specic investments.
High debt increases the risk of bankruptcy and rm distress costs, so rms choose lower debt to
signal their business partners about their nancial heath and stability of long-term relationships.
In this paper we build up on this literature and focus on the bilateral social connections between
executives of customer and supplier rms. Our research question is how social connections
to customers who undertake relation-specic investments aect capital structure decisions of
suppliers. We focus on studying capital structure decisions of dependent suppliers, because they
are much smaller than customers, and the loss of the major customer may substantially damage
the dependent supplier nancial health.
On one hand, there are several reasons why we may observe the positive eect of connec-
tions to major customers with relation-specic investments on the suppliers’ capital structure.
First, connected suppliers are more likely to pursue riskier nancial policies if they know that
the relationship with the customer with relation-specic investments is stable. We build our
intuition on the vast literature in sociology and economics, which shows that connections can
create trust between connected individuals (e.g. Coleman (1988), Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998),
Woolcock (1998), Putnam (2000), Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2009)) through building
so-called “social collateral” (or “credit slip”), which serves similar to physical collateral securing
borrowing-lending transactions. The break of contracts may incur personal and rm reputational
damage (Brass and Labianca (2006), Karpo and Lott (1993)), so social connections between
customer and supplier rms are likely to decrease the probability that each rm will behave
opportunistically toward its partner. When social connections promote trust between trading
parties, suppliers in multiperiod settings will maintain their reputation for future sales (and, for
example, will not reduce the quality of the products), because cheating will have monetary and
social costs. Thus, connections allow the suppliers to take more debt, because they are condent
in the future stability of the relationship and repayment of the debt. We label this channel as
bonding channel.
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Second, personal connections can mitigate the information asymmetry between parties in
supply-chain relationship (Chen, Levy, Martin, and Shalev (2017)) by transmitting hard and soft
information and lowering monitoring costs. Moreover, recent studies have provided evidence
about the role of social connections in mitigating information asymmetries in nancial decisions
(e.g. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008), (2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). Socially connected
customer and supplier are likely to interact more frequently than unconnected parties, and more
intensively - even outside their formal business relationship. Frequent interactions will facilitate
information transfers between parties (e.g. through communication or factory site visits), thereby
mitigating information asymmetry. Thus when suppliers have connections to customer rms,
the customer rms are likely to have greater access to information about nancial health of
their suppliers and can better evaluate the risk of potential bankruptcy. If social connections to
customers with investments in relation-specic assets reduce costs of monitoring, then dependent
suppliers will choose higher level of debt. We refer to this channel as information asymmetry
channel.
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that connections to major customers with
relation-specic assets may lead to lower debt. This happens, for example, if debt is used to
protect prots from expropriation (e.g. Bronars and Deere (1991)). The threat of surplus renego-
tiation leads to ex ante underinvestment in specic assets (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990)). Higher debt helps to “shield” prots and reduce the amount of prots that could
be expropriated. In our setting, social connections while promoting trust between parties could
lower the likelihood of aggressive renegotiation. We label this channel as bargaining channel.
We use BoardEx to calculate the connections between senior managers of customer and
supplier rms. We consider two people as being connected if they participated in the same
organization at the same time in the past. To account for potential reverse causality when
business relationship leads to a formation of connections, we focus only on past connections
formed at third-party organizations (e.g. universities, past employment). We additionally exclude
connections that we formed after the start of the customer-supplier business relationship as a
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robustness check. We take information from Compustat Segment les and use the combination
of manual and automated procedures to identify the major customers (customers with more than
10% of supplier sales).21
Using a matched supplier-customer sample of U.S. rms, we nd a strong support for a
positive eect of social connections on market leverage of suppliers. We document that suppliers
connected to key R&D-intensive customers choose higher book and market leverage. The eect
of connections to key R&D-intensive customers on the leverage is economically meaningful. We
estimate that for a median rm, an increase in market leverage due to connections compensates
for approximately the half of the leverage decline due to customers’ R&D investments.
Our results hold even after controlling for potential endogeneity concerns. While we use
supplier xed eects to account for supplier-level unobservable factors, one needs to rule out
all other potential explanations. For example, the allocation of certain types of suppliers across
customer rms is not random, and suppliers’ leverage choices could be a function of customer
characteristics. Specically, Demirci (2016), Lian (2017) and Oliveira, Kadapakkam and Beyhaghi
(2017) show that customer nancial health aects the leverage of the supplier. To address the
endogeneity concerns we use two independent approaches. The rst one is the event study, when
we use turnovers of key executives (CEO, CFO or COO) at the customer rms as exogenous shocks
to supplier connections. These shocks are likely to be exogenous to the managers’ connections
at the supplier rms, because on average the purchases from a particular supplier constitute less
than 3% from customer total purchases. The turnovers of key executives at the customer rms
are likely to lead to a loss or break of social connections that suppliers have formed with the
customer rms. Using dierence-in-dierence research design, we compare changes in leverage
ratios of the connected suppliers that have lost connections to the changes in leverage ratios of
the connected suppliers to the same customer that did not lose any connections as a result of
21Because relationship-specic investments are unobservable, we follow a common approach in the literature
and use rm’s research and development (R&D) expenditures as a proxy for relationship-specic investments (e.g.
Titman and Wessels (1988), Allen and Phillips (2000), Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008)). R&D expenditures include
expenses incurred in research and development of the product, reecting rm’s innovation eort. When a supplier
(customer) rm makes relation-specic investments in a partner, it tends to produce unique and customized products
that have no close substitutes (Titman and Wessels (1988), Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008)).
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the turnover at the customer rm. Comparing suppliers for the same customer allows us to keep
the quality of the customer (observed and unobserved) constant. We show that suppliers with
R&D-intensive customers experience signicant drops in leverage ratios following the loss of the
connections.
The second approach is the propensity score matching, where we match connected and un-
connected suppliers to eliminate dierences in observable characteristics. We repeat our baseline
tests on the sample of suppliers, which are similar across all key characteristics, but dier only in
being connected to their customer. We show that our results that connections to R&D-intensive
customers positively aect supplier’s leverage continue to hold. In addition, we address the
potential reverse causality problem, when existing business relationships facilitate the formation
of social connections between trading partners. We exclude connections formed after the start of
the business relationship between suppliers, and our baseline results continue to hold.
We next study the potential explanations for the positive eect of connections to R&D-
intensive customers on leverage. Consistent with the bonding channel, connected suppliers are
likely to increase leverage when trading relationships are more intense and last longer. To test
this channel, we rst show that after controlling for rm xed eects suppliers connected to
key customers indeed have higher sales to these customers. In addition, using Cox proportional
hazard model we nd that business relationships tend to last longer for suppliers connected
to key customers. These eects are stronger in the subsamples of suppliers with connections
to R&D-intensive customers. Second, we nd that the eect of connections to R&D-intensive
customers on market leverage is signicantly stronger when relationship between supplier and
customer is intense and lasts longer. Overall, these results strongly support the bonding channel
that connected suppliers are likely to increase debt when they are condent in the stability of the
relationship.
We also nd support for the information asymmetry channel and show that the eect of so-
cial connections to R&D-intensive customers is stronger when information asymmetry between
customer and supplier is high. We use geographical distance between supplier and customer
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locations to measure information asymmetry. Higher distance is associated with higher costs
of access to information and higher monitoring costs (Giroud (2013), Costello (2013)). Since
social connections facilitate communication between parties and help to decrease the information
acquisition costs, social connections should be more important when customers and suppliers are
located far away from each other. We compute average geographical distance between supplier
and its key customers by averaging the distances between the headquarters location of supplier
and that of each of its customers. Consistent with our expectations, we nd that the positive eect
of social connections to R&D-intensive customers on market leverage is signicant only when
supplier is located far away from the customer. Overall, these results imply that connections may
serve a channel for reducing information asymmetry between trading parties.
To provide a better picture of the eect of connections on leverage, we perform a set of
tests examining the deviation from the target capital structure. If connections indeed promote
bonding and resolve information asymmetry issues, then we might expect that taking extra debt
does not “push” the supplier towards nancial distress. Consistent with this expectation, we
nd that suppliers connected to R&D-intensive customers are likely to optimally increase debt.
Specically, we observe that as customers increase R&D investments, connected suppliers signif-
icantly reduce underleverage, while unconnected suppliers signicantly increase underleverage.
Consistent with our channels, we interpret this evidence as connected suppliers being able to
move closer to optimal (target) debt levels.
Our study contributes to the emerging research on the role of social connections in customer-
supplier relationships. To our knowledge, we are the rst to focus on the eect of social connec-
tions between customers and suppliers on supplier capital structure decisions. We extend the
work of Chen, Levy, Martin, and Shalev (2017), who study how social connections aect the
selection of suppliers and contractual terms between suppliers and customers, and the work of
Dasgupta, Zhang and Zhu (2017), who study the eect of social connections between customers
and suppliers on supplier innovation.
Our study is also related to the stream of research on solutions to hold-up problems in
69
customer-supplier relationships. For example, Johnson, Karpo and Yi (2015) nd that IPO rms
being heavily dependent on their business partners benet from using takeover defenses to show
commitment to their business relationships. When a rm goes public it becomes an easy target,
especially when it is young and small. In case of takeover the management is usually replaced,
what can lead to renegotiation of previous informal agreements. The use of takeover defenses
helps the rm to commit to its business strategy, and, moreover, to signal to the partner that
it values the relationship. The work of Dass, Kale and Nanda (2014) suggests that trade credit
can serve as a commitment device between vertically related rms, which invest in relationship-
specic assets. In contrast to these studies, we focus on the role of social connections in bonding
to partners’ contracts.
3 Sample and Data
3.1 Sample and Variable Construction
To construct the sample, we select all rms covered by the Compustat Industry Segment le dur-
ing the period from 2000 through 2014. According to SFAS No. 131, rms are required to disclose
the identity of the principal customer that account for more than 10% of their total sales, and some
rms voluntary report the names of the principal customers when sales are below the threshold.
We treat all disclosed customers as the principal customers, but exclude customers, whose names
are reported as “Customers”, “Companies”, “Distributors” or “Not reported”. We keep rms with
non-missing information on sales to major customers. One diculty in working with Compustat
Segment le is to determine whether the customer rm is covered by Compustat/CRSP les, as
customer names are often abbreviated.
In matching disclosed customer names with Compustat/CRSP les we follow (Fee and
Thomas (2004)) and use a combination of automated and manual procedures. Specically, we
rst match each customer name with several potential Compustat rms, based on customer
name spelling. Then we manually check and conrm each match based on corporate names and
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industry classication. If the customer is a subsidiary of a publicly traded rm, then we assign to
the customer the identier of the parent corporation. We tend to be conservative in our matching
of customer names to rm identiers to ensure that disclosed customers are matched to correct
Compustat rms.
Following previous studies of capital structure determinants (e.g. Berger, Ofek and Yermack
(1997), Kale and Shahrur (2007)), we exclude nancial rms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999)
and utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999). We then require that each customer-supplier pair
is present in BoardEx database. BoardEx provides information on work and educational histories,
board memberships and non-prot organization memberships, as well as information on bilateral
social connections for senior executives. Because prior to 2000 the coverage of BoardEx is limited,
we use 2000 as a starting year to mitigate survivorship bias (Engelberg, Gao and Parsons (2013)).
We use CIK identier to match BoardEx and Compustat databases. For cases, when CIK was not
provided, we used a string matching procedure to match company names from both databases.
To ensure the quality of the matching procedure, we manually checked all matches and made
necessary corrections.
Finally, we require that both suppliers and customers have non-missing nancial infor-
mation. Firm-level nancial variables are obtained from Compustat and CRSP databases. To
eliminate outliers, we trim the sample by excluding observations with market and book leverage
greater than 1, rm cash ow (to total assets) greater than 1 or less than -1, rm’s Tobin’s Q
greater 10 and then winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th sample percentiles. The nal
sample consists of 1219 unique supplier rms, 493 customer rms and 5374 supplier rm-year
observations.22
We use two measures of nancial leverage as common in the literature (e.g. Baker and
22The sample size implies 4.4 observations on average per rm per year. This smaller number of observations
relative to the sample duration from 2000 to 2014 is for two reasons. First, the need to match with BoardEx, where we
require that both supplier and customer rms not only be present in the database, but the composition of executives
be covered in the “Summary” les for both rms in a given year. Our sample size is substantially reduced because
for early 2000s the coverage of BoardEx is still limited, and we drop supplier-customer pair in a given year if either
rm is not represented in terms of composition of managers. Second, we aggregate the observations by supplier rm
for all customers of a given supplier. As a result, our sample is not by pair-level, but by supplier rm-level. Later, in
section 3.2.1 we describe our empirical model.
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Wurgler (2002), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)). The rst one, Market Leverage, is equal
to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the sum of
book value of debt and market value of common equity. The second one, Book leverage, is the sum
of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by book value of assets.
The data on social connections are obtained from BoardEx. Following the extensive lit-
erature, we base our measure of social connections on employment, educational and social ties
between senior managers of supplier and customer rms. We focus only on connections formed
between executives that potentially participate in supply chain decisions: specically, we restrict
our attention to connections formed between senior managers (e.g. CEO, CFO, COO), excluding
board members for the analysis. For example, besides CEO, CFO and COO, we consider the
following titles frequently represented in our sample: “Senior Vice President”, “Vice President”,
“Division VP/President”, “General Manager”, “Executive VP”. We consider two people as being
connected if they participated in the same organization at the same time in the past. For example,
we would classify two executives as being connected if they both previously worked at the same
public or private company. Because the business relationship between customer and supplier may
lead to a formation of the connections between them, we require the employment connections
be formed only at third-party companies. Similarly, two executives would share an educational
connection if they both studied in the same university or were members of professional/social
clubs during the same period of time in the past. The overwhelming majority of connections
(about 94%) comes from employment or board memberships in public or private companies, about
4% - are educational connections and the remaining connections (about 2%) - are connections
formed through memberships in professional organizations and social clubs.
We compute our measure of connections similar to Ishii and Xuan (2014). For each supplier-
customer pair we count the number of connected pairs of individuals composed of one member of
the supplier rm and one member of the customer rm. Then we computeConnections to Key Customer
by dividing the number of connected pairs by the total number of pairs that exist between indi-
viduals of customer and supplier rms.
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3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of variables we used in the empirical analysis. As shown in
Panel A the mean market leverage of the supplier is 17% and the share sales to key customers is
about 27%. Customers are much greater in size (as measured by book value of assets and market
capitalization) than suppliers, and the ratio of the median book assets of the customer to that
of the supplier indicates that customer is about 64 times bigger than the median supplier. An
average supplier invests about 7% of the book assets in R&D, and average Key customers R&D
(dened as the sum of R&D-intensities of key customers weighted by the percentage of sales to
these customers) is about 0.01 and consistent with the values reported in Kale and Shahrur (2007).
Overall, the descriptive statistics of the independent variables show that rms in our sample dier
signicantly across characteristics of suppliers and their customers.
About 60% of suppliers are connected, and for the sample of pairs of suppliers and customers
the average Connections to Key Customer is about 0.01 suggesting that on average six connections
exist between a typical supplier and customer rms in our sample.23 In panel B we report the
numbers by subsamples based on existence of Connections to Key Customer between supplier and
customer. We dene an indicator variable Connected equals one if Connections to Key Customer
is positive, suggesting that a supplier has a least one connection with its key customer(s). Con-
nected suppliers have higher level of market and book leverage, higher book value of assets,
invest more in R&D, are less risky (as measured by standard deviation of ROA for the previous
10 years) than unconnected suppliers. Connected suppliers dier from unconnected suppliers
along their customers’ characteristics. For example, connected suppliers have higher number of
major customers, sell a higher share of their sales to their major customers than unconnected
suppliers, and have key customers with greater R&D-intensity. The dierences are signicant
at 1%. The summary statistics suggest that there are signicant dierences between connected
and unconnected suppliers, and in our empirical analysis we account for this dierences, rst,
23Given that the average [median] network size (number of non-board executives) of a supplier rm in our sample
is 16 [13], and the average network size of the customer rm is much larger than that of a supplier with the average
[median] number of executives of 39 [33].
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by explicitly controlling for this dierences in our regression analysis and, second, by using
propensity-score matching to create similar subsamples of connected and unconnected suppliers
across these characteristics.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Univariate Results
Table 2 compares the mean values of measures of nancial leverage for the connected and uncon-
nected subsamples. Panel A (B) reports the mean values of market (book) leverage across terciles
of Key Customers R&D and between connected and unconnected subsamples. There are several
observations from this table. First, the market and book leverage almost monotonously decline
with the increase in Key Customers R&D, consistent that rms decrease leverage when they have
customers investing in relation-specic assets (Kale and Shahrur (2007)). The decline in leverage
across terciles ofKey Customers R&D is observed for connected (t=7.49 and t=10.11 for market and
book leverage, respectively) and for unconnected suppliers (t=8.25 and t=8.91). Second, in every
tercile of Key Customers R&D the market leverage for connected suppliers is signicantly higher
than for unconnected suppliers. The dierences persist at 1%. The similar picture is observed for
the book leverage. These results suggest that cross-rm social connections are associated with
higher debt levels for suppliers whose major customers undertake relation-specic investments.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis
4.2.1. Empirical Model
To test how connections to key customers that undertake relation-specic investments aect the
rm leverage, we estimate the following regression model:
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Supplier Debtit = β1Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers+
+γXit−1 + ζi + δt + it
(4)
where Supplier Debtit is a market (book) leverage of supplier i in scal year t,
Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is the sum of connections between supplier i and
each of its key customer weighted by R&D intensities and sales to these customers measured at
the scal year t-1. The regression also includes a set of control variables Xit−1, rm xed eects
ζi, and year xed eects δt. We include rm xed eects to account for cross-rm heterogeneity
(such as strategy, managerial talent) that could potentially aect the amount of debt the rm
takes. The year xed eects help to account for macroeconomic factors that could aect the
leverage decisions of sample rms. Because the unit of observation is supplier rm-year, we
adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and cluster at rm (supplier) level.
Our main variable of interest is Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is computed
in the following way:
Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers =
n∑
j=1
(Connections to Key Customerj
× Key Customer R&Dj × Sales to Key Customerj)
here n is the number of customer rms, Connections to Key Customerj is the total number
of connections between executives of supplier and customer rms scaled by the total number of
possible executives’ pairs (see the discussion of this measure in section 2.1), Key Customer R&Dj
is equal to the R&D expense (scaled by total assets) of the jth customer, Sales to Key Customerj is
the percentage of rm’s sales to the jth customer.
The intuition behind this measure is similar to that of the measure of weighted R&D inten-
sities of all major customers introduced in Kale and Shahrur (2007). If the supplier expects that
customers will undertake relation-specic investments, supplier will choose the level of debt to
be dependent on connections to all key R&D-intensive customers.
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Because Kale and Shahrur (2007) shows that suppliers’ leverage depends on R&D intensities
of all major customers, we explicitly include this variable in the model (1). Key Customers R&D
is a sum of sales-weighted R&D intensities of all major customers for a supplier rm in a given
year:
Key Customers R&D =
n∑
j=1
(Key Customer R&Dj × Sales to Key Customerj)
Other control variables include variables that are known to aect the leverage (e.g. Berger,
Ofek and Yermack (1997), MacKay and Phillips (2005), Kale and Shahrur (2007), Lemmon, Roberts,
and Zender (2008)). These variables include: Size (natural logarithm of total assets), ROA (oper-
ating income divided by total assets), Fixed Assets (net property, plant and equipment divided by
total assets), R&D (research and development expenditures divided by total assets), SGA (selling,
general and administrative expenses divided by total assets), Tobin’s Q (book value of assets plus
the market value of common equity minus the book value of common equity divided by book
value of assets), Volatility (rolling standard deviation of ROA for the previous 10 years relative to
a given year), Non-Debt Tax Shields (investment tax credit divided by total assets).
4.2.2. The Eect of Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers on Dependent Sup-
pliers Leverage: Baseline Results
Table 3 reports the results of estimation of equation (1). First, the results show the coecient on
Key Customers R&D is negative and signicant at 1%, suggesting that suppliers decrease leverage
when they have R&D-intensive customers. This result is similar to Kale and Shahrur (2007), who
show that rm’s leverage is negatively related to R&D intensities of its customers and suppli-
ers. Second, the connections to R&D-intensive customers increase the leverage. For example,
as Panel A column (1) shows the coecient on Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is
positive and signicant at 5%. In column (2) we report the results of regressions, in which
industry xed eects (based on 2-digit SIC industry classication) are added. We include industry
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xed eects to account for time-invariant industry dierences in leverage. The coecient on
Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers remains positive and becomes signicant at 1% (t =
2.73). Column (3) reports the results of regressions with rm xed eects added. And again,
the coecient on Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is positive and signicant at 1%
(t = 2.59). It’s worth to note that rm xed eects can also absorb slow-changing cross-rm
dierences in corporate governance (investor protection, antitakeover laws, etc.), since R&D
expenses can be correlated with the quality of a supplier corporate governance (John, Litov and
Yeung (2008), Sapra, Subramanian and Subramanian (2014)).
The eect is economically meaningful. To evaluate the economic signicance we rst
estimate the portion of change in the main explanatory variable Connections to Key R&D-intensive
Customers due to change in the rst component - when Connections to Key Customer moves from
the 5th percentile value to the 95th percentile value, holding Key Customer R&D and Sales to
Key Customer at their sample means. Next we compute the change in market leverage due to
change of Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers caused by change in connections. For
example, using the estimated coecient in column (2), we nd that when Connections to Key
Customer moves from the 5th percentile value to the 95th percentile, the Connections to Key
R&D-intensive Customers increases by 0.045, what corresponds to leverage increase by 0.01 or
by 10% for a median rm. Further, to better evaluate the economic signicance, we compute
the drop in leverage associated with the change in Key Customers R&D. It turns out that when
Key Customers R&D moves from the 5th percentile value to the 95th percentile value, market
leverage declines by 21% for a median rm.24 Hence an increase in market leverage due to connec-
tions covers approximately the half of the leverage decrease due to customers’ R&D investments.
Columns (4) - (6) report nearly identical results for the book leverage. Notably, the estimates
on other control variables have predicted signs. For example, higher supplier size and xed assets
are positively related to leverage, because larger rms or rms with higher collateral have lower
costs in obtaining debt. Firms with more growth opportunities (higher Tobin’s Q) and more
24The magnitude of the eect is comparable to estimates in Kale and Shahrur (2007).
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risky rms (with higher prot volatility) have to maintain lower leverage. Consistent with the
bargaining role of debt, suppliers with more concentrated customers (Key Customers Industry
Concentration) increase leverage (Kale and Shahrur (2007)). Overall, the results in this section
suggest that rms choose higher leverage when they have social connections to business partners
who undertake relation-specic investments.
4.3 Potential Endogeneity
While the results in Section 3.2.2 show that there is positive relation between connections to
key R&D-intensive customers and leverage, this relation is not necessarily causal. In our base-
line regression we control for unobserved factors at the supplier level using rm xed eects.
However, there are still some unobserved factors that could confound our results. The allocation
of certain types of suppliers and across customer rms is not random, and suppliers’ leverage
choices could be a function of customer characteristics. Specically, Demirci (2016), Lian (2017)
and Oliveira, Kadapakkam and Beyhaghi (2017) show that customer nancial health aects the
leverage of the supplier. This leads to a potential endogeneity, which we address in two ways.
First, we employ a dierence-in-dierence framework and use managers’ turnovers at customer
rms as exogenous shocks to connectivity. As an alternative strategy, we compare changes in
leverage using matched rms with similar characteristics.
4.3.1. Event-Study Approach
In the rst approach to establish causality, we focus on a subsample of turnovers of senior
managers at the customer rms. Senior managers at the supplier rms who have pre-existing
social connections with the departing manager at the customer rm are likely to lose a connection
with the customer rm. Hence, as a result of the turnover at the customer rm, the supplier rm
may lose connection(s) with the customer rm. At the same time, since the average share of
purchases from a particular supplier constitute less than 3% from a customer sales, the turnover
of the senior manager at the customer rm is likely to be exogenous to the performance of
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the supplier rm. Therefore, the result that a loss of connection due to plausibly exogenous
shock to supplier rm connectivity would lead to a choice of lower leverage by a supplier rm
would provide a causal support for the previously shown positive relation between supplier rm
connectivity and leverage.
To show that decrease in the supplier rm connectivity due to a manager turnover in
a customer rm results in a decrease in supplier leverage, we identify the senior managers’
departures at the customer. Among all senior managers we limit our attention to the departures
of CEO, CFO and COO, because these executives hold greater responsibility for the supply chain
decisions (than other executives), and hence losing connections to them should aect the leverage
of a supplier rm to a greater extent. Next, for each supplier that lost connection(s) due to
turnovers in a customer rm we nd a supplier who has connections to the same customer rm,
but was not aected by the turnover at the customer rm. Following Fracassi and Tate (2012) we
use dierence-in-dierence setup, which allows us to compare the leverage of a treatment group
- suppliers who lost connection(s) to the customer rm with the leverage of a control group -
suppliers who did not lose any connections while still being connected to the same customer
rm. The advantage of this approach is that while comparing the leverage of the connected
suppliers to the same customer rm, we rule out all confounding factors related to the quality of
the customer. We estimate the following model:
Market Leverageit = β1After + β2After × Lost Connections+
+γXit + ζi + δt + it
(5)
where Market Leverageit is a market leverage of supplier i in scal year t, After is a dummy
variable that equals one for the scal years after the manager turnover at the customer rm,
Lost Connections is a dummy variable that equals one if the connected supplier lost connection
after the turnover. The key variable is After × Lost Connections, which captures the dierence in
dierences eect or change in market leverage for a supplier who lost connection to a customer
rm. The coecient on After will show the average within-rm changes in leverage for the
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unaected suppliers. We control for the same set of control variables as in our baseline model (1)
and supplier rm xed eects. If the rm experiences multiple events, we include rm-years for
all events, but correct for repeating rm-years by clustering standard errors at the supplier rm
level. We choose a one-year window centered on the event year (the scal year of the turnover)
to minimize the possibility that other events will confound the tests.
The results of the tests are reported in Table 4. The odd numbers of columns report the
estimates for the suppliers, which customers have high R&D expenses (above the sample me-
dian), the columns with even numbers correspond to suppliers with customers with low R&D
expenses (below the sample median). The estimate in Column (1) show that the coecient on
After × Lost Connections is negative and signicant at 5% (t = -2.63). This result suggests that
suppliers with R&D-intensive customers choose lower levels of debt in the year following the
lost of connection(s) with a C-level executive (CEO, CFO, COO) as a result of the turnover at
the customer rm. In contrast, in Column (2) the coecient on After × Lost Connections is
not signicant and close to zero (t = 0.35), suggesting that suppliers with not R&D-intensive
customers do not decrease leverage in the next year they lose connection(s) with an “important”
executive at the customer rm. The results in the remaining columns imply that this pattern of
results holds after adding industry or rm xed eects.
4.3.2. Propensity-Score Matching
We supplement our event-based tests with a propensity score matching approach and construct
samples of connected suppliers with unconnected suppliers with similar observable suppliers
(customers) characteristics. We match connected with unconnected suppliers based on the fol-
lowing variables: Size, Firm R&D, Key Customers R&D and Percent of Sales to Key Customers. In
the matching procedure we use a propensity score obtained from predicted values from the rst
stage. For each observation from a connected supplier (in a given year) we search an observation
from another unconnected supplier that satises the caliper of 0.01. In addition, we limit search
to the same 3-digit SIC industry of the connected supplier. This procedure yields 1010 rm-years
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that cover 294 connected (treated) suppliers matched to 286 unconnected (control) suppliers.25
Table 5 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the matched and control supplier
(customer) samples. The results show that after matching the sample of connected suppliers
(customers) became much more similar to the sample of unconnected suppliers (customers). For
example, for suppliers there are no signicant dierences between matched and control groups
across all factors that are likely to aect leverage. Panel B reports the results of the regression
analysis of the model (1) but on the matched sample. Again as in Table 3, we observe a positive and
signicant eect of connections to key R&D-intensive customers on the leverage of the dependent
suppliers. The results hold for the market and for the book leverage.
Overall, the results in this section support a positive causal long-term and short-term re-
lationship of the connections to key R&D-intensive customers on the leverage of the dependent
suppliers.
4.4 Channels of the Eect
4.4.1. Bonding Channel
We have established that rms with connections to R&D-intensive partners maintain higher debt.
According to our rst explanation, which we refer to as bonding channel, connected suppliers
are likely to increase debt, because they can better predict the sales coming from the trustworthy
customer and they are condent in the stability of the relationship. If connections aect the lever-
age through bonding partners’ commitment, then we might expect that the eect of connections
on leverage is stronger, when the trading relationship is intense and has a long duration. In
this section, we rst show that connections indeed increase the intensity and duration of the
relationship, and then we derive results about the eect of connections on debt depending on the
intensity and duration of the relationship.
25The reason for the uneven number of connected and unconnected suppliers is because we match rm-year
observations.
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We start with gauging the eect of connections on the intensity of the relationship. To
measure the intensity of relationship we use Sales to Key Customers (sum of sales to key cus-
tomers divided by total supplier sales), which characterizes the importance of relationship as the
degree of dependence on major customers increases when suppliers are selling more to customers
(e.g. Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008), Itzkowitz (2013)). Our major explanatory variable,
Connections to Key Customers is the sum of sales-weighted connections that the particular sup-
plier has with all its key customers in a given year:
Connections to Key Customers =
n∑
j=1
(Sales to Key Customerj × Connections to Key Customerj)
here Connections to Key Customerj is the total number of connections between executives
of supplier and customer rms scaled by the total number of possible executives’ pairs (see the
discussion of this measure in section 2.1).
To empirically estimate the eect of connections to key customers on the intensity of the re-
lationship, we regress the measure of intensity of the relationship onConnections to Key Customers.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results. Column (1) shows estimates with industry (2-digit SIC)
xed and column (2) - with rm xed eects to control for the all unobserved time-invariant
factors that could bias our results. In all regressions we adjust standard errors for heteroscedas-
ticity and cluster them by rm. The results in column (1) show that connections to key customers
signicantly increase purchases by key customers (t = 5.37). After adding rm xed eects, the
coecient on Connections to Key Customers remains positive and signicant at 1%. In columns
(3) and (4) we study how this eect varies with the R&D-intensity of the customer. The results in
these columns suggest that suppliers’ connections matter for the sales only when customers are
highly R&D-intensive (R&D-expenses are above the sample median).
We next study how connections aect the duration of the business relationship. If social
connections encourage relation-specic investment, the business relationship is likely to be main-
tained for a longer time. We follow Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) and use duration analysis
to estimate the hazard function describing the length of the relationship. In our estimation
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procedure we treat the relationships that last until the last year of the sample period as right
censored observations, because we know that the relationship lasted at least until this last year.
We assume that the relationship starts in the rst year the customer-supplier relationship appears
in Compustat segment le and ends when the sample period ends (2014).
The estimates reported in Panel B of Table 6 are the coecients (not hazard rates) from
the estimation of Cox proportional hazard model for the sample, where the unit of observation is
supplier-customer pair. The dependent variable is the hazard rate that the relationship between
customer and supplier will be terminated in the next year. The main explanatory variable is
Connections to Key Customer , which is the number of connections between customer and supplier
scaled by the possible number of pairs of executives that could exit between two companies. We
cluster standard errors at the pair level. Column (1) shows that connections between customers
and suppliers signicantly reduce the hazard rate of the termination of the relationship, suggest-
ing that connections facilitate longer relationships. The eect is signicant at 1%. In column
(2) we add controls (lagged one year) that could possibly predict the duration of the relation.
The coecient on connections variable maintains the sign and signicance (1%) after adding the
controls. The coecients on controls have predicted signs. For example, higher supplier market
leverage increases the risk of the relationship termination through increasing the probability of
the supplier bankruptcy. Lower supplier ROA signicantly reduces the relationship duration.
In column (3) we additionally include industry xed eects (supplier 2-digit SIC) to account
for the unobserved industry variation (for example, industry-specic M&A activity) that could
aect both the connections and the duration of relationship (Fee and Thomas (2004)). Again,
after adding industry xed eects our results remain signicant at 1%. Finally, in column (4) we
examine the role of connections to key customer depending on the R&D-intensity of the customer.
The results show that the magnitude of the eect is twice higher for the suppliers with highly
R&D-intensive customers (when customer R&D intensity is above the sample median).
Overall, the results show that connections to key R&D-intensive customers is an important
factor for the intensity and duration of the business relationship. We next measure how the eect
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of connections on leverage changes depending on the intensity and duration of the trading rela-
tionship. We measure the intensity of the relationship by using Sales to Key Customers described
above, and we measure Relationship Duration by computing the number of years the relationship
lasts between supplier and customer. Additionally, we compute Bonding Index, which combines
two previous measures in one index. To construct the index, we, rst, average the rm’s percentile
rankings according to each of the measures, and then, we scale the index value to range from zero
(low) to one (high). For each of the three bonding measures, we classify suppliers into suppliers
with high or low degree of bonding. We label high- (low-) bonding suppliers to be suppliers,
which have value of the measure at the top (bottom) quartile of the sample distribution. We next
replicate the Table 3 using created subsamples. The results are reported in Table 7. Across three
measures of bonding the eect of connections to R&D-intensive customers on market leverage
is positive and signicant only in the subsample of suppliers with high degree of bonding. This
suggests that connected suppliers choose higher debt only if relationship is intense and/or has
long duration. Results of tests of coecients of interest (Chi2-statistics) strongly conrm that the
eects are dierent across the corresponding subsamples.
4.4.2. Information Asymmetry Channel
Extensive research on social connections supports the premise that social connections facilitate
communication and decrease information acquisition costs (e.g. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy
(2008), (2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). In the context of customer-supplier relationships
Chen, Levy, Martin, and Shalev (2017) show that social connections between two trading parties
reduce information asymmetry, because business partners are likely to have greater access to
more accurate information about nancial health of their respective partners. Hence, consistent
with Information Asymmetry channel we argue that partners will be able to choose higher level
of debt, because this does not necessarily signal about approaching bankruptcy or severe nancial
distress. If indeed rms increase leverage, because their partner is better informed about their
nancial health, then we would expect that the eect of connections on leverage is stronger
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(weaker) in settings characterized by high (low) information asymmetry.
Following the approach widely accepted in literature, we use geographical distance between
supplier and customer locations to measure information asymmetry. Higher distance is associ-
ated with higher costs of access to information and, hence, with higher information asymmetry
(Giroud (2013)). For example, Costello (2013) using geographical distance between customers
and suppliers as a proxy for information asymmetry shows that distance increases the probabil-
ity of using restrictive nancial covenants in the supplier contracts, and her evidence suggests
that nancial covenants can mitigate information asymmetry. Since social connections facilitate
communication between parties and help to decrease the information acquisition costs, they also
substitute for formal contractual terms (Chen, Levy, Martin, and Shalev (2017)). Therefore, we
expect that social connections should be more important when information gaps are larger or, in
other words, when customers and suppliers are located far away from each other.
Distance is computed as an average geographical distance between a supplier and its key
customers, measured in miles. The average distance is computed by averaging the distances
between the headquarters location of supplier and that of each of its customers. We compute
the distance using latitude and longitude coordinates for the addresses of the supplier (customer)
headquarters obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer City-State File. We then apply the
formula to calculate the distance between two points on Earth’s surface. customers. As shown in
Table 1, the mean (median) geographical distance between the supplier and customer pair is 970
(738) miles, and the mean (median) distance between supplier and its key customers is 953 (850)
miles, what is similar to estimates shown in Chu, Tian and Wang (2018) and Dasgupta, Zhang
and Zhu (2017).26
Again, we replicate the results of Table (3) by subsamples of suppliers divided by the degree
of information asymmetry (measured by distance). Consistent with our expectations, the results
in Table 8 show that the coecient on Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is signicant
at 5%, and its magnitude is higher in the subsample of the suppliers located far away from their
26For example, Dasgupta, Zhang and Zhu (2017) nd that the mean (median) geographical distance between
customer and supplier is 984 (772) miles.
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major customers. The magnitude of the coecient is approximately four times larger in the
subsample of high-distance suppliers than that in the subsample of low-distance suppliers, and
the test of coecients between two subsamples reveals that the dierence between these two
coecients is signicant at 10%. Overall, these results provide the evidence that information
asymmetry can explain our results.
4.4.2. Leverage Adjustment Analysis
If connections indeed lead to leverage increase through promoting bonding and resolving infor-
mation asymmetry issues, then we expect that this increase is benecial for the supplier, because,
for example, extra funds allow it to invest more. Hence, in another set of tests we check whether
rms increase debt optimally. It has been well established that rms can deviate from the target
capital structure, and the leverage deviation is costly for the rms. The commitment role of debt
implies that the existence of R&D-intensive customers pushes suppliers to maintain low-leverage
policy (Kale and Shahrur (2007), Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008)), and these lower levels
of debt could be suboptimal. If connected suppliers tend to increase debt, then it is natural to
study whether they lever up to move close to optimal debt ratios, thereby reducing underleverage
caused by the commitment to key R&D-intensive customers.
To measure the leverage deviation from the optimal level, we use a two-step estimation
procedure similar to that used in previous studies (e.g. Frank and Goyal (2007), Uysal (2011)). On
the rst step, we estimate the target ratio by running annual cross-section regressions of market
leverage on its determinants widely studied in literature (e.g. Frank and Goyal (2007), Kayhan and
Titman (2007), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)). On the second step, we compute deviation
from the target. We begin by estimating the target leverage by running yearly regressions of
market leverage on known determinants:
Market Leverageit = β
′Xit−1 + 1t (6)
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The set of control variables Xit−1 includes: Industry Leverage (median industry leverage),
Protability (operating income scaled by assets), Tobins’s Q, Fixed Assets, Size (the natural loga-
rithm of total assets), Ination (the natural logarithm of CPI), Depreciation (depreciation expenses
scaled by total assets), R&D Intensity (R&D expenses scaled by total assets), Positive R&D Intensity
(indicator of positive R&D expenses). In estimation we construct separate cross-section samples,
consisting of all rms in Compustat universe in a given year. Following previous literature, we
exclude foreign rms, subsidiaries of rms, utilities and nancial rms. To minimize the eect of
outliers on our results, we further drop observations with abnormal cash ows scaled by assets
(less than -1 or greater than 1) and Tobin’s Q greater than 10. We also winsorize all variables at
the 1% and 99% levels.
Next we compute the market leverage deviation dened as the dierence between the actual
market leverage and the target market leverage. Consistent with the empirical approach adopted
in previous studies, the target market leverage is the tted values from the equation (3). Panel A
of Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics for the market leverage deviation. The mean market
leverage deviation is negative for the sample rms (-0.024), suggesting that the average sample
rm is underleveraged. This is consistent with previous studies showing that many rms follow a
low-leverage policy (e.g., Molina (2005), Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan and Krishnamurthy (2012),
Strebulaev and Yang (2013)).
In Panel B of Table 9 we compare the mean deviation from the target for connected and
unconnected rms across terciles of customers’ R&D. Notably, in the second and third terciles
of Key Customers R&D connected suppliers are less underleveraged than unconnected suppliers
with dierences signicant in two terciles at 5% and 1% levels respectively. The dierences in
deviation from target increase with Key Customers R&D. As we move from the 1st to the 3rd
tercile, we observe two dierent trends for connected and unconnected rms. Connected rms
are able to reduce the deviation (by taking more debt), but unconnected rms, on the other hand,
increase the deviation from the target (by reducing debt). The dierences between the 1st and
the 3rd terciles are signicant at 1% level for connected rms. Overall, these results imply that
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connections between supplier and customer rms are benecial for supplier rms by allowing
them to move closer to the optimal level of debt.
4.5 Reverse Causality
Common concern in studies about personal connections is the reverse causality. In our setting,
this suggests that the business relationship facilitates creation of social connections. For example,
people knowing each other as executives of trading partners are more likely to interact beyond
the business relationship (attend professional conferences, establish personal contact at MBA
program, etc.). To address this concern, we eliminate social connections that were formed after
the rms became business partners. From Compustat Segments we additionally collect the start
dates of the business relationship between customers and suppliers. Using this lter, we drop
only 17% of connections, and the overwhelming majority of connections were formed in distant
past. After we replicate the results in Table 3. The results reported in Table 10 are very similar to
the baseline results in Table 3, implying that reverse causality is unlikely to drive our results.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the relation between suppliers’ social connections to R&D-intensive cus-
tomers and suppliers’ capital structure decisions. We nd that suppliers with social connections
to innovative customers choose higher levels of book and market leverage. To provide the causal
support for the eect we use customer rms managers turnovers as exogenous shocks to sup-
plier connections. The turnovers of C-level executives at customer rms are likely to lead to
loss or break of social connections that suppliers have formed with the customer rms. Using
dierence-in-dierence research design, we compare changes in leverage ratios of the connected
suppliers that have lost connections to the changes in leverage ratios of the connected suppliers
to the same customer that did not lose any connections as a result of the turnover at the customer
rm. We show signicant drops in leverage ratios at the supplier rm following the loss of the
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connections. We support our ndings with additional robustness tests based on propensity score
matching and with tests addressing reverse causality.
We also examine the potential mechanisms that may explain these results: bonding of
suppliers and customers and reduced information asymmetry between suppliers and customers.
Our ndings provide support for the both mechanisms. In particular, consistent with the bond-
ing channel, connected suppliers are likely to trade more with major R&D-intensive customers,
and the business relationship between suppliers connected to R&D-intensive customers lasts
signicantly longer. Consistent with information asymmetry channel, we nd that the eect
of social connections to R&D-intensive customers is stronger when information asymmetry be-
tween customer and supplier is higher. In addition, we document that social connections allow
suppliers to move closer to optimal debt levels. Overall, we show that social connections that
have been formed between managers of supplier and customer rms play an important role in
capital structure decisions.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 1219 unique supplier rms and 493
customer rms between 2000 and 2014, which are covered both by Compustat Segments and
BoardEx and have non-missing nancial information. Panel A shows the nancial characteristics
of customers and suppliers, and panel B reports the results of univariate comparisons for the
sample partitioned based on whether a supplier is connected to at least one of its major customers.
All variables are dened in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Suppliers and Customers
Variable Mean 25th perc. Median 75th perc. St. dev.
Supplier Characteristics (5374 obs.)
Supplier Market Leverage 0.171 0.002 0.102 0.275 0.197
Supplier Book Leverage 0.183 0.003 0.140 0.303 0.186
Supplier Market Value of Assets, $M 4748 178 679 2697 14639
Supplier Book Assets, $M 2491 116 448 1884 6399
Supplier Sales, $M 2518 93 380 1609 6984
Supplier Capital Expenditure/Assets 0.048 0.016 0.028 0.052 0.062
Supplier Tobin’s Q 1.908 1.146 1.522 2.187 1.224
Supplier Return on Assets (ROA) 0.077 0.040 0.107 0.159 0.158
Supplier Fixed Assets 0.223 0.067 0.149 0.289 0.219
Supplier R&D Intensity 0.066 0.000 0.020 0.096 0.103
Supplier Tax Credit 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
Supplier Volatility 0.110 0.035 0.067 0.124 0.140
Supplier Industry Concentration 0.080 0.042 0.059 0.107 0.055
Percent of Sales to Major Customers 0.265 0.126 0.200 0.340 0.201
Number of Customers per Supplier 2.203 1.000 2.000 3.000 1.396
Customer Market Value of Assets, $M 123173 20421 53048 182394 163840
Customer Book Assets, $M 75530 10786 28754 109159 114025
Key Customers R&D 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.016
Key Customers Industry Concentration 0.044 0.011 0.027 0.058 0.051
Key Customers Change in Sales 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.013
Customer-Supplier Distance (1000 miles) 0.970 0.318 0.738 1.532 0.796
Average Distance to Key Customers 0.953 0.398 0.805 1.389 0.721
Social Connections:
Proportion of Connected Suppliers 60.3%
Connections to Key Customer 0.011 0 0 0.004 0.045
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Panel B: Connected and Unconnected Suppliers
Variable Connected Unconnected Di. T-stat.
Supplier Market Leverage 0.185 0.158 0.027 4.949 ***
Supplier Book Leverage 0.208 0.161 0.047 9.284 ***
Key Customers R&Dt-1 0.008 0.006 0.002 4.960 ***
Supplier Firm Sizet-1 6.726 5.484 1.241 25.218 ***
Supplier Return on Assetst-1 0.088 0.078 0.010 2.307 **
Supplier R&D Intensityt-1 0.069 0.061 0.008 2.876 ***
Supplier Tobin’s Q t-1 2.078 1.954 0.124 3.191 ***
Supplier Volatilityt-1 0.105 0.114 -0.010 -2.531 ***
Number of Customers per Supplier 2.298 2.118 0.180 4.735 ***
Percent of Sales to Major Customerst-1 0.280 0.252 0.029 5.216 ***
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Table 2: Univariate Results
The table reports dierences-in-means estimates across depending on the terciles of Key Cus-
tomers R&D and by subsamples of Connected and Unconnected suppliers. Key Customers R&D is
the sum of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by the proportion of sales to each
customer. Connected supplier is a supplier that has least one connection to one of its major
customers. Market Leverage is equal to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in
current liabilities divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of common equity.
Book Leverage is the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided
by book value of assets. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Supplier Market Leverage
Variable Connected Unconnected Di. T-stat.
Key Customers R&D (tercile)
1 0.208 0.180 0.028 3.43 ***
2 0.204 0.165 0.038 3.44 ***
3 0.144 0.111 0.034 3.93 ***
(3)-(1)
T-stat. 7.49*** 8.25***
Panel B: Supplier Book Leverage
Key Customers R&D (tercile)
1 0.244 0.183 0.061 7.94 ***
2 0.220 0.172 0.049 4.75 ***
3 0.158 0.114 0.044 5.42 ***
(3)-(1)
T-stat. 10.11*** 8.91***
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Table 3: The Eect of Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers on the Leverage of Dependent Suppliers
The table presents the results of supplier-level regressions, in which each observation is supplier rm-year. The dependent variable is
Market Leverage or Book Leverage. Market Leverage is equal to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities
divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of common equity. Book Leverage is the sum of book values of long-term debt
and debt in current liabilities divided by book value of assets. The key explanatory variable,Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers,
is the sum of connections to each major customer weighted by R&D intensities and proportion of sales to each major customer, where
connections to each major customer is the number of connected pairs divided by the total number of pairs that exist between individuals
of customer and supplier rms. Key Customers R&D is the sum of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by the proportion
of sales to each customer. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. All other variables are dened in Appendix
A. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the supplier rm level. ***, ** and *
denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Market Leverage Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connections to Key R&D-int. Customers 0.204** 0.228*** 0.150*** 0.211* 0.216** 0.150***
(2.13) (2.73) (2.59) (1.73) (2.00) (2.66)
Key Customers R&Dt-1 -0.638*** -0.689*** -0.515*** -0.778*** -0.811*** -0.567***
(-3.49) (-3.86) (-2.71) (-3.67) (-3.82) (-2.93)
Key Customers Industry Concentrationt-1 0.403*** 0.328*** -0.013 0.518*** 0.352*** 0.111
(4.87) (4.14) (-0.13) (6.23) (4.40) (1.18)
Key Customers Change in Salest-1 -0.794*** -0.718*** -0.548*** -0.745*** -0.604*** -0.446**
(-3.97) (-3.97) (-3.07) (-3.65) (-3.04) (-2.29)
Supplier Industry Concentrationt-1 0.223** 0.043 0.064 0.127 -0.038 -0.086
(2.16) (0.27) (0.40) (1.21) (-0.25) (-0.63)
Supplier Sizet-1 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.053*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.037***
(7.82) (6.30) (5.88) (10.50) (8.87) (4.30)
Supplier ROAt-1 -0.242*** -0.233*** -0.154*** -0.203*** -0.181*** -0.110***
(-8.96) (-8.66) (-5.15) (-7.05) (-6.33) (-3.88)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 0.178*** 0.200*** 0.154** 0.209*** 0.189*** 0.082*
(6.55) (5.02) (2.43) (8.26) (5.22) (1.68)
Supplier R&Dt-1 -0.322*** -0.251*** -0.025 -0.200*** -0.163*** -0.039
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Market Leverage Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(-7.43) (-5.78) (-0.46) (-4.14) (-3.45) (-0.64)
Supplier SGAt-1 -0.015 -0.010 0.005 -0.001 0.010 0.029
(-0.72) (-0.46) (0.15) (-0.07) (0.40) (0.60)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.010*** -0.002
(-12.80) (-12.34) (-3.47) (-2.45) (-4.08) (-0.77)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 -0.057** -0.048** 0.019 -0.035 -0.032 -0.022
(-2.51) (-2.10) (0.49) (-1.12) (-1.04) (-0.56)
Supplier Nondebt Tax Shieldst-1 -4.067*** -4.145*** -0.962 -4.432*** -4.179*** -0.282
(-4.41) (-4.61) (-1.42) (-4.08) (-3.89) (-0.30)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) No Yes No No Yes No
Firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 5374 5374 5374 5374 5374 5374
R-squared 0.28 0.35 0.81 0.25 0.32 0.83
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Table 4: Leverage of Dependent Suppliers and Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers: Event Studies
The table presents the results of the regressions, in which each observation is a pair of supplier-customer rm-year. The dependent
variable is Market Leverage, which is equal to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the
sum of book value of debt and market value of common equity. After is a dummy variable that equals one for the scal years after the
manager turnover at the customer rm, Lost Connections is a dummy variable that equals one if the connected supplier lost connection
after the turnover. The key variable is After×Lost Connections, which captures the dierence in dierences eect or change in market
leverage for a supplier who lost connection to a customer rm. If the rm experiences multiple events, all rm-years are included. The
estimation is made on a one-year window centered on the event year (the scal year of the turnover). Key Customers R&D is the sum
of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by the proportion of sales to each customer. The sample is splitted according to
high (low) Key Customers R&D - when Key Customers R&D is above (below or equal) the sample median. Calendar year xed eects
are included in all regressions, industry xed eects (based on 2-digit SIC industries) are included in columns ((3) and (4) and supplier
rm xed eects are included in columns (5) and (6). All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. All other variables
are dened in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the supplier
rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Market Leverage
Key Customers R&D
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.024 0.071 -0.022
(0.08) (-0.02) (-0.13) (0.56) (1.55) (-0.85)
Lost Connections -0.020 0.004 -0.026 -0.061 omitted
(-0.62) (0.07) (-0.68) (-1.38)
After x Lost Connections -0.156** 0.039 -0.160** 0.034 -0.164** 0.116
(-2.63) (0.35) (-2.36) (0.39) (-2.15) (1.48)
Customer Industry Concentrationt-1 0.015 0.273 -0.030 0.047 -1.102 2.974
(0.08) (0.98) (-0.12) (0.20) (-0.37) (1.30)
Customer Change in Salest-1 -0.312 0.446 -0.146 -0.370 -0.479 0.483
(-0.78) (0.53) (-0.28) (-0.47) (-0.97) (1.04)
Supplier Concentrationt-1 0.139 0.155 1.755 1.745 0.841 -2.356
(0.33) (0.18) (1.43) (1.40) (0.46) (-1.03)
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Market Leverage
Key Customers R&D
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Supplier Firm Sizet-1 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.041 0.040
(0.78) (0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.83) (0.42)
Supplier Firm ROAt-1 -0.333*** -0.346 -0.343*** -0.205 0.079 0.096
(-4.83) (-1.56) (-3.28) (-1.20) (0.50) (0.66)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 -0.311** 0.306* -0.289* 0.422* -0.225 -0.177
(-2.15) (1.92) (-1.78) (1.90) (-0.40) (-0.51)
Supplier Firm R&Dt-1 -0.139 -0.400 -0.137 -0.201 0.101 -0.029
(-1.24) (-1.31) (-1.06) (-0.65) (0.69) (-0.09)
Supplier Firm SGAt-1 -0.137* -0.297* -0.158 -0.186 0.114 0.126
(-1.79) (-1.74) (-1.57) (-1.07) (1.43) (0.40)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.026** -0.003 0.004
(-0.84) (-1.41) (-0.60) (-2.59) (-0.47) (0.47)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 -0.112** -0.126 -0.126** -0.099 -0.638 -0.266
(-2.63) (-0.51) (-2.51) (-0.42) (-1.07) (-0.68)
Supplier NonDebt Tax Shieldst-1 3.006 -7.008 3.314 -8.545 -0.325 0.080
(1.10) (-1.39) (1.04) (-1.27) (-0.10) (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes
Chi2 statistic 2.75 4.22 26.31
p-value 0.097 0.039 0.000
Observations 145 122 145 122 145 122
R-squared 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.68 0.91 0.98
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Table 5: Leverage of Dependent Suppliers and Connections to Key R&D-intensive
Customers: Propensity-Score Matching
Panel A reports dierences-in-means estimates by subsamples of propensity score matched Con-
nected and Unconnected suppliers. Connected supplier is a supplier that has least one connection
to one of its major customers. Panel B presents the results of the regression analysis on the
propensity-score matched sample of suppliers. Key Customers R&D is the sum of R&D intensities
of all major customers weighted by the proportion of sales to each customer. Market Leverage
is equal to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by
the sum of book value of debt and market value of common equity. Book Leverage is the sum
of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by book value of assets.
Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is the sum of connections to each major customer
weighted by R&D intensities and proportion of sales to each major customer, where connections
to each major customer is the number of connected pairs divided by the total number of pairs that
exist between individuals of customer and supplier rms. Industry xed eects (based on 2-digit
SIC industries) are included in regressions. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and
99% levels. All other variables are dened in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported in parentheses,
are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the supplier rm level.***, ** and * denote
statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: PSM Matched Sample of Suppliers (1010 obs.)
Variable Connected Unconnected Di. T-stat.
Supplier Market Leverage 0.129 0.098 0.032 3.06 ***
Supplier Book Leverage 0.151 0.115 0.035 3.23 ***
Control Variables:
Key Customers R&Dt-1 0.011 0.009 0.002 1.59
Supplier Firm Sizet-1 5.644 5.531 0.113 1.18
Supplier Return on Assetst-1 0.042 0.040 0.002 0.20
Supplier R&D Intensityt-1 0.110 0.113 -0.003 -0.41
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 2.390 2.245 0.145 1.45
Supplier Volatilityt-1 0.164 0.150 0.014 1.33
Number of Customers per Supplier 2.339 2.245 0.094 1.16
Percent of Sales to Major Customerst-1 0.287 0.300 -0.013 -0.92
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Panel B: Regression Analysis
Market
Leverage
Book
Leverage
(1) (2)
Connections to Key R&D-int. Customers 0.241** 0.218*
(2.26) (1.61)
Key Customers R&Dt-1 -0.535** -0.946***
(-1.98) (-2.70)
Key Customers Industry Concentrationt-1 0.333** 0.445**
(2.31) (2.32)
Key Customers Change in Salest-1 -0.391 -0.566
(-1.08) (-1.48)
Supplier Industry Concentrationt-1 0.322 -0.029
(1.12) (-0.09)
Supplier Sizet-1 0.015*** 0.023***
(2.89) (3.93)
Supplier ROAt-1 -0.137*** -0.192***
(-4.25) (-3.91)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 0.094 0.121*
(1.50) (1.74)
Supplier R&Dt-1 -0.153*** -0.104
(-3.20) (-1.59)
Supplier SGAt-1 -0.001 0.014
(-0.04) (0.36)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.017*** -0.001
(-5.08) (-0.27)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 0.010 0.006
(0.34) (0.13)
Supplier Nondebt Tax Shieldst-1 -4.245*** -5.490***
(-3.54) (-3.36)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 1010 1010
R-squared 0.39 0.32
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Table 6: Social Connections, Intensity and Duration of the Customer-Supplier
Relationship
Panel A presents the results of supplier-level regressions, in which each observation is supplier
rm-year. The dependent variable is Supplier Sales to Key Customers, which is equal to the total
sales to key customers divided by the total sales of the supplier. Connections to Key Customers is
the sum of connections to each major customer weighted by the proportion of sales to each major
customer, where connections to each major customer is the number of connected pairs divided
by the total number of pairs that exist between individuals of customer and supplier rms. Panel
B presents the coecients of Cox proportional hazards model describing the duration of the
relationship between customer and supplier. The unit of observation is the customer-supplier
pair, and we treat relationships that last until the last year of the sample period as right censored.
Connections to Key Customer is the total number of connections between executives of supplier
and customer rms scaled by the total number of possible executives’ pairs. All explanatory
variables are lagged. All other variables are dened in Appendix A. All continuous variables are
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors
that allow for clustering at the supplier rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Social Connections and Intensity of the Customer-Supplier Relationship
Supplier Sales to Key Customers
Key Customers R&D
High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connections to Key Customers 2.358*** 2.178*** 2.240** 1.970
(5.37) (2.72) (2.29) (1.32)
Key Customers Ind. Concentrationt-1 2.029*** 1.972*** 1.968*** 2.010***
(18.71) (13.29) (8.36) (11.81)
Key Customers Change in Salest-1 2.324*** 0.635*** 0.579* 0.313
(7.60) (2.72) (1.74) (0.98)
Supplier Concentrationt-1 -0.369*** -0.395*** -0.585** -0.316**
(-3.24) (-2.93) (-2.18) (-2.23)
Supplier Firm Sizet-1 -0.011*** 0.006 0.010 0.008
(-4.07) (0.67) (0.68) (0.78)
Supplier Firm ROAt-1 0.087*** 0.182*** 0.201*** 0.095*
(2.70) (4.31) (3.47) (1.86)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 -0.045 0.030 0.023 0.047
(-1.57) (0.60) (0.26) (0.94)
Supplier Firm R&Dt-1 0.388*** 0.081 -0.013 0.208**
(6.96) (0.97) (-0.13) (2.05)
Supplier Firm SGAt-1 -0.074*** 0.083* 0.114* 0.075
(-3.21) (1.86) (1.70) (1.61)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.003 -0.008** -0.008* -0.006
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Panel A. Social Connections and Intensity of the Customer-Supplier Relationship
Supplier Sales to Key Customers
Key Customers R&D
High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(-1.23) (-2.57) (-1.91) (-1.45)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 0.100*** 0.095 0.062 0.016
(2.86) (1.49) (0.77) (0.25)
Supplier NonDebt Tax Shieldst-1 0.392 0.850 1.990 -0.185
(0.29) (0.48) (0.84) (-0.14)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes No No No
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5374 5374 2687 2687
R-squared 0.51 0.85 0.85 0.89
103
Panel B: Social Connections and Duration of the Customer-Supplier Relationship
Hazard Rate of Relationship Termination
Customer R&D
High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connections to Key Customer -2.049*** -2.068*** -1.869*** -3.282** -1.614**
(-2.63) (-2.79) (-2.76) (-2.09) (-2.05)
Supplier Sizet-1 0.010 0.001 0.023 0.004
(0.58) (0.05) (0.75) (0.18)
Supplier ROAt-1 -0.638** -0.679** -0.648 -0.389
(-2.15) (-2.16) (-1.60) (-0.84)
Supplier Market Leveraget-1 0.478** 0.605*** 0.259 0.810***
(2.48) (2.96) (0.81) (3.19)
Supplier R&Dt-1 1.448*** 1.278*** 1.269** 1.707***
(3.68) (3.00) (2.30) (2.68)
Customer Sizet-1 -0.064** -0.070*** -0.050 -0.053
(-2.57) (-2.66) (-1.08) (-1.58)
Customer ROAt-1 0.835* 1.096** 0.616 0.328
(1.66) (2.08) (0.96) (0.32)
Customer R&Dt-1 -2.551* -1.770
(-1.90) (-1.32)
Customers Ind. Concentrationt-1 -0.245 -0.359 -2.039** 0.037
(-0.80) (-0.98) (-2.37) (0.09)
Sales to Customert-1 0.394** 0.347* 0.141 0.616*
(2.01) (1.76) (0.55) (1.84)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes No No
Observations 6447 6321 6321 3168 3153
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Table 7: Leverage of Dependent Suppliers and Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers: Bonding Channel
The table presents the results of supplier-level regressions, in which each observation is supplier rm-year. The dependent variable
is Market Leverage, which is equal to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the sum
of book value of debt and market value of common equity. Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is the sum of connections
to each major customer weighted by R&D intensities and proportion of sales to each major customer, where connections to each
major customer is the number of connected pairs divided by the total number of pairs that exist between individuals of customer
and supplier rms. Key Customers R&D is the sum of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by the proportion of sales to
each customer. The sample is splitted according to whether the value of bonding measures is in the top (bottom) quartile of sample
distribution. Supplier Sales to Key Customers is equal to the total sales to key customers divided by the total sales of the supplier.
Relationship Duration is the average duration of the relationship between customer and all its suppliers in years. Bonding Index
combines Supplier Sales to Key Customers and Relationship Duration in one index. To construct the index we rst average the rm’s
percentile rankings according to each of the measures, and then scale the index to range from zero (low) to one (high). All continuous
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. All other variables are dened in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are
based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the supplier rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Measure Supplier Sales to Relationship Bonding
Key Customers Duration Index
Degree High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connections to Key R&D-int. Customers 0.254*** -0.145 0.559*** 0.159 0.413*** -0.036
(2.97) (-1.02) (3.09) (1.49) (3.17) (-0.26)
Key Customers R&Dt-1 -0.474** 0.103 -1.832** -0.536** -0.717** -0.474
(-2.51) (0.13) (-2.13) (-2.09) (-2.09) (-0.67)
Key Customers Industry Concentrationt-1 0.274** -0.032 0.497*** 0.234* 0.356** 0.072
(2.52) (-0.09) (2.85) (1.94) (2.42) (0.37)
Key Customers Change in Salest-1 -0.648*** -1.584 -0.796** -0.135 -0.968*** 0.539
(-2.92) (-1.27) (-2.13) (-0.37) (-3.49) (0.63)
Supplier Industry Concentrationt-1 -0.040 -0.294 -0.139 0.045 0.385 0.226
(-0.12) (-1.06) (-0.38) (0.16) (1.19) (0.78)
Supplier Sizet-1 0.024*** 0.009** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.008**
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Measure Supplier Sales to Relationship Bonding
Key Customers Duration Index
Degree High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(4.96) (2.00) (3.81) (4.98) (4.08) (2.01)
Supplier ROAt-1 -0.170*** -0.294*** -0.312*** -0.202*** -0.246*** -0.239***
(-4.38) (-5.28) (-3.93) (-5.33) (-3.99) (-5.01)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 0.282*** 0.170*** 0.370*** 0.193*** 0.319*** 0.203***
(3.48) (2.89) (4.24) (4.72) (3.91) (3.97)
Supplier R&Dt-1 -0.148*** -0.367*** -0.191 -0.303*** -0.262*** -0.353***
(-2.61) (-4.02) (-1.27) (-4.86) (-2.98) (-4.04)
Supplier SGAt-1 0.029 -0.057 0.023 -0.018 0.007 -0.075**
(0.93) (-1.64) (0.42) (-0.60) (0.19) (-2.16)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.017*** -0.033*** -0.056*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.029***
(-4.40) (-8.08) (-6.39) (-7.58) (-4.95) (-7.80)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 -0.025 -0.128** 0.048 -0.077*** 0.052 -0.116**
(-0.83) (-2.26) (0.57) (-2.65) (0.97) (-2.57)
Supplier Nondebt Tax Shieldst-1 -3.443** -4.879*** -6.690** -2.867** -5.091** -4.198***
(-2.33) (-2.78) (-2.57) (-2.43) (-2.53) (-2.69)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi2 statistic 10.81 5.44 7.74
p-value 0.001 0.020 0.005
Observations 1343 1344 1198 1367 1309 1345
R-squared 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.38
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Table 8: Leverage of Dependent Suppliers and Connections to Key R&D-intensive
Customers: Information Asymmetry Channel
The table presents the results of supplier-level regressions, in which each observation is supplier
rm-year. The dependent variable is Market Leverage, which is equal to the sum of book values
of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the sum of book value of debt and
market value of common equity. Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers is the sum of con-
nections to each major customer weighted by R&D intensities and proportion of sales to each
major customer, where connections to each major customer is the number of connected pairs
divided by the total number of pairs that exist between individuals of customer and supplier
rms. Key Customers R&D is the sum of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by
the proportion of sales to each customer. Distance is the average distance between a supplier
and its key customers, measured in miles. The Distance is computed by averaging the distances
between the headquarters location of supplier and that of each of its customers. The sample
is splitted according to value of Distance is in the top (bottom) quartile of sample distribution.
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. All other variables are dened
in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for
clustering at the supplier rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Measure Distance
Degree High Low
(1) (2)
Connections to Key R&D-int. Customers 0.278** 0.063
(2.18) (0.53)
Key Customers R&Dt-1 -0.679*** -0.688**
(-2.67) (-2.06)
Key Customers Industry Concentrationt-1 0.482*** 0.221
(3.11) (1.10)
Key Customers Change in Salest-1 -0.708** 0.132
(-2.08) (0.28)
Supplier Industry Concentrationt-1 -0.643 0.033
(-1.59) (0.11)
Supplier Sizet-1 0.009** 0.034***
(2.03) (5.66)
Supplier ROAt-1 -0.110*** -0.251***
(-2.68) (-3.92)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 0.192*** 0.174***
(2.77) (2.68)
Supplier R&Dt-1 -0.153** -0.212**
(-2.55) (-1.97)
Supplier SGAt-1 -0.030 0.030
(-0.96) (0.60)
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Measure Distance
Degree High Low
(1) (2)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.021*** -0.033***
(-6.89) (-5.75)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 -0.001 -0.051
(-0.02) (-1.05)
Supplier Nondebt Tax Shieldst-1 -2.201* -1.688
(-1.90) (-0.78)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Chi2 statistic 3.08
p-value 0.079
Observations 1302 1306
R-squared 0.43 0.41
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Table 9: Supplier Market Leverage Adjustment Analysis
Panel A presents the summary statistics. Market Leverage Deviation is the dierence between
the actual market leverage and the target leverage, where the target leverage is computed as the
predicted value from yearly regressions of market leverage on its determinants: Industry Leverage
(median industry leverage), Protability (operating income scaled by assets), Tobins’s Q, Fixed
Assets, Size (the natural logarithm of total assets), Ination (the natural logarithm of CPI), Depre-
ciation (depreciation expenses scaled by total assets), R&D Intensity (R&D expenses scaled by total
assets), Positive R&D Intensity (indicator of positive R&D expenses). Panel B presents the univari-
ate results, comparing connected and unconnected suppliers across terciles ofKey Customers R&D.
Key Customers R&D is the sum of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by the pro-
portion of sales to each customer. Connected supplier is a supplier that has least one connection
to one of its major customers. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statictics (4150 obs.)
Variable Mean 25th perc. Median 75th perc. St. dev.
Supplier Market Leverage Deviation -0.024 -0.135 -0.053 0.053 0.163
Panel B: Univariate Results (4150 obs.)
Supplier Market Leverage Deviation
Variable Connected Unconnected Di. T-stat.
Key Customers R&D (tercile)
1 -0.0195 -0.0273 0.008 1.056
2 -0.0200 -0.0425 0.023 2.205 **
3 0.0044 -0.0453 0.050 5.273 ***
(3)-(1)
T-stat. 2.82*** 2.06**
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Table 10: Leverage of Dependent Suppliers and Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers: Reverse Causality
The table presents the results of supplier-level regressions from Table 3. The connections variable is adjusted to address reverse
causality by dropping connections formed after the formation of business relationship. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1%
and 99% levels. All variables are dened in Appendix A. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow
for clustering at the supplier rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full Sample
Market Leverage Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connections to Key R&D-int. Customers 0.276** 0.293*** 0.230*** 0.292** 0.282** 0.176**
(2.44) (2.92) (3.57) (2.18) (2.40) (2.39)
Key Customers R&Dt-1 -0.677*** -0.721*** -0.556*** -0.823*** -0.846*** -0.576***
(-3.63) (-3.97) (-2.79) (-3.81) (-3.94) (-2.91)
Key Customers Industry Concentrationt-1 0.403*** 0.327*** -0.014 0.518*** 0.352*** 0.111
(4.87) (4.14) (-0.13) (6.23) (4.40) (1.18)
Key Customers Change in Salest-1 -0.793*** -0.716*** -0.548*** -0.743*** -0.603*** -0.446**
(-3.96) (-3.96) (-3.07) (-3.64) (-3.03) (-2.29)
Supplier Industry Concentrationt-1 0.223** 0.043 0.062 0.127 -0.038 -0.088
(2.17) (0.27) (0.39) (1.22) (-0.25) (-0.64)
Supplier Sizet-1 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.053*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.037***
(7.82) (6.31) (5.87) (10.51) (8.90) (4.29)
Supplier ROAt-1 -0.243*** -0.234*** -0.155*** -0.203*** -0.182*** -0.110***
(-9.02) (-8.71) (-5.16) (-7.09) (-6.37) (-3.88)
Supplier Fixed Assetst-1 0.177*** 0.199*** 0.154** 0.208*** 0.188*** 0.082*
(6.52) (5.01) (2.43) (8.23) (5.21) (1.68)
Supplier R&Dt-1 -0.324*** -0.253*** -0.025 -0.202*** -0.164*** -0.038
(-7.49) (-5.82) (-0.46) (-4.18) (-3.48) (-0.62)
Supplier SGAt-1 -0.016 -0.011 0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.028
(-0.73) (-0.48) (0.13) (-0.08) (0.38) (0.58)
Supplier Tobin’s Qt-1 -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.009*** -0.006** -0.010*** -0.002
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Panel A: Full Sample
Market Leverage Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(-12.81) (-12.35) (-3.50) (-2.46) (-4.09) (-0.79)
Supplier Volatilityt-1 -0.057** -0.048** 0.019 -0.035 -0.032 -0.023
(-2.51) (-2.10) (0.48) (-1.12) (-1.04) (-0.58)
Supplier Nondebt Tax Shieldst-1 -4.108*** -4.180*** -0.986 -4.476*** -4.213*** -0.279
(-4.45) (-4.65) (-1.47) (-4.12) (-3.92) (-0.30)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry FE (2-digit SIC) No Yes No No Yes No
Firm FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 5374 5374 5374 5374 5374 5374
R-squared 0.28 0.35 0.81 0.25 0.32 0.83
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8 Appendix A. Variables Denitions
• Market Leverage - equal to the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of common equity.
• Book leverage - the sum of book values of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities
divided by book value of assets.
• Market Leverage Deviation - the dierence between the actual market leverage and the
target leverage, where the target leverage is computed as the predicted value from yearly
regressions of market leverage on its determinants: Industry Leverage (median industry
leverage), Protability (operating income scaled by assets), Tobins’s Q, Fixed Assets, Size
(the natural logarithm of total assets), Ination (the natural logarithm of CPI), Depreciation
(depreciation expenses scaled by total assets), R&D Intensity (R&D expenses scaled by total
assets), Positive R&D Intensity (indicator of positive R&D expenses).
• Size - natural logarithm of total assets.
• ROA - operating income divided by total assets.
• Fixed Assets - net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
• R&D intensity - research and development expenditures divided by total assets. Following
the literature, we set missing values of research and development expenditures to equal
zero.
• SGA - selling, general and administrative expenses divided by total assets.
• Tobin’s Q -book value of assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book
value of common equity divided by book value of assets.
• Volatility - rolling standard deviation of ROA for the previous 10 years relative to a given
year.
• Non-Debt Tax Shields - investment tax credit divided by total assets.
• Industry Concentration - the sum of squared market shares in sales. Industry is dened
using two-digit SIC code.
• Key Customers R&D - the sum of R&D intensities of all major customers weighted by the
proportion of sales to each customer.
• Key Customers Industry Concentration - the sum of industry concentration of all major cus-
tomers weighted by the proportion of sales to each major customer.
• Key Customers Change in Sales - the sum of changes in sales of all major customers weighted
by the proportion of sales to each major customer. Change is sales is computed as percent-
age dierence in sales (scaled by assets) between the current and the previous year.
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• Connections to Key Customer - the total number of connections between executives of sup-
plier and customer rms scaled by the total number of possible executives’ pairs.
• Connections to Key Customers - the sum of connections to each major customer weighted by
the proportion of sales to each major customer, where connections to each major customer
is the number of connected pairs divided by the total number of pairs that exist between
individuals of customer and supplier rms.
• Connections to Key R&D-intensive Customers - is the sum of connections to each major cus-
tomer weighted by R&D intensities and proportion of sales to each major customer, where
connections to each major customer is the number of connected pairs divided by the total
number of pairs that exist between individuals of customer and supplier rms.
• Supplier Sales to Key Customers - total sales to key customers divided by the total sales of
the supplier.
• Relationship Duration - the duration of the relationship between customer and supplier
measured in years. We consider the year of start of the relationship as the rst year the
supplier-customer relationship appears in Compustat segment le.
• Bonding Index - combines Supplier Sales to Key Customers and Relationship Duration in one
index. To construct the index we rst average the rm’s percentile rankings according to
each of the measures, and then scale the index to range from zero (low) to one (high).
• Distance - average geographical distance between a supplier and its key customers, mea-
sured in miles. The average distance is computed by averaging the distances between the
headquarters location of supplier and that of each of its customers. We compute the dis-
tance using latitude and longitude coordinates for the addresses of the supplier (customer)
headquarters obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer City-State File. We then
apply the formula to calculate the distance between two points on Earth’s surface.
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CHAPTER3: SOCIALCONNECTIONSAND INNOVATION INDIVERSIFIEDCONGLOM-
ERATES
1 Abstract
Using a hand-collected sample on divisional managers in S&P500 diversied conglomerates, we
study the eect of divisional manager-CEO social connections on the scale and success of corpo-
rate innovation activities. Divisional managers who previously worked or studied with CEO le
a greater number of patents during their tenure at the segment. These patents receive more
citations in future and represent a greater scientic and economic value. To provide causal
support for our ndings, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in connections caused by
CEO non-performance related retirements. The dierence-in-dierence estimation shows that
after the CEO leaves the oce, connected segments experience drop in a quantity and quality of
innovation activities. These ndings can imply that socials connections help to mitigate adverse
selection problems associated with R&D investments.
2 Introduction
Do personal connections aect innovation in conglomerates? Current research on innovation
in diversied conglomerates supports the view that diversication leads to both less innovation
and innovation of lower quality (Seru (2014)). Because of the information asymmetries between
corporate headquarters and divisional managers, the allocation of research and development
(R&D) resources is susceptible to supply-demand mismatches, leading to lower innovation. At
the same time, it is hard to not recognize that personal connections being woven at all levels of
organizational hierarchy are important for rm performance. A large body of work on the role of
social connections in nancial decisions suggests that social connections facilitate information
transfers and information sharing (e.g. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008, 2010), Duchin and
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Sosyura (2013)), but little is known about the role of social connections in innovation activities
in conglomerates.
This question becomes particularly important given that it is well established that innova-
tion fosters economic growth (Romer (1986)), and diversied conglomerates make up a signicant
part of U.S. economy (Montgomery (1994)). In this paper we study how the ndings of Seru
(2014) that diversied rms are less innovative will change in the presence of social connections
inside these rms. We focus on social connections between corporate headquarters and divisions,
because information frictions that exist between these levels of organizational hierarchy could
impede innovation. More specically, our main question is how social connections between CEO
and divisional managers in diversied conglomerates aect conglomerates’ innovative activities.
We are also interested to know whether conglomerates with a higher proportion of divisional
managers connected to CEO generate more innovation.
In forming our hypothesis we substantially build on the intuition of Seru (2014). It is well
understood that R&D projects are characterized by high uncertainty about eventual outcomes.
Moreover, there are large information asymmetries between divisional managers responsible for
the innovative projects and headquarters who provide nancing for these projects. Divisional
managers knowing ahead that the nancing of their divisions depends on the success of the
R&D project have a substantial discretion over the information they provide to CEO about the
prospects of the project. We hypothesize that personal connections may mitigate internal infor-
mation asymmetry between divisional managers and CEO. Therefore, divisions run by managers
with social connections to CEO will be more productive in terms of internal quantity and quality
of generated innovation.
There are two ways how social connections may help in reducing information asymmetry
between divisional managers and CEO. First, social connections facilitate the transmission of the
valuable information through the network of top executives (e.g. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy
(2008, 2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). Hence, divisional managers with connections to CEO
are more likely to provide more rich and precise information about the prospects of innovative
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projects. Second, social connections formed in the past may be relevant for building good rep-
utation, and divisions run by managers with good reputation will be more trustworthy and in
future face less information problems (Diamond (1989)).27
We combine segment data from Compustat Segment les with hand-collected data on iden-
tities of divisional managers. We use BoardEx to calculate the connections between CEO and
divisional managers. We consider CEO as being connected to divisional manager if they studied
or worked together at the same time in the past. We count only connections formed during
previous employment or education. We obtain innovation data from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru
and Stoman (2017) patents dataset, which is based on U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce (USPTO)
data from 1926-2010. Following Seru (2014), we distribute 46,534 patents produced by the sample
rms across conglomerate divisions by matching the patent technology class with the three-digit
SIC code of the division industry. We measure the scale of innovation by the natural logarithm
of one plus the total number of patents applied (citations received by these patents) during a
given scal year. We measure the scientic success of innovation by focusing on the patents that
are cited in the 50th percentile (and above) of the citation distribution within their technology
class-year. We measure the economic success of innovation by using the dollar value of each
patent as reported in the Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoman (2017) and estimated using the
stock market response to news about the patent.
Our baseline results show that segments run by divisional managers connected to CEO are
associated with greater number of applied patents, more citations generated by these patents,
higher probability to le highly scientically important patents, higher number of scientically
important patent applications and higher economic value of this patents as measured by market
valuations of the applications (Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoman (2017)). The magnitude of
the eects is substantial: one additional connection to CEO is associated with next year increase
in patents’ applications by 24.10%, in future citations received by the patents - by 27.10% , in
high-impact patents as measured by technology class citations in the 50th percentile - by 31.04%,
27In addition, a threat of losing a connection to an important and inuential CEO may ex-ante mitigate possible
negative behavior (e.g. Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993), Brass and Labianca (2006)).
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and, nally, in patents economic value - by 21.10%.28 The results are robust to controlling for
unobserved time-invariant rm-level factors (by including rm xed eects) and controlling for
overall divisional managers’ connectedness.
To provide a causal support for the eects we use plausibly exogenous CEO non-performance
related retirements as exogenous shocks to managers’ connections. CEO departures due to planned
retirements are likely to lead to a loss of connection(s) with the divisional managers these CEOs
were previously connected. Using a dierence-in-dierence setup, we show that following a
plausibly exogenous CEO turnover segments that switched from connected to unconnected CEO
experience a signicant decrease in innovation outcomes.
After establishing the results at the segment-level, we turn to the rm-level analysis. Specif-
ically, we study whether conglomerates with a higher proportion of divisional managers con-
nected to CEO generate more innovation. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, we estimate re-
gressions with variables represented as annual changes. This approach cancels all rm-invariant
factors. We nd that when the rms increase the proportion of divisional managers connected to
CEO, they le more patents and patents of higher economic value. Taken together, our segment-
and rm-level results suggest that connections to CEO have a innovation-enhancing role in
conglomerates.
Our study contributes to the emerging research on the innovation in conglomerates. Seru
(2014) using plausibly exogenous variation in the merger outcomes due to failed mergers shows
that rms completed diversied mergers produce subsequently less amount of innovation and
innovation of less quality relative to rms that did not complete the mergers. He concludes that
the observed drop in innovation can be explained by the existence of information asymmetries
between CEO and divisional managers. Anjos and Fracassi (2015) view conglomerates as possess-
ing informational advantage compared to single-segment rms and show that conglomerates par-
ticipating in more informationally-central industries (relative to single-segment rms) produce
more patents and better patents. Anjos (2018) builds on Seru (2014) and theoretically studies the
28The reported percentage increases are in logarithmic values.
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innovation behavior of conglomerates. He provides an explanation for the result of Seru (2014)
that conglomerates innovate less by focusing on the existence of knowledge spillovers that allow
for information exchange between divisions. He shows that in the presence of these knowledge
spillovers conglomerates can innovate less compared to single-segment rms. We complement
these ndings by providing evidence that is consistent with the view that reduced innovation out-
comes of conglomerates relative to single-segment rms can be caused by information problems.
Because personal connections between CEO and divisional managers can alleviate the internal
information problems, we show that conglomerates with such connections are associated with
greater and more successful innovation.
We also add to the research examining the eect of external connectivity of managers
on innovation. For example, Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014) nd that rms with
better-connected CEOs are associated with more R&D investments and greater number and
higher quality patents. Consistent with our paper, their ndings imply that personal connections
alleviate the access to valuable information and thereby reduce the CEOs’ reluctance upon taking
risky innovative projects. Kang, Liu, Low and Zhang (2018) nd that rms with CEOs socially
connected with board members produce more patents and citations. Their ndings are also con-
sistent with the information role of personal connections, specically, that connections facilitate
more productive exchange of information between CEO and board members who provide CEO
with industry expertise about innovation projects. We complement this literature by focusing on
CEO connections to divisional managers, and our results are consistent with the information role
of personal connections.
3 Sample and Data
3.1 Segments Data
Our sample is based on the Compustat Segment les and covers the 8-year period from 2003 to
2010. Our sample ends in 2010, because it is the last year for which the innovation data is available.
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The sample selection procedure is as follows. First, we select all the companies that enter S&P500
for one or more years within the sample period of 2006-2013. We then exclude nancial and
utilities companies leaving 507 companies. We next require that conglomerates operate in indus-
trial segments, that segments have non-missing SIC values, that rms have at least 2 business
segments with non-missing values for segment assets and segment capital expenditures, and that
the sum of segment sales does not deviate more than 5% from the total rm sales. These lters
produce 237 rms. We then randomly select 100 rms out of those 237 rms with information
for all divisional managers for these rms. If a rm doesn’t provide information on all divisional
managers, we replace the rm with another rm from our sample of multisegment rms. To
avoid the reduction of the sample size due to missing nancial data, we additionally hand-collect
missing nancial data (operating prot and segment assets) from 10-K annual reports for our
sample of rms with information about divisional managers. Since the sample period starts
from 2003, we complement the existing dataset of divisional managers starting from 2006 by
additionally hand-collecting the identities of divisional managers for 2003-2005 years.
We dene a segment’s industry based on its primary 3-digit SIC code (sics1). Following
Cohen and Lou (2012) and Schneider and Spalt (2016), we dene conglomerate rms as rms
operating in more more than one industry.29 For 100 rms for which we collected information on
divisional managers, we aggregate segment data by reportable segments (identier sid) by indus-
tries or three-digit SIC code. Our nal sample utilized in regressions consists of 1030 segment-
year-observations, which cover 232 unique divisions (based on industries)30 and 79 companies.31
We report summary statistics on rms and segments in our sample in Panel A Table 1. An average
conglomerate has book assets valued at $22.8 billion, has annual R&D expenses of 2% of book
assets and operates in 3.15 distinct three-digit SIC industries.
29As in Schneider and Spalt (2016), we treat rms as single-segment rms if they: 1) operate in one three-digit
SIC code and 2) appear in Compustat Fundamentals Annual database but not in the segment data.
30Henceforth, we will use segments and divisions interchangeably and refer to segments based on three-digit SIC
classication.
3121 rms out of randomly selected 100 rms dropped from the sample as a result of data aggregation by industries
as opposed by reportable segments.
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3.2 Innovation Data and Measures
We obtain innovation data from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoman (2017) (henceforth
KPSS) patents dataset, which is based on U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce (USPTO) data from
1926-2010. For each rm in the dataset we can observe the number of patents led with the
USPTO, the number of citations each led patent received and the estimated market value of
each patent. Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoman (2017) obtain the entire history of U.S.
patent documents from Google Patents, and match the patent data to corporations covered in
CRSP database. The matched rms in KPSS can be identied by CRSP PERMNO identiers. Using
these identiers, we augment the innovation dataset by matching the nancial information for
sample rms from Compustat.
However, the KPSS dataset provides the innovation data only at the aggregated rm level
without distribution of the patents applied by a specic segment of the conglomerate. To dis-
tribute 46,534 patents produced by the sample rms across segments we follow the algorithm
suggested in Seru (2014). Specically, for each patent we use the technology class the patent was
led in and match it to the three-digit SIC code of the segment industry. We obtain the matching
table between technology classes and SIC codes from USPTO website. If the patent cannot be
assigned to a unique division, we divide the patent equally among the possible candidates.32
To measure dierent dimensions of innovation activity we construct several variables. Fol-
lowing the innovation literature (e.g. Trajtenberg (1990), Griliches (1990), Hall, Jae and Tra-
jtenberg (2005)), we use simple patent counts to measure the amount of innovation and citations
counts to measure the quality of innovation. Following a common approach in innovation studies,
we use the patent application date to assign patents to scal years. For each conglomerate
segment we nd the aggregate number of patents produced in a given scal year, and Patents
is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of patents applied during a given
scal year. Similarly, Citations counts the total number of citations generated by patents led in
32Around 30% of patents are assigned using this approach. Seru (2014) additionally uses the state of location of
inventors and state of the subsidiary to assign patents to divisions, and we leave it for future work.
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a given scal year and is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of citations
received for patents applied during a given scal year.
A common concern in innovation literature is so-called truncation bias, which appears
because of the average two-year lag between the patent application time and patent approval
time. As a result patents and citations diminish towards the end of the sample. We address the
truncation bias by scaling patents (citations) by average patents (citations) granted in the same
year and in the same technology class (variables Scaled Patents and Scaled Citations, respectively)
as in Seru (2014) and Bernstein (2015). Moreover, as recommended in Hall, Jae and Trajtenberg
(2001) we include year dummies in all regressions. Additionally, in robustness regressions we
exclude two last years restricting our sample to patents led up to 2007, considering that patents
applied after 2007 may not appear in the sample.
To capture the novelty dimension of innovation, we construct High Impact Patents in the
spirit of the measure used by Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik (2014)) , which focuses on the patents
that are cited in the 50th percentile (and above) of the citation distribution within their technology
class-year. Similarly, we construct High Impact Innovation, which is a dummy variable equal
to one if any of the rm’s patents are cited in the 50th percentile (and above) of the citation
distribution within their technology class-year. To measure the economic value of innovation,
we use the market value of each patent as reported in the KPSS dataset. KPSS dataset provides the
dollar value of each patent, estimated using the stock market response to news about the patent.
Using this data, we compute Patents Value as the natural logarithm of one plus the dollar value
of all patents applied for during a given year.
3.3 Managers and Connections
Our sample includes 495 unique divisional managers and 110 CEOs. To identify the divisional
manager responsible for the business segment, we follow the procedure of data collecting de-
scribed in Duchin and Sosyura (2013). We read biographical histories of the rm’s executives in
the annual reports (both types of reports - “for investors” and 10-Ks) and proxy statements. In
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addition to these sources we use biographical information in BoardEx database and other publicly
available sources of information: Bloomberg Executive directory, Reuters and companies press
releases. Divisional managers typically hold the following titles: “Executive Vice President”,
“Senior Vice President”, “Divisional President” or “Chief Executive Ocer” (of the corresponding
subsidiary). We select only the managers who are responsible for a particular business segment.
We disregard managers who are responsible for a functional area across all or many segments
(such as senior vice president of nance, senior vice president of marketing), because it is not
possible to establish a clear match between these managers and particular business segments.
In matching managers to segments we consider only the highest-level executive responsible
for a business segment in a given period of time. In some cases the segment names in Compustat
and in annual reports disagree. For example, the segments reported by Compustat are sometimes
more aggregated than divisions reported in the annual report. In this situation, we match the
segment with the highest-level manager among all the managers responsible for the segment as
reported by Compustat. In addition, we collect starting and ending dates of the managers’ tenure
in the position. If a segment changes its manager during the scal year we assign both old and
new managers to the segment in this year.
We consider two managers to be socially connected if at one moment in their past they
participated in the same organization. In our approach of measuring connections we require that
participation in the same organization has time overlaps. This stricter approach in measuring
connections allows us to better account for actual interaction between two people in the past.
Arguably, just having the same organization in their CV’s does not guarantee that two managers
were at one place in any period of time in the past.
We obtain data on social connections from the BoardEx database. BoardEx provides infor-
mation on pairwise connections, based on their educational, employment and non-professional
background. For each pair of people we have dates of their overlap in the same organization, type
of organization and the persons’ roles in that organization during the connection period. Each
divisional manager-CEO pair we consider being connected if they both studied or worked in the
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organization, which is not the current conglomerate rm, during the same time in the past. To
mitigate reverse causality issues, we count only one earliest connection between two managers
irrespective of when and where it was established, and drop all observations that represent du-
plicate connections between the same pair of managers. We nd that 12% of divisional managers
have connections to CEO in our sample.
We use the measure of social connections, developed in previous studies (Gaspar and Massa
(2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2013)). We deneConnections to CEO as the the fraction of connected
managers (to CEO) out of the total number of managers responsible for the segment minus the
average value of this fraction of connected managers (across all rm segments) in a given rm-
year. This rm-adjusted measure allows us to capture the relative connectedness of each segment
in conglomerate relative to other segments in conglomerate. We use the following formula:
Connections to CEOi = Connectioni −
∑n
j=1 Connectionj
n
(7)
here Connectioni denotes the fraction of connected managers (to CEO) out of the total
number of managers responsible for the segment i, and n denotes the number of segments
(three-digit SIC industries) in conglomerate in a given year.
3.4 Additional Variables
In our regressions we include the standard control variables used in the conglomerate and inno-
vation literature. Specically, we control for Segment Sales (ratio of segment sales to rm sales),
Segment Size (natural logarithm of segment assets), Segment Relative Size (ratio of segment assets
to total conglomerate assets), Segment Relative Q (demeaned Tobin’s Q for conglomerate three-
digit SIC industry), Segment CapEx (ratio of segment capital expenditures to segment assets), R&D
Expenses (ratio of rm R&D expenses to rm assets), ROA Volatility (rolling standard deviation of
ROA for the previous 10 years relative to a given year) and CEO Ownership (percent of the rm’s
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outstanding stock hold by CEO). We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels to
mitigate the eect of outliers.
We also control for manager ability and formal inuence in order to isolate these two
eects from the role of manager’s connections. For example, McNeil and Smyth (2009) nd
that manager’s formal inuence distorts capital allocation eciency, because more powerful
managers obtain more capital. Specically, to control for the formal inuence we use the average
company tenure of managers responsible for segment (Tenure) and proportion of managers (out
of all managers responsible for the segment) in senior status as identied by BoardEx role title
(Senior). To control for ability and/or skill, we use the proportion of managers graduated Ivy
League universities (Ivy League) and proportion of managers that have Ph.D. degree (PhD).
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Univariate Results
Table 1 Panel B compares the measures of innovation activity taken at the time of ling for
the connected and unconnected segments. Since R&D investments may require time to produce
patents, we sort segments into connected and unconnected subsamples based on connections in
one year prior to ling. We dene Connected segments as segments where the majority of the
managers are connected to CEO, or in other words, the proportion of connected managers is
greater (or equal) 0.5 and Unconnected segments as segments where the proportion of connected
managers is less than 0.5. We observe that connected segments generate greater number of
patents (scaled patents) than unconnected segments, with dierence signicant at 5%. The same
observation is true for other measures of innovation activity - citations (scaled citations), high
impact patents and patents value. Taken together, these results give a preliminary picture that
segments run by divisional managers connected to CEO are associated with greater amount and
higher quality of innovation.
Looking at other segment characteristics, we nd no signicant dierences (at most marginal
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dierences) in segment sales (as measured ratio of segment sales to rm sales), size, relative
size (ratio of segment assets to total conglomerate assets), relative Tobin’s Q (demeaned across
segments’ Q). However, connected segments have a lower proportion of divisional managers in
senior status and higher proportion of managers having a PhD degree.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis
To test how connections to CEO aect the segments’ innovation outcomes, we estimate the
following regression model:
Innovationit+1 = α + βConnections to CEOt + γXit + Industryn + Industryi
+Yeart + it
(8)
where Innovationit+1 is an innovation outcome of segment i in scal year t+1. We examine
the innovation outcomes in the next year, because it takes time for the R&D investments to pro-
duce patents. Connections to CEO is the connections measure for segment i computed as shown
in equation (1) above. The regression also includes a set of control variablesXit, rm industry and
segment industry xed eects (based on 2-digit SIC codes) and year xed eects. Additionally,
we include rm xed eects to account for time-invariant industry dierences across rms (such
as strategy, managerial talent) that could potentially aect segments’ innovation activity. We
adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and cluster at rm level.
Table 2 reports the results of estimation of equation (2). The results show that across all
specications the coecient on Connections to CEO is positive and signicant at 5% or better. The
results in column (1) suggest that segments run by divisional managers who have connections
to CEO le more patents in the following year. In column (2) we add rm xed eects to the
regression, and our results remain unchanged (t = 2.68, coecient signicant at 1%). The positive
and signicant coecients in columns (3) and (4) indicate that connections to CEO are associated
with increased citations. The estimates in columns (5) and (6) tell us that connections to CEO are
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associated with the greater amount of novel innovation, measured by higher number of generated
patents, which are cited in the 50th percentile (and above) of the citation distribution within their
technology class-year. The results from logit regression in column (7) suggest that connections
to CEO are associated with the signicantly higher probability of ling patents that are more
novel in nature. Finally, columns (8) and (9) show that connections to CEO are associated with
more commercially successful patents. The economic signicance of the results is substantial.
Specically, in the column (1) the coecient on Patents of 0.514 tells us that for a mean rm (with
the average of Patents equal to 1.03) an increase by one connection to CEO is associated with
24.10% increase in Patents in the next year.33 Further, the coecients in the columns (3), (5) and
(8) imply that for a mean rm one additional connection to CEO is associated with increase in
Citations - by 27.10% , with increase in High Impact Patents - by 31.04%, and, nally, with increase
in Patents Value - by 21.10%. It is worth to note that the estimates on other control variables
have predicted signs. For example, higher CEO ownership is negatively related to innovation
outcomes, because CEO may be reluctant on taking risky innovative projects. We also nd that
rms with more volatile ROA are associated with more segment-level innovation.
In Table 3 we examine the robustness of our baseline results. In the rst set of tests we
account for truncation bias. Our results continue to hold if we: 1) use Scaled Patents and
Scaled Citations as dependent variables, as shown in columns (1) and (2) respectively; 2) we
restrict our sample to patents led up to 2007, considering that patents applied after 2007 may not
appear in the sample as shown in columns (3) and (4). We next control for overall connectedness of
divisional managers, since Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014) show that better-connected
CEOs are associated with more and higher quality patents. We measure the overall connectedness
of divisional managers by using the concept of degree centrality as in El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik
(2015). Degree centrality measures the total number of social connections a given manager has to
all other executives within the whole BoardEx network of North America executives. As common
33Increase by one connection to CEO translates into increase in our demeaned measure Connections to CEO by
0.48, multiplying coecient of 0.514 by 0.48 gives 0.248 increase in the log-patents variable Patents, what corresponds
the percentage increase of 24.10% for a mean rm in a sample - with a mean value of Patents equal to 1.03.
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in literature, Centrality is expressed in percentiles (1st percentile – least central, 100th percentile
– most central), which capture the relative position of the manager in the entire network of
BoardEx executives. After calculating the degree centrality for all managers, we compute the
relative centrality using the equation (1) above (variable Centrality). Columns (5) and (6) show
that our results remain unchanged after controlling for overall connectedness of divisional man-
agers. Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we repeat analysis by replacing Connections to CEO with the
dummy variable Connected to compare connected and unconnected segments, and our results
continue to hold.
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that segments operated by divisional
managers with connections to CEO are associated with higher quality and quantity of innovation.
4.3 Potential Endogeneity
While the results in the previous section show that there is positive relation between connections
to CEO and innovation outcomes, this relation is not necessarily causal. In our baseline regression
we control for unobserved factors at the rm level using rm xed eects. However, there are
still some unobserved segment-level factors that could drive both - innovation outcomes and
connections to CEO.
We address potential endogeneity using a dierence-in-dierence estimation. Following
a large body of work on social connections (e.g. Duchin and Sosyura (2013), Fracassi and Tate
(2012)), we use CEO planned retirements as exogenous shocks to connections of divisional man-
agers to CEO.34 Specically, we focus on a subsample of CEO turnovers caused by CEO plausibly
exogenous retirements. Divisional managers who are connected with the departing CEO are
likely to lose this connection(s) after the CEO departure. Hence, as a result of the CEO turnover
the segment run by connected divisional manager may lose connection(s) with CEO. Therefore,
the observed decrease in the innovation outcomes as a result of a loss of connection due to
plausibly exogenous CEO turnovers would provide a causal support for the previously shown
34We have only one CEO death during the sample period, so we focus only on CEO retirements.
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positive relation between segment connections and innovation.
We identify CEO turnovers due to deaths or planned retirements at the sample rms. Using
Execucomp, we focus on a subset of CEO departures with codes for the reason “Deceased” and
“Retired”. To identify non-performance related retirements, we require the executive to have
age exceeding 60 years at the year of the departure (Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001), Parrino
(1997)). We next check each potential retirement using rms’ press releases and media articles.
If we nd a press-release about the planned CEO retirement, we classify the potential retirement
as a retirement, otherwise - we label this departure as non-retirement and later exclude this CEO
departure from the sample of retirements. Using this process, we identify 38 CEO turnovers with
23 CEO retirements (including one death) and 15 CEO departures (non-retirements) during the
sample period.
In a dierence-in-dierence setup we dene a treatment group (Connected CEO = 1) - seg-
ments in which a connected CEO was replaced by a unconnected CEO due to an exogenous
turnover and control group (Connected CEO = 0) - segments in which a unconnected CEO was
replaced by a unconnected CEO due to an exogenous turnover. In other words, in this approach
we are comparing the innovation outcomes of the treated segments - segments that lost con-
nection(s) due to exogenous CEO departure with control segments - segments that did not lose
any connections as a result of the CEO departure. We remove turnovers when the connected
CEO was replaced by a connected CEO or unconnected CEO was replaced by a connected CEO.
We run the tests with commonly used 7-year and 5-year investigation-windows (e.g. Fracassi
and Tate (2012)) centered on the CEO departure year and remove two confounding turnovers
in these 7(5)-year windows. Since in our sample the number of control segments signicantly
dominate the number of treated segments, we follow Seru (2014) and conduct our analysis by
randomly selecting ve control segments (without replacement) for every treated segment. Our
nal sample consists of ve treated segments and twenty ve control segments, yielding 130
rm-segment-year observations for a 7-year window centered on the CEO retirement event. We
estimate the following model:
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Innovation Outcomeit = α + β1After + β2Connected CEO + β3After × Connected CEO
+Industryn + Industryi + Yeart + it
(9)
where Innovation Outcomeit is an innovation outcome of segment i in scal year t, After
is a dummy variable that equals one for the scal years after the exogenous CEO departure,
Connected CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the segment lost connection after the
exogenous CEO turnover. The key variable After × Connected CEO captures the dierence in
dierences eect or change in innovation outcome for a segment that lost connection to CEO as
a result of the exogenous CEO turnover. The coecient on After shows the average changes in
innovation outcome for the unaected segments. We control for the same set of control variables
as in our baseline model (2) taken at the year prior to ling. As previously, we cluster standard
errors at the rm level.
The results of the tests are reported in Table 4. The estimates in Column (1) show that
the coecient on After × Connected CEO is negative and signicant at 5% (t = -2.74), suggesting
that after the segment les signicantly less patents in the year following the departure of the
connected CEO. The results in the remaining columns paint the similar picture: decrease in other
innovation outcomes after the CEO departure due to planned retirement.35
4.4 Firm-Level Innovation
So far, we documented that there is a positive eect of social connections on the innovation
outcomes at the segment level. In this section we study if such eects exist at rm level. We
use the measure of rm-level patents by aggregating patents led at the segment level. Similarly
to segment-level patents variable, we dene Firm Patents as the natural logarithm of one plus
the total patents led by all rm segments. We are also interested in the rm-level value of
patents led by all segments, and Firm Patents is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the
35In unreported analysis, we repeat the estimation using Scaled Patents, Scaled Citations and controlling for
Centrality. We obtain quantitatively similar results.
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total dollar value patents led by all rm segments. To mitigate omitted variable concerns, we
perform regressions in yearly changes. This approach allows to cancel all time-invariant rm-
level factors. Specically, the dependent variable is the change in Firm Patents from the previous
year, and the main independent variable is the change is the change in Firm Connectedness from
the previous year. Firm Connectedness is a rm-level connections measure and is equal to asset-
weighted average of the proportion of divisional managers connected to CEO.
Table 5 presents the results. Column (1) shows estimates for rm patents and column (2)
- for rm-level patents value. In all regressions we adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity
and cluster them by rm. The positive (and signicant at 5%) coecient on Firm Connectedness
in both columns indicates that when connections to CEO increase, the rm les more patents
and the economic value of the patents increase. The results suggest that connections to CEO
matter for rm innovation at aggregate rm-level irrespective of how relatively connected the
individual segments are.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the how connections to CEO aect conglomerates’ innovation outcomes.
We nd that segments operated by divisional managers who have past educational or employ-
ment overlaps with CEOs are associated with greater number of led patents, more highly cited
patents and higher probability to le novel and highly scientically valuable patents. Importantly,
these higher quantity of patent applications translates into subsequent higher market valuations
of these applications suggesting the economic success of inventions. The observed relationships
are robust to controlling for unobserved time-invariant rm-level factors (by including rm xed
eects) and controlling for overall divisional managers’ connectedness.
To provide a causal support for the eects we use exogenous CEO turnovers as exogenous
shocks to managers’ connections. CEO departures due to planned retirements are likely to lead
to a loss of connection(s) with the divisional managers these CEOs were previously connected.
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Using a dierence-in-dierence setup, we show that following a CEO turnover segments that
switched from connected to unconnected CEO experience a signicant decrease in innovation
outcomes. At rm level, we show that rms with greater proportion of divisional managers
connected to CEO are associated with superior innovation outcomes. Overall, our results suggest
that connections to CEO have a innovation-enhancing role in conglomerates.
131
6 References
Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., and Celik, M. A. (2014). Young, restless and creative: Openness to
disruption and creative innovations (No. w19894). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anjos, F. (2018). Knowledge Spillovers and Innovation in Multi-Division Firms. Available at
SSRN 3046780.
Anjos, F., and Fracassi, C. (2015). Shopping for information? Diversication and the network of
industries. Management Science, 61(1), 161-183.
Bernstein, S. (2015). Does going public aect innovation?. Journal of Finance, 70(4), 1365-1403.
Boot, A. W., Greenbaum, S. I., and Thakor, A. V. (1993). Reputation and discretion in nancial
contracting. The American Economic Review, 1165-1183.
Brass, D. J. and Labianca, G. (2006). Exploring the social ledger: Negative relationships and
negative asymmetry in social networks in organizations. Academy of Management Review,
31(3), 596-614.
Cohen, L. Frazzini A., and Malloy, C. (2008). The small world of investing: board connections
and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116(5), 951-979.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., and Malloy, C. (2010). Sell-side school ties. Journal of Finance, 65(4),
1409-1437.
Cohen, L., and Lou, D. (2012). Complicated rms. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(2), 383-400.
Diamond, D. W. (1989). Reputation acquisition in debt markets. Journal of Political Economy,
97(4), 828-862.
Duchin, R. and Sosyura, D. (2013). Divisional managers and internal capital markets. Journal of
Finance, 68(2), pp.387-429.
Faleye, O., Kovacs, T., and Venkateswaran, A. (2014). Do better-connected CEOs innovate more?.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49(5-6), 1201-1225.
Fracassi, C., and Tate, G. (2012). External networking and internal rm governance. Journal of
Finance, 67(1), 153-194.
Gaspar, J. M., and Massa, M. (2011). The role of commonality between CEO and divisional
managers in internal capital markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(03),
841-869.
Griliches, Z. (1990). Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey. Journal of Economic
Literature, 28(4), 66-707.
Hall, B. H., Jae, A. B., and Trajtenberg, M. (2001). The NBER patent citation data le: Lessons,
insights and methodological tools (No. w8498). National Bureau of Economic Research.
132
Hall, B. H., Jae, A., and Trajtenberg, M. (2005). Market value and patent citations. RAND Journal
of Economics, 16-38.
Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., and Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO
turnover: A long-term perspective. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2265-2297.
El-Khatib, R., Fogel, K., and Jandik, T. (2015). CEO network centrality and merger performance.
Journal of Financial Economics, 116(2), 349-382.
Kang, J. K., Liu, W. L., Low, A., and Zhang, L. (2018). Friendly boards and innovation. Journal of
Empirical Finance, 45, 1-25.
Kogan, L., Papanikolaou, D., Seru, A., and Stoman, N. (2017). Technological innovation, re-
source allocation, and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2), 665-712.
McNeil, C. R., and Smythe, T. I. (2009). Division manager lobbying power and the allocation of
capital. Financial Review, 44(1), 59-85.
Montgomery, C.A. (1994). Corporate diversication. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (3), 163–178.
Parrino, R. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession a cross-sectional analysis. Journal of
Financial Economics, 46(2), 165-197.
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy, 94(5),
1002-1037.
Seru, A. (2014). Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity. Journal
of Financial Economics, 111(2), 381-405.
Schneider, C., and Spalt, O. (2016). Conglomerate Investment, Skewness, and the CEO Long-Shot
Bias. Journal of Finance, 71(2), 635-672.
Trajtenberg, M. (1990). A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of innovations.
RAND Journal of Economics, 172-187.
133
7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for rms (Panel A) and segments (Panel B. The sample is
79 randomly selected S&P industrial conglomerates between 2003 and 2010, which operate in at
least two business segments, have non-missing operating prot and segment assets and disclose
identity of divisional managers. Innovation data is from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoman
(2017) patents dataset. The nancial information is from merged Compustat and Compustat
Historical Segments, identities of divisional managers’ are collected from 10-K annual reports
and data on divisional managers’ personal characteristics and connections is from BoardEx.
Panel A: Firms
All Firms
Variable Mean Median SD
Book assets, $millions 22768 13922 44680
Firm R&D 0.020 0.016 0.023
Market value, $millions 29614 15857 51147
Number of 3-digit SIC segments 3.148 3.000 1.105
Sales, $millions 22096 11026 24440
ROA volatility 0.027 0.021 0.020
CEO ownership 0.011 0.001 0.033
Patents 1.432 0.000 1.993
Citations 1.226 0.000 1.972
Patents Value 2.483 0.000 3.080
High Impact Patents 0.949 0.000 1.537
Firm Connectedness 0.003 0.000 0.049
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Panel B: Segments
All Firms Connected Unconnected
(Prop >= 0.5) (Prop < 0.5)
Variable Mean SD Mean Mean Dierence
Innovation Measures at Patent Application Year
Patents 1.031 1.551 1.478 1.003 0.475 **
Scaled Patents 0.681 1.075 0.961 0.663 0.298 **
Citations 0.860 1.539 1.299 0.833 0.466 **
Scaled Citations 0.904 1.538 1.281 0.880 0.401 **
High Impact Patents 0.626 1.131 0.931 0.607 0.324 **
High Impact Innovation 0.313 0.464 0.417 0.306 0.111 *
Patents Value 1.956 2.621 2.759 1.906 0.853 **
Independent Variables in One Year Before Patent Application
Connections to CEO 0.001 0.157 - - -
Segment Sales 1.502 0.994 1.694 1.490 0.204
Segment Size 7.998 1.203 7.759 8.012 -0.253 *
Segment Relative Size 0.341 0.237 0.348 0.340 0.008
Relative Q -0.016 0.332 0.030 -0.019 0.049
Segment CapEx 0.048 0.048 0.037 0.048 -0.011 *
Tenure (yrs.) 14.081 10.442 4.551 14.656 -10.105
Senior 0.494 0.477 0.267 0.508 -0.241 ***
Ivy League 0.225 0.38 0.237 0.224 0.013
PhD 0.041 0.173 0.114 0.037 0.077 ***
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Table 2: Connections to CEO and Innovation Outputs
The table presents the results of segment-level regressions of innovation measures on social connections measure, segment and
manager controls. The innovation variables are taken at year t+1. All other variables are measured at year t. All continuous variables
are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow for clustering at the
rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable Patents Citations High High Patents Value
(t+1) (t+1) Impact Impact (t+1)
Patents Innovation
(t+1) (t+1)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Connections to CEO 0.514*** 0.486*** 0.482** 0.407** 0.402*** 0.346** 1.054** 0.854** 0.848**
(2.68) (2.68) (2.55) (2.24) (2.69) (2.15) (2.19) (2.18) (2.60)
Segment Sales 0.421*** 0.169** 0.407*** 0.173** 0.315*** 0.134** 0.733** 0.624*** 0.267*
(4.61) (2.06) (4.50) (2.25) (4.32) (2.29) (2.47) (4.57) (1.95)
Segment Size 0.322*** 0.214 0.304*** 0.252* 0.239*** 0.194* 0.742*** 0.643*** 0.326
(3.41) (1.45) (3.64) (1.81) (3.58) (1.93) (2.82) (4.42) (1.25)
Segment Rel. Size -0.553 -0.157 -0.525 -0.297 -0.384 -0.212 -0.888 -1.411*** -0.146
(-1.59) (-0.32) (-1.66) (-0.65) (-1.55) (-0.63) (-0.98) (-2.69) (-0.18)
Segment Rel Q 0.236*** 0.165* 0.215** 0.166* 0.182*** 0.140* 0.721*** 0.378** 0.227
(2.84) (1.79) (2.51) (1.68) (2.78) (1.84) (3.52) (2.49) (1.52)
Segment CapEx 2.263* 2.848** 2.778** 2.839** 1.827** 2.190*** 11.080** 5.112** 5.066**
(1.92) (2.50) (2.41) (2.63) (2.08) (2.80) (2.15) (2.42) (2.46)
R&D Expenses 8.923* -2.337 6.662 -3.000 5.558* -4.783 23.825** 15.817** 9.056
(1.94) (-0.31) (1.57) (-0.28) (1.76) (-0.63) (2.10) (2.35) (0.74)
CEO Ownership -8.483* -15.438** -11.413** -19.052*** -7.365** -12.876*** -157.526*** -16.582* -24.839**
(-1.91) (-2.53) (-2.36) (-2.73) (-2.25) (-2.80) (-3.12) (-1.98) (-2.26)
ROA volatility 14.977*** 20.087** 13.467*** 22.867** 9.822*** 13.344* -4.675 21.237** 30.262**
(3.03) (2.07) (2.70) (2.24) (2.67) (1.80) (-0.30) (2.39) (2.05)
Tenure 0.017** 0.002 0.012* -0.002 0.010** -0.001 0.043*** 0.022** 0.005
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Dependent Variable Patents Citations High High Patents Value
(t+1) (t+1) Impact Impact (t+1)
Patents Innovation
(t+1) (t+1)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(2.43) (0.43) (1.87) (-0.44) (2.04) (-0.18) (2.92) (2.11) (0.68)
Senior -0.445*** -0.007 -0.379*** 0.035 -0.292*** 0.033 -1.178*** -0.563** 0.006
(-3.40) (-0.05) (-3.26) (0.24) (-3.36) (0.31) (-2.81) (-2.34) (0.03)
Ivy League 0.376*** 0.165 0.295** 0.095 0.237** 0.074 0.908*** 0.530** 0.275
(2.68) (1.40) (2.33) (0.84) (2.52) (0.93) (2.63) (2.18) (1.35)
PhD -0.031 -0.492 0.058 -0.346 -0.022 -0.332 0.521 0.148 -0.425
(-0.11) (-1.31) (0.21) (-0.98) (-0.10) (-1.14) (0.47) (0.31) (-0.83)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Industry FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
Segment Industry FE Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Firm xed eects No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes
N 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 779 1030 1030
Adj. R2 0.57 0.66 0.54 0.63 0.53 0.62 N/A 0.57 0.65
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Table 3: Connections to CEO and Innovation Outputs: Robustness
The table presents the results of segment-level regressions of innovation measures on social connections measures, segment and
manager controls. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on
standard errors that allow for clustering at the rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Scaled Restricted Sample Controlling for Centrality Connections Dummy
Dependent Variable Patents Citations Patents Citations Patents Citations Patents Citations
(t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Connections to CEO 0.446*** 0.593*** 0.640** 0.659** 0.614*** 0.523***
(3.24) (3.17) (2.61) (2.59) (3.09) (3.08)
Connected (>= 0.5) 0.500** 0.444**
(2.42) (2.04)
Segment Sales 0.309*** 0.408*** 0.574*** 0.580*** 0.275*** 0.226*** 0.416*** 0.403***
(4.66) (4.52) (4.71) (4.71) (3.34) (3.18) (4.61) (4.48)
Segment Size 0.211*** 0.315*** 0.461*** 0.478*** 0.220** 0.181** 0.323*** 0.305***
(2.98) (3.44) (3.09) (3.44) (2.43) (2.47) (3.46) (3.68)
Segment Rel. Size -0.261 -0.582* -0.755 -0.776 -0.489 -0.460 -0.563 -0.534*
(-0.99) (-1.68) (-1.38) (-1.49) (-1.36) (-1.57) (-1.61) (-1.68)
Segment Rel Q 0.176*** 0.209** 0.383*** 0.359*** 0.177** 0.147** 0.229*** 0.209**
(2.94) (2.29) (3.03) (2.85) (2.35) (2.00) (2.76) (2.46)
Segment CapEx 1.197 2.967** 3.284* 4.016** 1.389 1.386* 2.367* 2.859**
(1.44) (2.55) (1.93) (2.31) (1.40) (1.80) (1.95) (2.44)
R&D Expenses 6.122* 7.571 11.171 8.555 10.212** 6.485* 8.822* 6.583
(1.78) (1.61) (1.65) (1.41) (2.29) (1.98) (1.94) (1.58)
CEO Ownership -4.968* -10.645** -7.903 -12.504 0.674 -2.125 -8.326* -11.277**
(-1.73) (-2.29) (-0.99) (-1.51) (0.15) (-0.61) (-1.92) (-2.35)
ROA volatility 9.876*** 12.199** 11.306* 12.659** 12.563** 6.066 14.127*** 12.716**
(2.85) (2.56) (1.76) (2.15) (2.41) (1.56) (2.82) (2.60)
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Scaled Restricted Sample Controlling for Centrality Connections Dummy
Dependent Variable Patents Citations Patents Citations Patents Citations Patents Citations
(t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tenure 0.013** 0.014** 0.019** 0.014 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.013**
(2.58) (2.14) (2.06) (1.60) (3.28) (3.06) (2.69) (2.09)
Senior -0.301*** -0.388*** -0.578*** -0.505*** -0.324*** -0.272*** -0.428*** -0.364***
(-3.25) (-3.22) (-2.74) (-2.66) (-2.71) (-3.30) (-3.29) (-3.12)
Ivy League 0.269*** 0.319** 0.515** 0.460** 0.341*** 0.251*** 0.370*** 0.289**
(2.69) (2.47) (2.42) (2.30) (2.81) (2.81) (2.67) (2.30)
PhD -0.050 -0.024 -0.128 -0.140 -0.463 -0.415 -0.057 0.036
(-0.23) (-0.09) (-0.34) (-0.38) (-1.46) (-1.62) (-0.20) (0.13)
Centrality -0.005 -0.003
(-1.54) (-1.22)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1030 1030 667 667 729 729 1030 1030
Adj. R2 0.54 0.53 0.63 0.60 0.48 0.38 0.57 0.54
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Table 4: Connections to CEO and Innovation Outputs: Dierence-in-Dierence Estimation
The table presents the estimation results of the following equation:
Innovation Outcomeit = α + β1After + β2Connected CEO + β3After × Connected CEO + Industryn + Industryi + Yeart + it
where Innovation Outcomeit is an innovation outcome of segment i in scal year t, After is a dummy variable that equals one for
the scal years after the exogenous CEO departure, Connected CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the segment lost connection
after the exogenous CEO turnover. After×Connected CEO captures the dierence in dierences eect or change in innovation outcome
for a segment that lost connection to CEO as a result of the exogenous CEO turnover. The coecient on After shows the average
changes in innovation outcome for the unaected segments. We control for the same set of control variables as in Table 2 taken at
the year prior to ling. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based
on standard errors that allow for clustering at the rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable Patents Scaled Citations Scaled High Patents Patents Scaled Citations Scaled High Patents
Patents Citations Impact Value Patents Citations Impact Value
Patents Patents
[-3,3] [-2,2]
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
After 0.226 0.146 0.321 0.352* 0.234* 0.006 0.247 0.188 0.331* 0.301 0.276** -0.107
(1.44) (1.33) (1.69) (1.97) (1.85) (0.02) (1.22) (1.35) (2.09) (1.75) (2.15) (-0.22)
Connected CEO 1.092*** 0.837*** 1.338*** 1.362*** 0.942*** 1.915*** 1.059*** 0.829*** 1.336*** 1.387*** 0.925*** 1.924***
(4.16) (3.11) (5.06) (3.53) (4.53) (3.15) (4.46) (3.40) (4.20) (3.19) (4.22) (3.02)
After x Connected CEO -0.658** -0.532*** -0.872*** -1.015** -0.695*** -1.011* -0.730*** -0.576*** -1.016*** -1.153*** -0.796*** -1.234**
(-2.74) (-4.05) (-4.79) (-2.78) (-3.48) (-1.83) (-3.20) (-4.42) (-5.45) (-3.42) (-4.03) (-2.69)
Segment Sales 0.416*** 0.356*** 0.339** 0.323* 0.363** 0.672*** 0.483*** 0.391*** 0.404** 0.407** 0.380** 0.840***
(3.24) (3.17) (2.32) (1.81) (2.59) (3.70) (3.93) (3.71) (2.72) (2.26) (2.53) (3.44)
Segment Size 1.094*** 0.801*** 0.946*** 0.993*** 0.878*** 1.215*** 1.158*** 0.839*** 1.018*** 1.104*** 0.890*** 1.421***
(5.01) (5.35) (4.55) (3.68) (4.92) (3.11) (5.89) (4.92) (4.78) (4.74) (5.20) (3.98)
Segment Rel. Size -3.586*** -2.765*** -3.169*** -2.896*** -3.056*** -3.938** -4.224*** -3.073*** -3.827*** -3.836*** -3.343*** -5.416***
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Dependent Variable Patents Scaled Citations Scaled High Patents Patents Scaled Citations Scaled High Patents
Patents Citations Impact Value Patents Citations Impact Value
Patents Patents
[-3,3] [-2,2]
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(-5.29) (-6.45) (-5.07) (-3.22) (-5.58) (-2.88) (-9.75) (-8.26) (-5.20) (-6.68) (-8.47) (-4.41)
Segment Rel Q 0.019 0.042 0.141 0.305 0.203 0.173 0.073 0.148 0.188 0.214 0.281 0.243
(0.06) (0.19) (0.49) (0.94) (0.82) (0.27) (0.18) (0.57) (0.70) (0.73) (1.16) (0.30)
Segment CapEx 1.342 -0.382 0.432 2.747 0.125 -7.337 1.662 0.319 0.595 2.758 0.554 -7.563
(0.41) (-0.20) (0.13) (0.84) (0.05) (-0.74) (0.59) (0.13) (0.15) (0.75) (0.17) (-0.92)
R&D Expenses 18.065* 15.088** 19.116** 15.656* 9.189 28.496 5.495 4.892 6.661 6.269 -2.388 16.312
(2.07) (2.41) (2.53) (1.91) (1.32) (1.66) (0.80) (1.17) (0.86) (0.99) (-0.39) (0.89)
CEO Ownership -108.0*** -84.1*** -124.5*** -89.9** -103.1*** -155.9** -114.6*** -79.7*** -131.5*** -103.8*** -98.7*** -187.5**
(-3.04) (-4.06) (-3.00) (-2.48) (-3.51) (-2.17) (-3.80) (-4.33) (-3.48) (-4.00) (-3.70) (-2.75)
ROA volatility 37.191* 30.932* 52.086** 48.425* 32.017* 55.669 14.265 16.834 25.216 26.229 13.334 17.333
(1.84) (2.05) (2.46) (2.11) (1.83) (1.68) (0.99) (1.57) (1.38) (1.49) (0.90) (0.60)
Tenure 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.007
(0.36) (0.92) (0.48) (0.72) (0.94) (0.09) (0.52) (0.98) (1.03) (0.85) (1.48) (0.21)
Senior 0.152 0.126 -0.196 0.112 0.016 0.472 0.299 0.230 0.188 0.290 0.300 0.620
(0.80) (1.05) (-1.01) (0.61) (0.09) (1.03) (1.50) (1.48) (0.54) (0.91) (1.06) (1.29)
Ivy League -0.181 -0.213 -0.502 -0.193 -0.283 -0.537 -0.360 -0.297 -0.762** -0.530** -0.447* -0.932
(-0.59) (-1.10) (-1.55) (-0.65) (-1.18) (-1.06) (-0.94) (-1.04) (-2.73) (-2.29) (-2.05) (-1.50)
PhD 0.029 0.080 0.142 -0.078 0.090 -0.042 0.229 0.194 0.280 0.160 0.203 0.502
(0.16) (0.60) (0.60) (-0.35) (0.63) (-0.10) (1.31) (1.46) (1.07) (0.88) (1.46) (1.16)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 130 130 130 130 130 130 106 106 106 106 106 106
Adj. R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.93
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Table 5: Firm Connectedness and Firm-Level Innovation
The table presents the results of regressions in rst-dierences, in which the dependent variable
is the annual change in rm-level innovation measures. All continuous variables are winsorized
at 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors that allow
for clustering at the rm level. ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable ∆Firm ∆Firm
Patents Patents Value
Model (1) (2)
∆Firm Connectedness 0.558** 0.912**
(2.23) (2.11)
∆R&D Expenses 11.229* 22.867*
(1.90) (1.82)
∆CEO Ownership -20.072*** -31.649**
(-2.94) (-2.39)
∆Number of Segments 0.098 0.330
(1.20) (1.40)
∆Firm Sales -0.127 -0.153
(-0.56) (-0.32)
∆ROA volatility 0.106 -5.216
(0.01) (-0.35)
Year FE Yes Yes
N 359 359
Adj. R2 0.09 0.08
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